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Preface
Lately, the theory of variational inequalities has taken an important role in scientific
research, in particular in Applied Mathematics because they are closely related with
many general problems arising from Nonlinear Analysis, such as optimization, fixed point
and complementarity problems. Originally, in the sixties, it represented an innovative and
effective method to solve a group of partial differential equations. The responsible of the
birth of this theory are, mainly, G. Fichera and G. Stampacchia (see [47, 62, 63, 100, 101]).
But in order to assist to the very first study of an optimization problem through a
variational approach, we had to wait the late seventies when M.J. Smith (see [98]) and S.
Dafermos (see [27]) studied the traffic network equilibrium problem in terms of a finite-
dimensional variational inequality. Consequently, this gave the start to the study of the
complex theory of existence, uniqueness and stability of equilibria and of computation of
solutions.
In the end of nineties some authors started to investigate the optimization problems by
considering also the dependence from time. Daniele, Maugeri and Oettli first investigated
the traffic network equilibrium problem with feasible path flows which have to satisfy
time-dependent capacity constraints and traffic demands in [37] and [38] (see also [48]).
In these papers an appropriate evolutionary variational inequality was formulated and
solved by means of theorems and computational procedures.
From that moment on, a lot of problems with time-dependent data were formulated
in the same terms. So, the evolutionary variational formulation gave a meaningful help
to the study of problems coming from economy (see [9, 29, 31, 34, 44, 45, 57, 77]), finance
(see [19, 30, 36]), engineering (see [79, 82]), physics (see [85]), biology (see [52]), sociology
(see [76, 81]) and other fields of applied sciences. All these problems can be handled as
generalized complementarity problems and their formulation can be expressed in a unified
way as projected dynamical systems (see [25, 50]).
In the same period the study of conditions under which the solution is continuous
represents an important achievement because the continuity of the solution plays an im-
portant role to solve numerically the dynamic network equilibrium problems. Infact,
it is possible to introduce some methods to compute dynamic equilibria by means of a
discretization procedure in order to reduce the infinite-dimensional problems to the finite-
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dimensional problems ones (see [3, 7, 9, 16]).
In this thesis we focus our attention on a particular optimization problem coming form
economy: the dynamic oligopolistic market equilibrium problem. This is the problem
of finding a trade equilibrium in a supply-demand market between a finite number of
spatially separated firms who produce one only commodity and ship it to some demand
markets.
The heart of this thesis is just the time-dependence that allows to explore the change
of behavior of equilibrium states for oligopolistic market models over a finite time inter-
val of interest. As M.J. Beckmann and J.P. Wallace pointed out, for the first time, in
[20], “the time-dependent formulation of equilibrium problems allows one to explore the
dynamics of adjustment processes in which a delay on time response is operating”. Of
course a delay on time response always happens because the processes have not an infinite
speed. Usually, such adjustment processes can be represented by means of a memory term
which depends on previous equilibrium solutions according to the Volterra operator (see,
for instance [10, 11]).
We start by giving a brief history of the mathematical models of such a problem.
The first author who treated the noncooperative behavior was Cournot (see [26]). He
investigated the competition between only two producers of a given commodity, nowa-
days called the duopoly problem. Cournot precised that if both producers try, each one
of his own, to increase his own profit, they will produce certain definite quantities of the
commodity for the market. An equilibrium will be obtained when no one can increase
his income by departing alone from his equilibrium decision, while the other retains it.
Moreover Cournot proved, under suitable assumptions, the existence, the uniqueness and
the stability of solution. As regards the stability of solution, Cournot showed that, if one
producer, temporarily mistaken about his actual self-interest, departs from the equilib-
rium, he will be driven back to it through a sequence of rational reactions of each producer
(called also player) to the decisions of the other producers.
Later Nash, (see [83, 84]), generalized this model by considering the behavior of n
agents each acting according to his own self interest, the so called non-cooperative game.
Each player i ∈ N = {1, 2, . . . , n} has at his disposal a strategy xi which he chooses from
a set Xi of feasible strategies. The Nash-equilibrium is a point x
∗ = (x∗1, x
∗
2, . . . , x
∗
n) in
the common strategy set X = X1 × X2 × . . . × Xn such that no player has a rational
motive to unilaterally depart from his equilibrium strategy. Rationality is defined here
on the basis of individual real-valued utility functions {ui : X −→ R, i = 1, 2, . . . , n, }
where ui(x) = ui(x1, x2, . . . , xn) represents the ith players evaluation of the collective
strategy x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn). The rationality postulate of noncooperative behavior can
be stated as follows: each player i ∈ N chooses a strategy xi ∈ Xi which maximizes
ii
CONTENTS
his utility level ui(x1, x2, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xn) given the decisions (xj)j 6=i of the other
players. Moreover, Nash proved the existence of the solution under the assumptions that
the sets Xi are simplexes and the functions ui are bilinear with respect to strategies.
Later, Rosen (see [92]) proved the existence in the more general case where the common
strategy set X is a nonempty, compact and convex subset of Rn and the functions ui are
concave functions on X. He also established the uniqueness and the stability of such an
equilibrium when the common strategy set X is described by a set of inequalities and the
utility functions are such that the operator −Fα : X −→ Rn defined by:
Fα =
[
α1
δu1
δx1
, α2
δu2
δx2
, . . . , αn
δun
δxn
]
,
is strictly monotone on X for given αi > 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
With Karamardian (see [58]) we assisted to a relaxation of the hypotheses on the
feasible set X for the existence of the solution. More precisely, he proved the existence
and the uniqueness of the solution by assuming X as the nonnegative orthant of Rn and
the utility functions such that the operator −F : X −→ Rn defined by:
F =
[
δu1
δx1
,
δu2
δx2
, . . . ,
δun
δxn
]
,
is continuous and strongly monotone on X (see also [59]). Such a monotonicity condition
is not necessary as Gabay and Moulin (see [49]) proved. By assuming that a coercivity
condition on the operator F is fulfilled, they guaranteed the existence of a Nash equi-
librium even if the feasible set is no longer compact. Moreover, if the opposite of the
gradient of the profit satisfies the strict monotonicity condition, as it is well known, the
uniqueness of the equilibrium is guaranteed, provided that the solution exists.
A more complete and efficient study was done by Nagurney in [28, 75, 78, 80] but the
problem was still faced in a static case through a finite-dimensional variational approach.
In order to study the time-dependent behaviour of the model, we afford this study by
considering the evolution of the market in time and, as a consequence, all the variables
present in this model, such as the costs, the commodity shipments, and the excesses
depend on time.
A time-dependent version of the oligopolistic market equilibrium problem was intro-
duced by Barbagallo and Cojocaru in [9]. Moreover, the authors proved the equivalence
between the dynamic Cournot-Nash principle and an evolutionary variational inequal-
ity that represents a particular parametric variational inequality where the parameter
is taken to represent physical time. Via the variational formulations it is possible to
give conditions under which the problem has solutions or if they are continuous with re-
spect to time. There exists a vast literature about existence and regularity results (see
[2–6, 8, 71]). The continuity allows to derive a computational procedure to numerically
iii
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approximate their solutions (see [7, 16, 103]. The discretization procedure allows to re-
duce the infinite-dimensional problem (time-dependent) into a finite-dimensional problem
where the variable time is a fixed parameter and it is possible to use the direct method
for the computation of solution (see [29, 34, 70]). Moreover, in [10], a Lipschitz continuity
result, which depends on the variation rate of projections onto time-dependent constraints
set, is shown while in [12] some sensitivity results have been obtained each of them show-
ing that small changes of the solution happen in correspondence with small changes of
the profit function.
In [12] the authors, through the notion of quasi-relative interior of sets (see [21]), ap-
plied the infinite-dimensional duality results (or Lagrange Theory) developed in [33, 35,
39, 72] to overcome the difficulty of the voidness of the interior of the ordering cone which
defines the constraints of the problem and so proved the existence of Lagrange variables
which permit to describe the behaviour of the market and to highlight the presence of
constraints. The equilibrium conditions established in terms of Lagrange variables do not
arouse any concern because it is possible to prove that their presence is not influential in
the definition of equilibrium because we can characterize such equilibrium conditions by
means of an evolutionary variational formulation that does not contain the Lagrange vari-
ables. Another thing to notice is that the equilibrium conditions provided with the help
of the duality theory, is equivalent to the dynamic Cournot-Nash equilibrium principle
because we can prove that they are both equivalent to the same evolutionary variational
inequality.
In [13, 14] the authors eliminate the serious drawback present in the theory of the
oligopolistic market equilibrium problem (see [9]) coming from the unreasonable assump-
tion that the production of a given commodity can be unbounded. This assumption can
give a false solution to the problem because it is supposed that any commodity shipment
from a firm to a demand market be always possible. Then, it is necessary to consider
a model in which the amount of a commodity, that the producers can offer, is limited
because it is reasonable to think that the resources are finite. As a consequence of this
assumption, it can happen that some of the amounts of the commodity available be sold
out, whereas for a part of the producers can occur an excess of production.
In [15] the authors consider capacity constraints, production and demand excesses.
In order to clarify the presence of these constraints we consider some concrete economic
situations: during an economic crisis period the presence of production excesses can be
due to a demand decrease in demand markets and, on the other hand, the presence of
demand excesses may occur when the supply can not satisfy the demand especially for
fundamental goods. Moreover, since the market model presented in this paper evolves
in time, the presence of both production and demand excesses is a consequence of the
fact that the physical transportation of commodity between a firm and a demand market
is evidently limited, therefore, there can exist some time intervals in which some of the
demand markets require more commodity, though some firms produce more commodity
iv
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than they can send to the demand markets.
It is also worth noting that most of the models in the literature study the problems
from a producer’s point of view in the sense that they describe the conditions for the
profit maximization of the producers. In [17, 18] a different approach has been con-
sidered: analogously to the case of the time-dependent spatial price equilibrium control
problem studied in [96], here the authors draw their attention to the policy-maker’s per-
spective who can influence the model of the problem in order to control the resource
exploitations by imposing taxes or giving subsides. In these papers the main goal is to
formulate an optimal regulatory tax and to give a characterization of the optimization
problem as an inverse variational inequality. Inverse variational inequalities can be con-
sidered as a special case of general variational inequalities introduced in [86] and can
be used to model various control problems. Only recently the strict connection between
the classical variational inequalities and inverse variational inequalities has been unveiled
but, despite everything, there exists an always increasing number of problems that can
be described through evolutionary variational inequalities. The equivalence between the
classical variational inequalities and inverse variational inequalities enables to exploit all
the powerful tools of evolutionary variational inequalities, so it is possible to treat com-
pletely this problem by studying the equilibrium solution and analyze the questions about
the existence, the regularity and the computation of solution.
In [54] the authors, for the first time, studied a general network economic equilibrium
problem with the help of an inverse static variational inequality. Later, in [104], the
power price problem is discussed in both the discrete and the evolutionary case and the
optimal price is characterized as a solution of an inverse variational inequality. Recently,
in [96] an optimal control perspective on the evolutionary time-dependent spatial price
equilibrium problem has been afforded by underlining the equivalence with an appropriate
inverse variational inequality.
Now, we conclude this introduction with a short presentation of the structure of the
thesis.
In Chapter 1, we recall the theory of variational inequalities by focusing on existence
results both in the finite and in the infinite cases and, moreover, we introduce the infinite-
dimensional duality theory that we exploit in the next chapter to emphasize the presence
of constraints and to study the behavior of the dynamic oligopolistic market equilibrium
problem. In Chapter 2, we describe the dynamic oligopolistic market equilibrium problem
by considering, as first, the model without excesses, then the model with production ex-
cesses and, in the end, the model with both production and demand excesses and capacity
constraints. For all the models we give an equilibrium definition according to dynamic
Cournot-Nash principle and we prove the equivalence with a suitable evolutionary vari-
v
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ational inequality. Moreover, by using the infinite-dimensional duality theory, we show
the equivalence between the equilibrium conditions given by Lagrange multipliers and an
evolutionary variational inequality. Since both evolutionary variational inequalities are
the same, we are able to say that the two equilibrium definitions are equivalent. The only
difference is that the former is a more practical definition in which we underline that each
firm’s aim is to maximize his own profit, and the latter is more helpful to describe the
behavior of the market since it highlights the presence of constraints. In Chapter 3 we
give some existence, regularity and sensitivity results for equilibrium solutions. For this
reason we recall some definitions of generalized continuity of functions and Kuratowski’s
set convergence. In Chapter 4 we face the problem from the policy-maker’s point of view,
namely we allow the presence of policy maker whose purpose is to control the resource
exploitations by adjusting taxes or giving subsides. A complete study is made by consid-
ering the theory of inverse evolutionary variational inequality and proving the equivalence
with an appropriate evolutionary variational inequality. In Chapter 5 we propose some
methods to solve evolutionary variational inequalities which express dynamic oligopolistic
market equilibrium problems. To this aim, we propose a discretization procedure which
reduces the infinite-dimensional problem to some finite-dimensional problems. Finally,
we construct an approximation of solution through linear interpolation. This is possible
because the equilibrium solution is continuous. To obtain numerical results, we make use
of MatLab software. In the end, we make a convergence study in L1-sense. At last, in
order to clarify the theory present in this thesis, some numerical examples are provided.
Before we go on, I would sincerely like to thank my supervisors Professor Antonino
Maugeri and Doctor Annamaria Barbagallo for their constant support and encouragement.
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Chapter 1
Variational inequalities and
Lagrange theory
1.1 A brief introduction to variational inequalities
Recently, a lot of problems coming from Economics, Engineering, Physics, Biology and
Operation Reasearch are investigated by the very powerful tool of Variational Inequal-
ities. For these problems, searching the equilibrium solutions is equivalent to find the
solution to a suitable finite or infinite dimensional variational inequality (see, for exam-
ple, [32, 51, 60, 89, 90]). Moreover, they are closely related with many general problems
of Nonlinear Analysis, such as fixed point, optimization and complementarity problems.
This is the reason why the theory and the solution methods have made considerable
advances, recently.
In the next section we present various basic concepts in optimization and variational
analysis and recall their properties.
1.1.1 Preliminary concepts
Let X be a real topological vector space, let K be a subset of X and let X∗ be the
topological dual space of X.
Definition 1.1.1. A mapping A : K → R ∪ {±∞} is upper semicontinuous if for all
v ∈ K,
lim sup
u→v
Au ≤ Av.
Definition 1.1.2. A mapping A : K → R ∪ {±∞} is lower semicontinuous if for all
v ∈ K,
lim inf
u→v
Au ≥ Av.
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Definition 1.1.3. A mapping A : K→ X∗ is monotone on K if for all u, v ∈ K,
〈Au− Av, u− v〉 ≥ 0.
Definition 1.1.4. A mapping A : K→ X∗ is strictly monotone on K if for all u, v ∈ K,
〈Au− Av, u− v〉 > 0.
Definition 1.1.5. A mapping A : K → X∗ is strongly monotone on K if for all u, v ∈
K, ∃ν > 0 such that
〈Au− Av, u− v〉 ≥ ν ‖u− v‖2
K
.
Definition 1.1.6. A mapping A : K→ X∗ is pseudomonotone if for all u, v ∈ K
〈Au, u− v〉 ≥ 0⇒ 〈Av, u− v〉 ≤ 0.
Definition 1.1.7. A mapping A : K→ X∗ is pseudomonotone in the sense of Karamar-
dian (K-pseudomonotone) if for all u, v ∈ K
〈Av, u− v〉 ≥ 0⇒ 〈Au, u− v〉 ≥ 0.
Definition 1.1.8. A mapping A : K→ X∗ is strictly pseudomonotone if for all u, v ∈ K,
u 6= v
〈Av, u− v〉 ≥ 0⇒ 〈Au, u− v〉 > 0.
Definition 1.1.9. A mapping A : K → X∗ is pseudomonotone in the sense of Brezis
(B-pseudomonotone) if
1. For each sequence un weakly converging to u (in short un ⇀ u) in K and such that
lim supn 〈Aun, un − v〉 ≤ 0 it results that lim infn 〈Aun, un − v〉 ≥ 〈Au, u− v〉 ∀v ∈
K.
2. For each v ∈ K the function u → 〈Au, u− v〉 is lower bounded on the bounded
subset of K.
Let, now, K be a convex subset of X.
Definition 1.1.10. A mapping A : K → X∗ is hemicontinuous if for all v ∈ K the
function u→ 〈Au, v − u〉 is upper semicontinuous on K.
Definition 1.1.11. A mapping A : K → X∗ is hemicontinuous along line segments, if
the function ξ → 〈Aξ, u− v〉 is upper semicontinuous for all u, v ∈ K on the line segments
[u, v] .
Definition 1.1.12. A mapping A : K→ X∗ is lower hemicontinuous along line segments,
if the function ξ → 〈Aξ, u− v〉 is lower semicontinuous for all u, v ∈ K on the line segments
[u, v] .
Definition 1.1.13. A mapping A : K → X∗ is hemicontinuous in the sense of Fan
(F-hemicontinuous) if for all v ∈ K the function u → 〈Au, u− v〉 is weakly lower semi-
continuous on K.
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1.1.2 Finite and infinite dimensional variational inequalities
Now, we introduce finite and infinite dimensional variational inequalities and we recall
some existence results.
Definition 1.1.14. Let K be a nonempty, convex and closed set of the m-dimensional
Euclidean space Rm and let A : K → Rm be a vector-function. The finite dimensional
variational inequality is the problem to find a vector x∗ ∈ K such that
〈A(x∗), x− x∗〉 ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ K. (1.1.1)
Here we make a list of some classical conditions showed by Stampacchia for existence
of solutions to variational inequality (1.1.1).
Theorem 1.1.1. [53] If K is a nonempty, convex and compact subset of Rm and A : K→
R
m is a continuous operator, then the variational inequality (1.1.1) admits at least one
solution.
Theorem 1.1.2. [63] If K is a nonempty, convex and compact subset of Rm and A : K→
R
m is a continuous operator, then the the set of solutions to the variational inequality
(1.1.1) is convex and compact.
Theorem 1.1.3. [66] If A : K → Rm is strictly monotone on K, then the solution to
variational inequality (1.1.1) admits a unique solution if it exists.
Whenever the set K is unbounded, the existence of solutions may also be established
under the coercivity condition, as shows the following results.
Theorem 1.1.4. [60] If A : K→ Rm satisfies the coercivity condition
lim
‖x‖
Rm→+∞
〈A(x)− A(x′), x− x′〉
‖x− x′‖
Rm
= +∞ (1.1.2)
for x ∈ K and some x′ ∈ K, then the variational inequality (1.1.1) admits a solution.1
Let X be a real topological vector space, let K be a subset of X and let X∗ be the
topological dual space of X.
Definition 1.1.15. Let K be a nonempty, convex and closed set of X and let A : K→ X∗
be a vector-function. The infinite dimensional variational inequality is the problem to find
a vector x∗ ∈ K such that
〈A(x∗), x− x∗〉 ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ K. (1.1.3)
1The symbol ‖.‖
Rm
denotes the norm in Rm, for all m > 1.
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Here we make a list of some general conditions for existence of solutions to variational
inequality (1.1.3).
Let X be a reflexive Banach space and let K ⊆ X be a convex and closed set. Let us
denote by ‖.‖ the norm in X. Let BR be the closed ball with center in O and radius R
and let us consider the closed and convex set KR = K ∩ BR. If R is large enough, then
KR is nonempty. We have the following result.
Theorem 1.1.5. [101] Let A : K → X∗ be a monotone and hemicontinuous along line
segments function, then the variational inequality (1.1.3) admits a solution if and only if
there exists a constant R such that at least one solution of the variational inequality
x∗R ∈ KR : 〈A(x∗R), x− x∗R〉 ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ KR. (1.1.4)
satisfies the condition
‖xR‖ < R. (1.1.5)
Remark 1.1.1. If the set K is unbounded, then the following conditions for the existence
of solutions are provided:
1. let us suppose that ∃x0 ∈ K and R > ‖x0‖ such that
〈A(x0), x− x0〉 < 0
∀x ∈ K, ‖x‖ = R, then (1.1.5) is verified.
2. let us suppose that ∃x0 such that C satisfies the coercivity condition (1.1.2), then
(1.1.4) holds.
3. let us suppose that C satisfies the weak coercivity requirement:
lim
‖x‖→+∞
〈A(x), x〉
‖x‖ = +∞ (1.1.6)
∀x ∈ K, then (1.1.5) is verified.
Theorem 1.1.6. [87] Let X be a real topological vector space and let K ⊆ X be a nonempty
convex set. Let A : K→ X∗ be a given function such that:
i. there exist A ⊆ K nonempty, compact and B ⊆ K nonempty, compact, convex such
that for every x ∈ K \ A, there exists xˆ ∈ B with
〈A(x), xˆ− x〉 < 0;
ii. A is pseudomonotone and hemicontinuous along line segments.
Then, the variational inequality (1.1.3) admits a solution.
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Theorem 1.1.7. [87] Let X be a real topological vector space and let K ⊆ X be a nonempty
convex set. Let A : K→ X∗ be a given function such that:
i. there exist A ⊆ K nonempty, compact and B ⊆ K nonempty, compact, convex such
that for every x ∈ K \ A, there exists xˆ ∈ B with
〈A(x), xˆ− x〉 < 0;
ii. A is hemicontinuous.
Then, the variational inequality (1.1.3) admits a solution.
1.2 A brief recall to Lagrange theory
1.2.1 Motivation
In the last two sections we recall the Infinite-Dimensional duality theory, namely the
problem to know conditions under which an optimization problem with cone constraints
and equality constraints and its dual lagrangean problem have the same extremal points.
The same problem can be seen as the problem to know the conditions under which it is
possible to guarantee the existence of Lagrange multipliers associated to the constraints.
This is called ”strong duality problem”. Well known results (see [56]) ensure such an
existence by assuming that the topological interior of the ordering cone that defines the
constraints is non empty. However, when the problem is infinite-dimensional, we can not
apply such results since the topological interior of the ordering cones is empty.
So, it was necessary to develop a new theory that could guarantee the effectiveness of
strong duality without the request that the topological interior of the ordering cone is
nonempty. Such a theory has been developed in the last decade (see, for example [21,
33, 35, 39, 55, 72, 106]). To overcome this difficulty, we do not consider the topological
interior, but we define an algebraic interior of sets through the notion of tangent cone
and normal cone, called quasi relative interior (q.r.i in short). We can observe that in all
infinite-dimensional problems that we consider, the quasi relative interior of the ordering
cone is nonempty even if the topological interior is empty.
The most important assumption to ensure the strong duality is the so called Assumption
S that we show throughout the chapter.
These results have gone beyond expectations because we have found that such conditions
are also necessary conditions for the validity of strong duality (see [43]).
1.2.2 Lagrange theory
Let us present the infinite dimensional Lagrange duality theory which represents an im-
portant and very recent achievement (see [33, 35, 39]). At first, we remind some definitions
and then we give some duality results (see [33, 39, 72]).
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Let X denote a real normed space, let X∗ be the topological dual of all continuous
linear functionals on X and let C be a subset of X. Given an element x ∈ Cl(C), the set:
TC(x) =
{
h ∈ X : h = lim
n→∞
λn(xn − x), λn > 0, xn ∈ C, ∀n ∈ N, lim
n→∞
xn = x
}
is called the tangent cone to C at x.
If C is convex, we have (see [56]):
TC(x) = Cl(Cone(C − {x})),
where Cone(C) = {λx : x ∈ C, λ ≥ 0}.
Following Borwein and Lewis [21], we give the following definition of quasi-relative
interior for a convex set.
Definition 1.2.1. Let C be a convex subset of X. The quasi-relative interior of C,
denoted by qri C, is the set of those x ∈ C for which TC(x) is a linear subspace of X.
If we define the normal cone to C at x as the set:
NC(x) = {ξ ∈ X∗ : 〈ξ, y − x〉 ≤ 0, ∀y ∈ C},
the following result holds:
Proposition 1.2.1. Let C be a convex subset of X and x ∈ C. Then x ∈ qri C if and
only if NC(x) is a linear subspace of X
∗.
Using the notion of qri C, in [39], the following separation theorem is proved.
Theorem 1.2.1. Let C be a convex subset of X and x0 ∈ C \ qri C. Then, there exists
ξ ∈ X∗, ξ 6= θX∗ , such that
〈ξ, x〉 ≤ 〈ξ, x0〉, ∀x ∈ C.
Vice versa, let us suppose that there exist ξ 6= θX∗ and a point x0 ∈ X such that 〈ξ, x〉 ≤
〈ξ, x0〉, ∀x ∈ C, and that Cl(TC(x0)− TC(x0)) = X. Then, x0 /∈ qri C.
Now, let us present the statement of the infinite dimensional duality theory.
Let X be a real linear topological space and S a nonempty convex subset of X; let
(Y, ‖ · ‖Y ) be a real normed space partially ordered by a convex cone C and let (Z, ‖ · ‖Z)
be a real normed space. Let f : S → R and g : S → Y be two convex functions and let
h : S → Z be an affine-linear function.
Let us consider the problem
min
x∈K
f(x), (1.2.1)
where K = {x ∈ S : g(x) ∈ −C, h(x) = θZ}, and the dual problem
max
u∈C∗
v∈Z∗
inf
x∈S
{f(x) + 〈u, g(x)〉+ 〈v, h(x)〉}, (1.2.2)
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where C∗ = {u ∈ Y ∗ : 〈u, y〉 ≥ 0 ∀y ∈ C} is the dual cone of C.
We say that Assumption S is fulfilled at a point x0 ∈ K if and only if it results
T
M˜
(0, θY , θZ) ∩
(
]−∞, 0[×{θY } × {θZ}
)
= ∅, (1.2.3)
where M˜ = {(f(x)− f(x0) + α, g(x) + y, h(x)) : x ∈ S \K, α ≥ 0, y ∈ C}.
Remark 1.2.1. If (0, θY , θZ) 6∈ Cl(M˜), then Assumption S holds, because TM˜(0, θY , θZ) =
∅.
Remark 1.2.2. If Assumption S holds, T
M˜
(0, θY , θZ) 6= ∅ and (l, θY , θZ) ∈ TM˜(0, θY , θZ),
then l ≥ 0.
Remark 1.2.3. If Assumption S holds, then (0, θY , θZ) 6∈ qri M˜ .
The following theorem holds (see [33]):
Theorem 1.2.2. Under the above assumptions, if problem (1.2.1) is solvable and Assump-
tion S is fulfilled at the extremal solution x0 ∈ K, then also problem (1.2.2) is solvable, the
extreme values of both problems are equal and if (x0, u, v) ∈ K × C∗ × Z∗ is the optimal
point of problem (1.2.2), it results:
〈u, g(x0)〉 = 0.
Using Theorem 1.2.2, we are able to show the usual relationship between a saddle
point of the so-called Lagrange functional
L(x, u, v) = f(x) + 〈u, g(x)〉+ 〈v, h(x)〉, ∀x ∈ S, ∀u ∈ C∗, ∀v ∈ Z∗, (1.2.4)
and the solution of the constraint optimization problem (1.2.1) (see [33]).
Theorem 1.2.3. Let us assume that the assumptions of Theorem 1.2.2 are satisfied.
Then, x0 ∈ K is a minimal solution to problem (1.2.1) if and only if there exist u ∈ C∗
and v ∈ Z∗ such that (x0, u, v) is a saddle point of the Lagrange functional (1.2.4), namely
L(x0, u, v) ≤ L(x0, u, v) ≤ L(x, u, v), ∀x ∈ S, u ∈ C∗, v ∈ Z∗
and, moreover, it results that
〈u, g(x0)〉 = 0. (1.2.5)
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Chapter 2
The dynamic oligopolistic market
equilibrium problem
2.1 Historical development
The dynamic oligopolistic market equilibrium problem is the problem of finding a trade
equilibrium in a time-dependent supply-demand market between a finite number of spa-
tially separated firms who produce one only commodity and ship the commodity to some
demand markets.
We seek to determine a non-negative commodity distribution for which the firms and the
demand markets will be in a state of equilibrium as defined next.
The equilibrium principle we consider here comes from Cournot and Nash’s consideration,
infact it will be called the dynamic Cournot-Nash principle (see [26, 83, 84]) and regards
the maximization of the firms’ profits. Corunot and Nash were the first authors who de-
scribed the model: Cournot investigated the problem by considering only two competitive
firms, while Nash extended the concept by considering n firms.
Cournot precised that if both producers try, each one of his own, to increase his own
profit, they will produce certain definite quantities of the commodity for the market and
an equilibrium will be obtained when no one can increase his income by departing alone
from his equilibrium decision.
Nash, moreover, stated that the equilibrium point is a strategy such that no player has a
rational motive to unilaterally depart from it. Each firm chooses a strategy which maxi-
mizes his utility level given the decisions of the other firms.
As regards the stability of solution, Cournot showed that, if one producer, temporarily
mistaken about his actual self-interest, departs from the equilibrium, he will be driven
back to it through a sequence of rational reactions of each producer to the others deci-
sions, called also players. As regards the existence of the solution we can refer to Nash
himself, Rosen, Karamardian, Gabay and Moulin (see [49, 58, 59, 92]).
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The introduction of time in all the variables present in the model was well motivated
by M.J. Beckmann and J.P. Wallace who pointed out, for the first time, in [20], ”the
time-dependent formulation of equilibrium problems allows one to explore the dynamics
of adjustment processes in which a delay on time response is operating”.
In [9] a time-dependent version of the oligopolistic market equilibrium was introduced
for the first time. Here the authors proved the equivalence between the dynamic Cournot-
Nash principle and an evolutionary variational inequality.
Another thing to notice is that in this paper we assume that the quantity produced by
each firm is equal to the commodity shipments from that firm to all the demand markets.
Moreover, the quantity demanded by each demand market is equal to the commodity
shipments from all the firms to that demand market. Namely, in this paper, no produc-
tion or demand excess is allowed.
In this thesis we consider another different, but equivalent, definition of equilibrium that
illustrates other important features of the equilibrium. Through the infinite-dimensional
duality results (or Lagrange Theory) recalled in section 1.2 we prove the existence of La-
grange variables which permit to describe the behaviour of the market and to highlight
the presence of constraints. Moreover, it is possible to prove that the equilibrium con-
ditions established in terms of Lagrange variables is equivalent to the same evolutionary
variational inequality coming from the Cournot-Nash principle and it does not contain
the Lagrange variables. In [12] the authors, for the first time, analyzed such equilibrium
conditions.
Lately, in [14, 15] we assist to an improvement of the model because here the feasible
sets allow the presence of production and demand excesses. This can be consequence
of problems coming from economic crisis periods, presence of fundamental goods and
physical transportation.
2.2 The case with no excesses
In this section, we study the dynamic oligopolistic market equilibrium problem where all
the production is shipped to the demand markets and the demand is fully satisfied.
Let us consider m firms Pi, i = 1, . . . ,m, that produce one only commodity and n
demand markets Qj, j = 1, . . . , n, that are generally spatially separated. Assume that
the homogeneous commodity, produced by the m firms and consumed by the n markets,
is involved during a time interval [0, T ], T > 0. Let pi(t), i = 1, . . . ,m, denote the
non-negative commodity output produced by firm Pi at the time t ∈ [0, T ]. Let qj(t),
j = 1, . . . , n, denote the non-negative demand for the commodity at demand market Qj
10
CHAPTER 2. THE DYNAMIC OLIGOPOLISTIC MARKET
EQUILIBRIUM PROBLEM
at the time t ∈ [0, T ]. Let xij(t), i = 1, . . . ,m, j = 1, . . . , n, denote the non-negative
commodity shipment between the supply market Pi and the demand market Qj at the
time t ∈ [0, T ] . In particular, let us set the vector xi(t) = (xi1(t), . . . , xin(t)), i = 1, . . . ,m,
t ∈ [0, T ] as the strategy vector for the firm Pi.
Let us group the production output into a vector-function p : [0, T ] −→ Rm+ , the
demand output into a vector-function q : [0, T ] −→ Rn+ and the commodity shipments
into a matrix-function x : [0, T ] −→ Rmn+ .
Let us assume that the following feasibility conditions hold:
pi(t) =
n∑
j=1
xij(t), i = 1, . . . ,m, a.e. in [0, T ] , (2.2.1)
qj(t) =
m∑
i=1
xij(t), j = 1, . . . , n, a.e. in [0, T ] . (2.2.2)
Hence, the quantity produced by each firm Pi, at the time t ∈ [0, T ], must be equal to
the commodity shipments from that firm to all the demand markets, at the same time
t ∈ [0, T ]. Moreover, the quantity demanded by each demand market Qj, at the time
t ∈ [0, T ], must be equal to the commodity shipments from all the firms to that demand
market, at the same time t ∈ [0, T ] .
Furthermore, we assume that the non-negative commodity shipment between the pro-
ducer Pi and the demand market Qj has to satisfy time-dependent constraints, namely
there exist two non-negative functions x, x : [0, T ] −→ Rmn+ such that
0 ≤ xij(t) ≤ xij(t) ≤ xij(t), ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, ∀j = 1, . . . , n, a.e. in [0, T ] . (2.2.3)
For technical reasons, let us assume that
x ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rmn+ ), x ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rmn+ ), x ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rmn+ ).
As a consequence, we have
p ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rm+ ), q ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rn+).
Then, the set of feasible vectors x ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rmn+ ) is
K =
{
x ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rmn+ ) : xij(t) ≤ xij(t) ≤ xij(t),
∀i = 1, . . . ,m, ∀j = 1, . . . , n, a.e. in [0, T ]
}
. (2.2.4)
This set is convex, closed and bounded in the Hilbert space L2([0, T ] ,Rmn+ ).
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Furthermore, let us associate with each firm Pi a production cost fi, i = 1, . . . ,m,
and assume that the production cost of a firm Pi may depend upon the entire production
pattern, namely,
fi = fi(t, x(t)).
Similarly, let us associate with each demand market Qj, a demand price for unity of the
commodity dj, j = 1, . . . , n, and assume that the demand price of a demand market Qj
may depend upon the entire consumption pattern, namely,
dj = dj(t, x(t)).
Moreover, since we allow production excesses and, consequently, the storage of commodity,
we must consider the function gi, i = 1, . . . ,m, that denotes the storage cost of the
commodity produced by the firm Pi and assume that this cost may depend upon the
entire production pattern, namely,
gi = gi(t, x(t)).
Finally, let cij, i = 1, . . . ,m, j = 1, . . . , n, denote the transaction cost, which includes the
transportation cost associated with trading the commodity between firm Pi and demand
market Qj. Here we permit the transaction cost to depend upon the entire shipment
pattern, namely,
cij(t) = cij(t, x(t)), (2.2.5)
Hence, we have the following mappings,
f : [0, T ]× L2([0, T ] ,Rmn+ ) −→ L2([0, T ] ,Rm+ ),
d : [0, T ]× L2([0, T ] ,Rmn+ ) −→ L2([0, T ] ,Rn+),
g : [0, T ]× L2([0, T ] ,Rmn+ ) −→ L2([0, T ] ,Rm+ ),
c : [0, T ]× L2([0, T ] ,Rmn+ ) −→ L2([0, T ] ,Rmn+ ).
The profit vi(t, x(t)), i = 1, . . . ,m, of the firm Pi at the time t ∈ [0, T ] is, then,
vi(t, x(t)) =
n∑
j=1
dj(t, x(t))xij(t)− fi(t, x(t))− gi(t, x(t))−
n∑
j=1
cij(t, x(t))xij(t),
namely, it is equal to the price that the demand markets are disposed to pay minus the
production costs, the storage costs and the transportation costs.
Moreover, we recall that in the Hilbert space L2([0, T ] ,Rk), we define the canonical bi-
linear form on L2([0, T ] ,Rk)∗ × L2([0, T ] ,Rk), by
〈〈φ,w〉〉 :=
∫ T
0
〈φ(t),w(t)〉 dt,
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where φ ∈ (L2([0, T ] ,Rk))∗ = L2([0, T ] ,Rk), w ∈ L2([0,T] ,Rk) and
〈φ(t),w(t)〉 =
k∑
l=1
φl(t)wl(t).
Let us denote by ∇Dv =
(
∂vi
∂xij
)
i = 1, . . . ,m
j = 1, . . . , n
and xi = {xij}j=1,...,n, i = 1, . . . ,m.
Let us assume the following assumptions:
(i) vi(t, x(t)) is continuously differentiable for each i = 1, . . . ,m, a.e. in [0, T ],
(ii) ∇Dv is a Carathe´odory function such that
∃h ∈ L2([0, T ]) : ‖∇Dv(t, x(t))‖mn ≤ h(t) ‖x(t)‖mn , a.e. in [0, T ] , (2.2.6)
(iii) vi(t, x(t)) is pseudoconcave with respect to the variables xi, i = 1, . . . ,m, a.e. in
[0, T ] .
For the reader’s convenience, we recall that a function v, continuously differentiable, is
called pseudoconcave with respect to xi, i = 1, . . . ,m, a.e. in [0, T ] (see [67]), if the
following condition holds, a.e. in [0, T ]:〈
∂v
∂xi
(t, x1, . . . , xi, . . . , xm), xi − yi
〉
≥ 0
⇒ vi(t, x1, . . . , xi, . . . , xm) ≥ vi(t, x1, . . . , yi, . . . , xm).
2.2.1 The variational formulation
Now let us consider the dynamic oligopolistic market, in which the m firms supply the
commodity in a noncooperative fashion, each one trying to maximize its own profit func-
tion considered the optimal distribution pattern for the other firms, at the time t ∈ [0, T ].
We seek to determine a non-negative commodity distribution matrix-function x for which
the m firms and the n demand markets will be in a state of equilibrium as defined below.
Definition 2.2.1. x∗ ∈ K is a dynamic oligopolistic market equilibrium if and only if for
each i = 1, . . . ,m and a.e. in [0, T ] we have
vi(t, x
∗(t)) ≥ vi(t, xi(t), xˆ∗i (t)), (2.2.7)
where
xˆ∗i (t) = (x
∗
1(t), . . . , x
∗
i−1(t), x
∗
i+1(t), . . . , x
∗
m(t)).
It is possible to prove (see [9]) that under the assumptions (i), (ii), (iii) on vi, Definition
2.2.1 is equivalent to an evolutionary variational inequality, namely:
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Theorem 2.2.1. Let us suppose that assumptions (i), (ii), (iii) are satisfied. Then, x∗ ∈ K
is a dynamic oligopolistic market equilibrium in presence of excesses according to Defini-
tion 2.2.1 if and only if it satisfies the evolutionary variational inequality∫ T
0
−
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
(xij(t)− x∗ij(t))dt ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ K. (2.2.8)
Proof. For first, let us prove that the evolutionary variational inequality (2.2.8)∫ T
0
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
(xij(t)− x∗ij(t))dt = 〈〈−∇Dv(x∗), x− x∗〉〉
=
∫ T
0
〈−∇Dv(t, x∗(t)), x(t)− x∗(t)〉 ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ K,
is equivalent to the following point-to-point formulation:
〈−∇Dv(t, x∗(t)), x(t)− x∗(t)〉 =
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
(xij(t)− x∗ij(t)) ≥ 0
∀x(t) ∈ K(t), a.e. in [0, T ], (2.2.9)
where
K(t) =
{
x(t) ∈ Rmn : xij(t) ≤ xij(t) ≤ xij(t), ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, ∀j = 1, . . . , n
}
.
In fact, let us suppose by absurdum that (2.2.9) does not hold,
namely ∃x¯(t) ∈ K, ∃I ⊆ [0, T ] with m(I) > 0 such that
〈−∇Dv(t, x∗(t)), x¯(t)− x∗(t)〉 < 0 a.e. in I.
Let us choose, now,
x(t) =
{
x∗(t) in [0,T] \ I ,
x¯(t) in I
So, by integrating over [0, T ] , we get:
〈〈−∇Dv(t, x∗(t)), x− x∗〉〉 =
∫
[0,T ]\I
〈−∇Dv(t, x∗(t)), x(t)− x∗(t)〉 dt
+
∫
I
〈−∇Dv(t, x∗(t)), x¯(t)− x∗(t)〉 dt < 0.
This is an absurdum.
The vice versa is immediate.
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So the equivalence between the evolutionary variational inequalities (2.2.8) and (2.2.9) is
proved.
Let us prove, now, the equivalence between the Cournot-Nash principle and the evo-
lutionary variational inequality (2.2.8).
Let us suppose that x∗ ∈ K is an equilibrium point according to definition 2.2.1, namely:
vi(t, x
∗(t)) ≥ vi(t, x(t), xˆ∗(t)) ∀x(t) ∈ K(t), a.e. in [0, T ], ∀i = 1, . . . ,m. (2.2.10)
For well know theorems of Optimization, we have that the necessary and sufficient con-
dition to get (2.2.10) is that ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, ∀x(t) ∈ K(t), a.e. in [0, T ]
〈−∇Dvi(t, x∗(t)), xi(t)− x∗i (t)〉 =
n∑
j=1
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
(xij(t)− x∗ij(t)) ≥ 0. (2.2.11)
By assumption ∇vi is a Carathe´odory function such that
∃h ∈ L2([0, T ]) : ‖∇Dvi(t, x(t))‖mn ≤ h(t) ‖x(t)‖mn a.e. in [0, T ],
and, moreover x and x∗ ∈ L2([0, T ],Rmn),
so we have that
t −→ 〈−∇Dvi(t, x∗(t)), xi(t)− x∗i (t)〉 ∈ L2([0, T ],R).
So, we get
〈〈−∇Dvi(t, x∗(t)), xi − x∗i 〉〉 ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ K,
from who, by summing for each firm Pi, for i = 1, . . . ,m, we obtain
m∑
i=1
〈〈−∇Dvi(t, x∗(t)), x− x∗〉〉 = 〈〈−∇Dv(t, x∗(t)), xi − x∗i 〉〉 ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ K.
Vice versa, let us suppose that x∗(t) is a solution to the evolutionary variational
inequality (2.2.8), but not an equilibrium solution according to Cournot-Nash principle,
namely:
∃I ⊆ [0, T ] with m(I) > 0, ∃i¯ ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and ∃x˜i¯ such that
vi¯(t, x
∗(t)) < vi¯(t, x˜i(t), xˆ
∗(t)) in I
Since the profit function vi¯(t, x(t)) is pseudoconcave with respect to xi, we get:
〈−∇Dvi¯(t, x∗(t)), x∗i¯ (t)− x˜i¯(t)〉 < 0 in I. (2.2.12)
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If we choose x ∈ K such that
xi(t) =

x∗i (t) in [0,T] \ I ,∀i = 1, . . . ,m,
x∗i (t) in I , if i 6= i,
x˜i in I , if i = i
,
then∫ T
0
〈−∇Dv(t, x∗(t)), x(t)− x∗(t)〉 dt =
∫
I
〈−∇Dvi¯(t, x∗(t)), x˜i¯(t)− x∗i¯ (t)〉 dt < 0,
so we get the contradiction.
2.2.2 The Lagrangean formulation
In this section we prove that, under the assumptions (i), (ii), (iii) on the profit function
v, Definition 2.2.1 is equivalent to the equilibrium conditions defined through Lagrange
variables which are very useful in order to analyze the constraints of K:
Definition 2.2.2. x∗ ∈ K is a dynamic oligopolistic market equilibrium if and only if for
each i = 1, . . . ,m and a.e. in [0, T ] there exist α∗ij ∈ L2([0, T ]), β∗ij ∈ L2([0, T ]) such that
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
+ β∗ij(t) = α
∗
ij(t), (2.2.13)
α∗ij(t)(xij(t)− x∗ij(t)) = 0, α∗ij(t) ≥ 0, (2.2.14)
β∗ij(t)(x
∗
ij(t)− xij(t)) = 0, β∗ij(t) ≥ 0. (2.2.15)
Conditions (2.2.13)-(2.2.15) give the optimal distribution pattern for the firm Pi. The
terms α∗ij(t), β
∗
ij(t) are the Lagrange multipliers associated to the constraints x
∗
ij(t) ≥
xij(t), x
∗
ij(t) ≤ xij(t), respectively. They, as it is well known, have a topical importance
on the understanding and the management of the market. In fact, at a fixed time t ∈ [0, T ],
we have:
(a) if α∗ij(t) > 0 then, by using (2.2.14), we obtain x
∗
ij(t) = xij(t), namely the commodity
shipment between the firm Pi and the demand market Qj is minimum;
(b) if x∗ij(t) > xij(t) then, taking into account (2.2.14), α
∗
ij(t) = 0 and, making use of
(2.2.13), it results β∗ij(t) =
∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
, namely β∗ij(t) is equal to the marginal utility
function;
(c) if β∗ij(t) > 0 then, by using (2.2.15), we obtain x
∗
ij(t) = xij(t), namely the commodity
shipment between the firm Pi and the demand market Qj is maximum;
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(d) if x∗ij(t) < xij(t) then, making use of (2.2.15), β
∗
ij(t) = 0 and, taking into account
(2.2.13), we get α∗ij(t) = −
∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
, namely α∗ij(t) is equal to the opposite of the
marginal utility function.
It is worth to underline that in Definition 2.2.2, even if in (2.2.13) - (2.2.15) the unknown
Lagrange variables α∗ij , β
∗
ij appear, they do not influence the equilibrium definition because
the following equivalent condition in terms of evolutionary variational inequality holds (see
[12]):
Theorem 2.2.2. x∗ ∈ K is a dynamic oligopolistic market equilibrium according to Def-
inition 2.2.2 if and only if it satisfies the evolutionary variational inequality:
∫ T
0
−
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
(xij(t)− x∗ij(t))dt ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ K. (2.2.16)
Definitions 2.3.1 and 2.2.2 describe the equilibrium by means of dynamic Cournot-Nash
principle and Lagrange multipliers, respectively, whereas the variational formulation gives
a powerful tool for the study of the existence, the regularity and the calculus of equilibrium
solutions.
Before proving this theorem, we need a preliminary lemma.
Lemma 2.2.1. Let x∗ ∈ K be a solution to the variational inequality (2.2.8) and let us
set,
E−ij =
{
t ∈ [0, T ] : x∗ij(t) = xij(t)
}
, ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, ∀j = 1, . . . , n,
E0ij =
{
t ∈ [0, T ] : xij(t) < x∗ij(t) < xij(t)
}
, ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, ∀j = 1, . . . , n,
E+ij =
{
t ∈ [0, T ] : x∗ij(t) = xij(t)
}
, ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, ∀j = 1, . . . , n.
Then, we have
∂vi(t, x(t))
∂xij
≤ 0, a.e. in E−ij ,
∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
= 0, a.e. in E0ij ,
∂vi(t, x(t))
∂xij
≥ 0, a.e. in E+ij .
17
CHAPTER 2. THE DYNAMIC OLIGOPOLISTIC MARKET
EQUILIBRIUM PROBLEM
Proof. Le us observe that we have∫ T
0
−
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
(xij(t)− x∗ij(t))dt =∫
E−ij
−
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
(xij(t)− xij(t))dt
+
∫
E0ij
−
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
(xij(t)− x∗ij(t))dt
+
∫
E+ij
−
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
(xij(t)− xij(t))dt ≥ 0.
∀x ∈ K.
If we choose x ∈ K such that xlr(t) = x∗lr(t) for l 6= i and r 6= j, we have ∀xij(t) ≤ xij(t) ≤
xij(t), ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, ∀j = 1, . . . , n,
∫ T
0
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
(xij(t)− x∗ij(t))dt =∫
E−ij
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
(xij(t)− xij(t))dt
+
∫
E0ij
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
(xij(t)− x∗ij(t))dt
+
∫
E+ij
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
(xij(t)− xij(t))dt ≥ 0. (2.2.17)
If we choose x ∈ K such that
xij(t)

> xij(t) inE
−
ij ,
= x∗ij(t) inE
0
ij ,
= x∗ij(t) inE
+
ij
,
then, (2.2.17) becomes
∫ T
0
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
(xij(t)− x∗ij(t))dt =
∫
E−ij
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
(xij(t)− xij(t))dt ≥ 0.
(2.2.18)
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Since xij(t) > xij(t), we get that
∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
≤ 0. In fact if there exists a subset F of E−ij
with m(F ) > 0 such that
∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
> 0 in F, choosing
xij(t)
{
= xij(t) inE
−
ij \ F ,
> xij(t) inF
,
we get∫ T
0
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
(xij(t)− x∗ij(t))dt =
∫
F
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
(xij(t)− xij(t))dt < 0
in contradiction with (2.2.18).
Hence,
∂vi(t, x(t))
∂xij
≤ 0, a.e. in E−ij .
If we choose x ∈ K such that
xij(t)

= x∗ij(t)) inE
−
ij ,
= x∗ij(t) inE
0
ij ,
< xij(t) inE
+
ij
,
then, (2.2.17) becomes
∫ T
0
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
(xij(t)− x∗ij(t))dt =
∫
E+ij
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
(xij(t)− xij(t))dt ≥ 0.
(2.2.19)
Since xij(t) < xij(t), we get that
∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
≥ 0. In fact if there exists a subset F of E−ij
with m(F ) > 0 such that
∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
< 0 in F, choosing
xij(t)
{
= xij(t) inE
−
ij \ F ,
< xij(t) inF
,
we get∫ T
0
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
(xij(t)− x∗ij(t))dt =
∫
F
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
(xij(t)− xij(t))dt < 0
in contradiction with (2.2.19).
Hence,
∂vi(t, x(t))
∂xij
≥ 0, a.e. in E+ij .
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In E0ij, by using the same technique as in the previous cases, it can be easily proved
that
∂vi(t, x(t))
∂xij
cannot be either negative or positive on any set with positive measure.
Hence,
∂vi(t, x(t))
∂xij
= 0, a.e. in E0ij.
Let us prove, now, Theorem 2.2.2.
Proof. Let us assume that x∗ ∈ K is an equilibrium solution according to Definition 2.2.2.
Then, taking into account that α∗ij(t)(xij(t) − x∗ij(t)) = 0 and β∗ij(t)(x∗ij(t) − xij(t)) = 0,
a.e. in [0, T ], we have for every x ∈ K, a.e. in [0, T ],
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
(xij(t)− x∗ij(t)) = −β∗ij(t)(xij(t)− x∗ij(t)) + α∗ij(t)(xij(t)− x∗ij(t))
= −β∗ij(t)(xij(t)− xij(t)) + α∗ij(t)(xij(t)− xij(t)) ≥ 0,
and, as a consequence, by summing over i = 1, . . . ,m and j = 1, . . . , n, integrating on
[0, T ], it results, for each x ∈ K,∫ T
0
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
(xij(t)− x∗ij(t))dt ≥ 0.
Hence, we obtain (2.2.8).
Vice versa, let x∗ ∈ K be a solution to (2.2.8) and let us apply the infinite dimensional
duality theory. First of all, let us prove that the Assumption S is fulfilled.
Let us set, for x ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rmn),
Ψ(x) =
∫ T
0
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
(xij(t)− x∗ij(t))dt
and
M˜ =
{
(Ψ(x) + α,−x+ x+ y, x− x+ u, ) : i = 1, . . . ,m, j = 1, . . . , n, α ≥ 0,
x ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rmn+ ) \K, y, u ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rmn+ )
}
,
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we must show that
if (l, θL2([0,T ],Rmn
+
), θL2([0,T ],Rmn
+
)) belongs to TM˜(0, θL2([0,T ],Rmn+ ), θL2([0,T ],Rmn+ )), namely
lim
n→+∞
λn(Ψ(x
n) + αn) = l,
lim
n→+∞
λn(−xn + x+ yn) = θL2([0,T ],Rmn
+
),
lim
n→+∞
λn(x
n − x+ un) = θL2([0,T ],Rmn
+
),
with λn ≥ 0, xn ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rmn+ ) \K, αn ≥ 0, yn, un ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rmn+ ), ∀n ∈ N, and
lim
n→+∞
(Ψ(xn) + αn) = 0,
lim
n→+∞
(−xn + x+ yn) = θL2([0,T ],Rmn
+
),
lim
n→+∞
(xn + x+ un) = θL2([0,T ],Rmn
+
),
then, l is non-negative.
As a consequence, we have
l = lim
n→+∞
λn(Ψ(x
n) + αn)
= lim
n→+∞
λn
(∫ T
0
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
(xnij(t)− x∗ij(t))dt+ αn
)
≥ lim
n→+∞
λn
(∫
E−ij
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
(xnij(t)− xij(t))dt
+
∫
E0ij
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
(xnij(t)− x∗ij(t))dt
+
∫
E+ij
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
(xnij(t)− xij(t))dt
)
.
We can observe that
lim
n→+∞
λn
∫
E0ij
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
(xnij(t)− x∗ij(t))dt = 0 (2.2.20)
being −∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
= 0, a.e. in E0ij, ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, ∀j = 1, . . . , n.
We will prove that
lim
n→+∞
λn
∫
E−ij
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
−∂vi(t, x(t)))
∂xij
(xnij(t)− xij(t))dt ≥ 0 (2.2.21)
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and
lim
n→+∞
λn
∫
E+ij
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
−∂vi(t, x(t))
∂xij
(xnij(t)− xij(t))dt ≥ 0. (2.2.22)
It results
lim
n→+∞
λn
∫
E−ij
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
−∂vi(t, x(t))
∂xij
(xnij(t)− xij(t))dt
= lim
n→+∞
λn
∫
E−ij
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
(
−∂vi(t, x(t))
∂xij
(xnij(t)− xij(t)− ynij(t))−
∂vi(t, x(t))
∂xij
(ynij(t))
)
dt
By virtue of the previous remarks and Lemma 2.2.1, for the conditions of belonging to
the tangent cone, we get the inequality (2.2.21) and, with analogous considerations, we
get the inequality (2.2.22).
Therefore, thanks to (2.2.20), (2.2.21), (2.2.22) we have that
l = lim
n→+∞
λn(Ψ(x
n) + αn)
= lim
n→+∞
λn
(∫ T
0
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
(xnij(t)− x∗ij(t))dt+ αn
)
is non-negative.
Taking into account Theorems 1.2.2 and 1.2.3, if we consider the Lagrange function
L(x, α, β) = Ψ(x)
+
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
∫ T
0
αij(t)(xij(t)− xij(t))dt+
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
∫ T
0
βij(t)(xij(t)− xij(t))dt,
∀x ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rmn+ ), α, β ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rmn+ ), we have that there exist α∗, β∗ ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rmn+ )
such that
L(x∗, α, β) ≤ L(x∗, α∗, β∗) ≤ L(x, α∗, β∗) (2.2.23)
∀x ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rmn+ ), α, β ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rmn+ ), and
〈〈α∗, x− x∗〉〉 =
∫ T
0
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
α∗ij(t)(xij(t)− x∗ij(t))dt = 0
〈〈β∗, x∗ − x〉〉 =
∫ T
0
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
β∗ij(t)(x
∗
ij(t)− xij(t))dt = 0.
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Hence,
α∗ij(t)(xij(t)− x∗ij(t)) = 0, ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, ∀j = 1, . . . , n, (2.2.24)
β∗ij(t)(x
∗
ij(t)− xij(t)) = 0, ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, ∀j = 1, . . . , n. (2.2.25)
Then, for conditions (2.2.24), (2.2.25), L(x∗, α∗, β∗) = 0, and by virtue of the right-hand
side of (2.2.23) and the equalities (2.2.24), (2.2.25), we get
L(x, α∗, β∗) =
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
∫ T
0
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
(xij(t)− x∗ij(t))dt
−
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
∫ T
0
α∗ij(t)(xij(t)− x∗ij(t))dt
+
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
∫ T
0
β∗ij(t)(xij(t)− x∗ij(t))dt
≥ L(x∗, α∗, β∗) = 0, ∀x ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rmn+ ).
Then, L(x, α∗, β∗) has a minimal point in x∗.
Let x1ij = x
∗
ij + εij and x
2
ij = x
∗
ij − εij. We observe that
L(x1, α∗, β∗) =
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
∫ T
0
(
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
− α∗ij(t) + β∗ij(t)
)
εij(t)dt ≥ 0
∀ε ∈ L2([0, T ],Rmn+ ),
and
L(x2, α∗, β∗) = −
{
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
∫ T
0
(
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
− α∗ij(t) + β∗ij(t)
)
εij(t)dt
}
≥ 0
∀ε ∈ L2([0, T ],Rmn+ ),
from which we get
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
∫ T
0
(
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
− α∗ij(t) + β∗ij(t)
)
εij(t)dt = 0 ∀ǫ ∈ L2([0, T ],Rmn+ )
Since ε is arbitrary, we get,
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
− α∗ij(t) + β∗ij(t) = 0,
α∗ij(xij(t)− x∗ij(t)) = 0, α∗ij(t) ≥ 0,
β∗ij(t)(x
∗
ij(t)− xij(t)) = 0, β∗ij(t) ≥ 0,
∀i = 1, . . . ,m, j = 1, . . . , n, a.e. in [0, T ].
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Figure 2.1: Network structure of the numerical dynamic spatial oligopoly problem.
Taking into account Theorems 2.2.1 and 2.2.2, the equivalence between Definitions
2.2.1 and 2.2.2 is proved.
2.2.3 A numerical example
Let us consider a example of the dynamical oligopolistic market equilibrium problem con-
sisting of three firms and four demand markets, as in Figure 2.1. Let x, x ∈ C([0, 1],R3×4)
be the capacity constraints such that, in [0, 1],
x(t) =
 0 112t 150t 1100t1
100
t 0 0 1
20
t
0 1
24
t 1
2
t 0
 , x(t) =
 2t 4t 6t t4t 3t 5t t
t t t 3t
 .
Hence, the feasible set is
K =
{
x ∈ L2([0, 1] ,R3×4) :
xij(t) ≤ xij(t) ≤ xij(t), i = 1, 2, 3, j = 1, 2, 3, 4, a.e. in [0, 1]
}
.
Let v ∈ C1(L2([0, 1],R3×4),R3) be the profit function defined by
v1(t, x(t)) = −4x211(t)− 4x212(t)− 6x213(t)− 6x214(t)− 4x11(t)x12(t)− 6x13(t)x14(t)
+3tx11(t) + 4tx12(t) + tx13(t) + tx14(t),
v2(t, x(t)) = −5x221(t)− 2x222(t)− 2x223(t)− 2x224(t)− 2x21(t)x22(t)− 2x23(t)x24(t)
+2tx21(t) + 2tx22(t) + 3tx23(t) + 2tx24(t),
v3(t, x(t)) = −10x231(t)− 4x232(t)− 4x233(t)− 5x234(t)− 2x11(t)x32(t)− 2x33(t)x34(t)
−2x12(t)x31(t) + tx31(t) + 2tx32(t) + 10tx33(t) + 3tx34(t).
Then, the operator ∇Dv ∈ C(L2([0, 1],R3×4),R3×4) is given by
∇Dv =
 −8x11 − 4x12 + 3t −8x12 − 4x11 + 4t −12x13 − 6x14 + t −12x14 − 6x13 + t−10x21 − 2x22 + 2t −4x22 − 2x21 + 2t −4x23 − 2x24 + 3t −4x24 − 2x23 + 2t
−20x31 − 2x12 + t −8x32 − 2x11 + 2t −8x33 − 2x34 + 10t −10x34 − 2x33 + 3t
 .
24
CHAPTER 2. THE DYNAMIC OLIGOPOLISTIC MARKET
EQUILIBRIUM PROBLEM
Now, we verify that −∇Dv is a strongly monotone operator, in fact:
〈−∇Dv(x(t)) +∇Dv(y(t)), x(t)− y(t)〉
=
{
8[x11(t)− y11(t)] + 4[x12(t)− y12(t)]
}
[x11(t)− y11(t)] +
{
8[x12(t)− y12(t)]
+4[x11(t)− y11(t)]
}
[x12(t)− y12(t)] +
{
12[x13(t)− y13(t)] + 6[x14(t)− y14(t)]
}
[x13(t)− y13(t)] +
{
12[x14(t)− y14(t)] + 6[x13(t)− y13(t)]
}
[x14(t)− y14(t)]
+
{
10[x21(t)− y21(t)] + 2[x22(t)− y22(t)]
}
[x21(t)− y21(t)] +
{
4[x22(t)− y22(t)]
+2[x21(t)− y21(t)]
}
[x22(t)− y22(t)] +
{
4[x23(t)− y23(t)] + 2[x24(t)− y24(t)]
}
[x23(t)− y23(t)] +
{
4[x24(t)− y24(t)] + 2[x23(t)− y23(t)]
}
[x24(t)− y24(t)]
+
{
20[x31(t)− y31(t)] + 2[x12(t)− y12(t)]
}
[x31(t)− y31(t)] +
{
8[x32(t)− y32(t)]
+2[x11(t)− y11(t)]
}
[x32(t)− y32(t)] +
{
8[x33(t)− y33(t)] + 2[x34(t)− y34(t)]
}
[x33(t)− y33(t)] +
{
10[x34(t)− y34(t)] + 2[x33(t)− y33(t)]
}
[x34(t)− y34(t)]
≥ 2‖x(t)− y(t)‖23×4.
Moreover, it results that −∇Dv is Lipschitz continuous, in fact:
‖ − ∇Dv(x) +∇Dv(y)‖23×4
=
{
8[x11 − y11] + 4[x12 − y12]
}2
+
{
8[x12 − y12] + 4[x11 − y11]
}2
+
{
12[x13 − y13] + 6[x14 − y14]
}2
+
{
12[x14 − y14] + 6[x13 − y13]
}2
+
{
10[x21 − y21] + 2[x22 − y22]
}2
+
{
4[x22 − y22] + 2[x21 − y21]
}2
+
{
4[x23 − y23] + 2[x24 − y24]
}2
+
{
4[x24 − y24] + 2[x23 − y23]
}2
+
{
20[x31 − y31] + 2[x12 − y12]
}2
+
{
8[x32 − y32] + 2[x11 − y11]
}2
+
{
8[x33 − y33] + 2[x34 − y34]
}2
+
{
10[x34 − y34] + 2[x33 − y33]
}2
≥ 800‖x− y‖23×4.
The dynamic oligopolistic market equilibrium distribution in presence of excesses is
the solution to the evolutionary variational inequality:∫ 1
0
3∑
i=1
4∑
j=1
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
(xij(t)− x∗ij(t))dt ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ K. (2.2.26)
Taking into account the direct method (see [29, 34, 70]), we consider the following system
8x∗11(t) + 4x
∗
12(t)− 3t = 0, 4x∗11(t) + 8x∗12(t)− 4t = 0,
12x∗13(t) + 6x
∗
14(t)− t = 0, 6x∗13(t) + 12x∗14(t)− t = 0,
10x∗21(t) + 2x
∗
22(t)− 2t = 0, 2x∗21(t) + 4x∗22(t)− 2t = 0,
4x∗23(t) + 2x
∗
24(t)− 3t = 0, 2x∗23(t) + 4x∗24(t)− 2t = 0,
20x∗31(t) + 2x
∗
12(t)− t = 0, 8x∗32(t) + 2x∗11(t)− 2t = 0,
8x∗33(t) + 2x
∗
34(t)− 10t = 0, 2x∗33(t) + 10x∗34(t)− 3t = 0
(2.2.27)
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We get the following solution, in [0, 1],
x∗(t) =

1
6
t
5
12
t
1
18
t
1
18
t
1
9
t
4
9
t
2
3
t
1
6
t
1
120
t
5
24
t
47
38
t
1
19
t
 .
But we observe that x∗ does not belong to the constraint set K because x∗33(t) > t.
Let us consider now the set
K˜ =
{
x ∈ L2([0, 1] ,R3×4) : xij(t) ≤ xij(t) ≤ xij(t),
i = 1, 2, 3, j = 1, 2, 3, 4, (i, j) 6= (3, 3), a.e. in [0, 1] ,
x33(t) = t, a.e. in [0, 1] ,
4∑
j=1
xij(t) ≤ pi(t), i = 1, . . . , 3, a.e. in [0, 1] ,
3∑
i=1
xij(t) ≤ qj(t), j = 1, . . . , 4, a.e. in [0, 1]
}
and the system
8x∗11(t) + 4x
∗
12(t)− 3t = 0, 4x∗11(t) + 8x∗12(t)− 4t = 0,
12x∗13(t) + 6x
∗
14(t)− t = 0, 6x∗13(t) + 12x∗14(t)− t = 0,
10x∗21(t) + 2x
∗
22(t)− 2t = 0, 2x∗21(t) + 4x∗22(t)− 2t = 0,
4x∗23(t) + 2x
∗
24(t)− 3t = 0, 2x∗23(t) + 4x∗24(t)− 2t = 0,
20x∗31(t) + 2x
∗
12(t)− t = 0, 8x∗32(t) + 2x∗11(t)− 2t = 0,
x∗33(t) = t, 2x
∗
33(t) + 10x
∗
34(t)− 3t = 0
(2.2.28)
We can observe that
x∗(t) =

1
6
t
5
12
t
1
18
t
1
18
t
1
9
t
4
9
t
2
3
t
1
6
t
1
120
t
5
24
t t
1
10
t
 ,
is a solution, in [0, 1], since 8x∗33(t) + 2x
∗
34(t) − 10t < 0. Making use of the equilibrium
definition (2.2.14)–(2.2.15), we obtain:
α∗ij(t) = 0, ∀i = 1, . . . , 3, j = 1, . . . , 4, a.e. in [0, 1],
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β∗ij(t) = 0, ∀i = 1, . . . , 3, j = 1, . . . , 4, (i, j) 6= (3, 3), a.e. in [0, 1].
β∗33(t) =
9
5
t represents the marginal utility.
2.3 The case with production excesses
In this section we consider a more general case. It is easy to see that in the model pre-
sented in section 2.2 there is an implicit assumption stating that the production of a
given commodity can be unbounded. This assumption can give a false solution to the
problem because we allow any commodity shipment from a firm to a demand market.
Then, it is necessary to consider a model in which the amount of a commodity, that the
producers can offer, is limited because it is reasonable to think that the resources are
finite. As a consequence of this assumption, it can happen that some of the amounts
of the commodity available be sold out, whereas for a part of the producers can occur
an excess of production. Then, an appropriate model must also consider, not only the
limited availability of commodities, but also the presence of production excesses. Let us
consider the simplest case in which the commodity shipment is greater than or equal to
zero. In addition to what considered in section 2.2, let us introduce the production excess.
Let εi(t), i = 1, . . . ,m, denote the non-negative production excess for the commodity
of the firm Pi at the time t ∈ [0, T ] and group it into a vector-function ε : [0, T ] → Rm+ .
The following feasibility condition holds:
pi(t) =
n∑
j=1
xij(t) + εi(t), i = 1, . . . ,m, a.e. in [0, T ] . (2.3.1)
Hence, the quantity produced by each firm Pi at the time t ∈ [0, T ] must be equal to the
commodity shipments from that firm to all the demand markets plus the production excess
at the same time t ∈ [0, T ] . Then, the set of feasible vectors (x, ε) ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rmn+m) is
K
∗ =
{
(x, ε) ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rmn+m) : xij(t) ≥ 0, ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, ∀j = 1, . . . , n, a.e. in [0, T ] ,
ǫi(t) ≥ 0, pi(t) =
n∑
j=1
xij(t) + εi(t), ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, a.e. in [0, T ]
}
.
Now, we can rewrite K∗ in an equivalent way. In virtue of (2.3.1) we can express εi(t)
in terms of pi(t) and xij(t), namely
εi(t) = pi(t)−
n∑
j=1
xij(t), i = 1, . . . ,m, a.e. in [0, T ] . (2.3.2)
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Then, the equivalent constraint set becomes
K =
{
x ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rmn) : xij(t) ≥ 0, ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, ∀j = 1, . . . , n, a.e. in [0, T ] ,
n∑
j=1
xij(t) ≤ pi(t), ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, a.e. in [0, T ]
}
. (2.3.3)
We can observe that K includes the presence of production excess described in K∗ and
that this set is convex, closed and bounded in the Hilbert space L2([0, T ] ,Rmn+ ).
The profit function becomes
vi(t, x(t)) = v
∗
i (t, x(t), ǫ(t), δ(t))
=
n∑
j=1
dj(t, x(t))xij(t)− fi(t, x(t))− gi(t, x(t))−
n∑
j=1
cij(t, x(t))xij(t).
2.3.1 The variational formulation
As regards the equilibrium definition according to Cournot-Nash principle, we can observe
that the formulation is the same.
Definition 2.3.1. x∗ ∈ K is a dynamic oligopolistic market equilibrium in presence of
production excesses if and only if for each i = 1, . . . ,m and a.e. in [0, T ] we have
vi(t, x
∗(t)) ≥ vi(t, xi(t), xˆ∗i (t)), a.e. in [0, T ] , (2.3.4)
where xi(t) = (xi1(t), . . . , xin(t)), a.e. in [0, T ] and xˆ
∗
i (t) = (x
∗
1(t), . . . , x
∗
i−1(t), x
∗
i+1(t), . . . , x
∗
m(t)).
With the same technique used in section 2.2 we can prove that under the assump-
tions (i), (ii), (iii), Definition 2.3.1 is equivalent to an evolutionary variational inequality,
namely:
Theorem 2.3.1. x∗ ∈ K is a dynamic oligopolistic market equilibrium according to Def-
inition 2.3.1 if and only if it satisfies the evolutionary variational inequality∫ T
0
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
(xij(t)− x∗ij(t))dt ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ K. (2.3.5)
2.3.2 The Lagrangean formulation
In this section we prove that, under the assumptions (i), (ii), (iii) on the profit function
v, Definition 2.3.1 is equivalent to the equilibrium conditions defined through Lagrange
variables which are very useful in order to analyze the constraints of excesses of K:
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Definition 2.3.2. x∗ ∈ K is a dynamic oligopolistic market problem equilibrium in
presence of excesses if and only if for each i = 1, . . . ,m, j = 1, . . . , n and a.e. in [0, T ]
there exists λ∗ij ∈ L2([0, T ]), µ∗i ∈ L2([0, T ]), such that
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
+ µ∗i (t) = λ
∗
ij(t), (2.3.6)
(
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
+ µ∗i (t)
)
x∗ij(t) = 0, (2.3.7)
λ∗ij(t)x
∗
ij(t) = 0, λ
∗
ij(t) ≥ 0, (2.3.8)
µ∗i (t)
(
n∑
j=1
x∗ij(t)− pi(t)
)
= 0, µ∗i (t) ≥ 0. (2.3.9)
The terms λ∗ij(t) and µ
∗
i (t) are the Lagrange multipliers associated to the constraints
x∗ij(t) ≥ 0 and to
n∑
j=1
x∗ij(t) ≤ pi(t), respectively. They, as it is a well-known, have a
topical importance on the understanding and the management of the market. In fact, at
a fixed time t ∈ [0, T ], we have
(a) if λ∗ij(t) > 0, then, by using (2.3.8), we obtain x
∗
ij(t) = 0, namely there is not com-
modity shipment between the firm Pi and the demand market Qj;
(b) if x∗ij(t) > 0, then, taking into account (2.3.8), λ
∗
ij(t) = 0 and, making use of (2.3.6),
it results
µ∗i (t) =
∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
, namely µ∗i (t) is equal to the marginal profit;
(c) if µ∗i (t) > 0, then, for the condition (2.3.9), we have
n∑
j=1
x∗ij(t) = pi(t), namely there
is no production excess;
(d) if
n∑
j=1
x∗ij(t) < pi(t), as a consequence of (2.3.9) we get µ
∗
i (t) = 0 and, for the condition
(2.3.6),
λ∗ij(t) = −
∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
, namely λ∗ij(t) is equal to the opposite of the marginal profit.
In Definition 2.3.2, even if in (2.3.6)– (2.3.9) the unknown Lagrange variables λ∗ij and
µ∗i appear, they have not any influence in the equilibrium definition because the following
equivalent condition in terms of variational inequality holds:
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Theorem 2.3.2. x∗ ∈ K is a dynamic oligopolistic market equilibrium according to Def-
inition 2.3.2 if and only if it satisfies the evolutionary variational inequality∫ T
0
−
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
(xij(t)− x∗ij(t))dt ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ K. (2.3.10)
Thanks to Theorems 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 we can clearly see the equivalence between Defi-
nitions 2.3.1 and 2.3.2.
We can observe that also in the case of limited production and in presence of production
excesses, the meaning of Cournot-Nash equilibrium does not change.
Before proving this theorem, we need some preliminary lemmas.
Lemma 2.3.1. Let x∗ ∈ K be a solution to the variational inequality (2.3.5). Setting
I0i :=
{
t ∈ [0, T ] :
n∑
j=1
x∗ij(t) = pi(t)
}
, i = 1, . . . ,m,
γ∗i (t) := min
j=1,...,n
{
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
}
, t ∈ I0i , i = 1, . . . ,m,
X0i :=
{
t ∈ I0i : −
∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
> γ∗i (t)
}
, i = 1, . . . ,m,
and
Y 0i :=
{
t ∈ I0i : −
∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
= γ∗i (t)
}
, i = 1, . . . ,m,
we have (
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
− γ∗i (t)
)
x∗ij(t) = 0, ∀t ∈ I0i , i = 1, . . . ,m, (2.3.11)
γ∗i (t) ≤ 0, a.e. in Y 0i , ∀i = 1, . . . ,m
and
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
≥ 0, a.e. in X0i , ∀j = 1, . . . , n.
Proof. Setting xhj(t) = x
∗
hj(t) for all indexes h 6= i for a fixed i and j = 1, . . . , n we get,
from variational inequality (2.3.5)∫ T
0
n∑
j=1
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
(xij(t)− x∗ij(t))dt ≥ 0 (2.3.12)
for every xij(t) ≥ 0, j = 1, . . . , n and
n∑
j=1
xij(t) ≤ pi(t).
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Let us consider the set
I0i =
{
t ∈ [0, T ] :
n∑
j=1
x∗ij(t) = pi(t)
}
, i = 1, . . . ,m
and let us choose xij(t) such that, for j = 1, . . . , n,
xij(t) :=
{
x∗ij(t), t ∈ [0, T ] \ I0i ,
xij(t), t ∈ I0i ,
with xij ∈ L2(I0i ), xij(t) ≥ 0 and
n∑
j=1
xij(t)− pi(t) ≤ 0.
Then, we have ∫
I0i
n∑
j=1
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
(xij(t)− x∗ij(t))dt ≥ 0. (2.3.13)
In order to prove the condition (2.3.11), by using the procedure adopted for the Wardrop’s
principle, we get, a.e. in I0i , if ∃(i1, j1), (i2, j2) such that
−∂vi1(t, x
∗(t))
∂xi1j1
> −∂vi2(t, x
∗(t))
∂xi2j2
,
then x∗i1j1(t) = 0. In fact, suppose, ad absurdum, there exists a set E˜ ⊆ I0i , µ(E˜) > 0,
such that x∗i1j1(t) > 0, and
−∂vi1(t, x
∗(t))
∂xi1j1
> −∂vi2(t, x
∗(t))
∂xi2j2
.
Now, we choose
xij(t) :=

x∗ij(t), t ∈ I0i \ E˜,
x∗ij(t), if i 6= i1, i2, j 6= j1, j2, t ∈ E˜,
0, if i = i1, j = j1, t ∈ E˜,
x∗i1j1(t) + x
∗
i2j2
(t), if i = i2, j = j2, t ∈ E˜,
which satisfies the condition
n∑
j=1
xij(t) = pi(t).
Then, (2.3.13) becomes∫
E˜
−∂vi1(t, x
∗(t))
∂xi1j1
(xi1j1(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
− x∗i1j1(t))dt+
∫
E˜
−∂vi2(t, x
∗(t))
∂xi2j2
( xi2j2(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=x∗i1j1
(t)+x∗i2j2
(t)
− x∗i2j2(t))dt
=
∫
E˜
[
−∂vi1(t, x
∗(t))
∂xi1j1
+
∂vi2(t, x
∗(t))
∂xi2j2
]
(−x∗i1j1(t))dt < 0,
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and our claim is proved.
Now, ∀t ∈ I0i we set
γ∗i (t) = min
j=1,...,n
{
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
}
, i = 1, . . . ,m,
and observe that ∀t ∈ I0i
if − ∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
= γ∗i (t), then x
∗
ij(t) ≥ 0;
if − ∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
> γ∗i (t), then x
∗
ij(t) = 0,
hence (2.3.11) holds, namely(
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
− γ∗i (t)
)
x∗ij(t) = 0, ∀t ∈ I0i , i = 1, . . . ,m.
If we set
X0i =
{
t ∈ I0i : −
∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
> γ∗i (t)
}
, i = 1, . . . ,m,
and
Y 0i =
{
t ∈ I0i : −
∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
= γ∗i (t)
}
, i = 1, . . . ,m,
then, inequality (2.3.13) can be written as:∫
X0i
n∑
j=1
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
xij(t)dt+
∫
Y 0i
γ∗i (t)
n∑
j=1
(xij(t)− x∗ij(t))dt ≥ 0.
Now, choosing in (2.3.14)
xij(t) :=
{
0 t ∈ X0i
x˜ij(t) t ∈ Y 0i
for j = 1, . . . , n, such that x˜ij ∈ L2(Y 0i ), x˜ij(t) ≥ 0,
n∑
j=1
x˜ij(t) ≤ pi(t), a.e. in Y 0i , then,
we have, ∫
Y 0i
γ∗i (t)
n∑
j=1
(x˜ij(t)− x∗ij(t))dt =
∫
Y 0i
γ∗i (t)
(
n∑
j=1
x˜ij(t)− pi(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
)
dt ≥ 0.
Hence, by using the usual technique, we can show that γ∗i (t) ≤ 0, in Y 0i .
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Moreover, choosing in (2.3.13)
xij(t) :=
{
x˜ij(t) t ∈ X0i
x∗ij(t) t ∈ Y 0i ,
for j = 1, . . . , n, such that x˜ij ∈ L2(X0i ), x˜ij(t) ≥ 0,
n∑
j=1
x˜ij(t) ≤ pi(t), a.e. in X0i , and
since x∗ij(t) = 0, ∀t ∈ X0i , for (2.3.11), we have∫
X0i
n∑
j=1
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
x˜ij(t)dt ≥ 0,
from which, by using again the same technique, it follows
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
≥ 0
a.e. in X0i , ∀j = 1, . . . , n.
Lemma 2.3.2. Let x∗ ∈ K be a solution to the variational inequality (2.3.5). Setting
I−i :=
{
t ∈ [0, T ] :
n∑
j=1
x∗ij(t)− pi(t) < 0
}
, i = 1, . . . ,m,
we have
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
= 0, a.e. in I−i . (2.3.14)
Proof. With analogous techniques of the proof of Lemma 2.3.1, we get the variational
inequality (2.3.12) ∫ T
0
n∑
j=1
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
(xij(t)− x∗ij(t))dt ≥ 0
for every xij(t) ≥ 0, j = 1, . . . , n and
n∑
j=1
xij(t) ≤ pi(t), a.e. in [0, T ].
Then, if we choose
xik(t) :=

x∗ik(t) t ∈ [0, T ] \ I−i
x∗ik(t) t ∈ I−i , k 6= j
x˜ij(t) t ∈ I−i , k = j
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with x˜ij ∈ L2(I−i ), x˜ij(t) ≥ 0 and
n∑
k = 1
k 6= j
xik(t) + x˜ij(t) ≤ pi(t), a.e. in I−i ,
we get, from the variational inequality (2.3.12),∫
I−i
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
(x˜ij(t)− x∗ij(t))dt ≥ 0.
Since
n∑
j=1
x∗ij(t)−pi(t) < 0, a.e. in I−i , it is possible to choose x˜ij(t) such that x˜ij(t) > x∗ij(t)
and
n∑
k = 1
k 6= j
x∗ik(t) + x˜ij(t)− pi(t) ≤ 0. So, with the aid of the same procedure,
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
≥ 0, a.e. in I−i . (2.3.15)
Moreover, if x∗ij(t) > 0, we can choose x˜ij(t) such that x˜ij(t) < x
∗
ij(t) and
n∑
k = 1
k 6= j
x∗ik(t) +
x˜ij(t)− pi(t) ≤ 0. Hence, from the variational inequality (2.3.12), we get∫
I−i
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
(x˜ij(t)− x∗ij(t))dt ≥ 0
and, then,
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
≤ 0, a.e. in I−i . (2.3.16)
Taking into account (2.3.15) and (2.3.16), we get (2.3.14).
Now we are able to prove Theorem 2.3.2.
Proof. Let us assume that x∗ ∈ K is an equilibrium solution according to Definition 2.3.2.
Then, taking into account (2.3.6)–(2.3.9), we have for every x ∈ K,
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
(xij(t)− x∗ij(t)) = −µ∗i (t)(xij(t)− x∗ij(t)) + λ∗ij(t)(xij(t)− x∗ij(t))
= −µ∗i (t)(xij(t)− x∗ij(t)) + λ∗ij(t)xij(t)
≥ −µ∗i (t)(xij(t)− x∗ij(t)),
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and hence, by summing over i = 1, . . . ,m and j = 1, . . . , n, integrating on [0, T ] , and
using the condition (2.3.9), we obtain, for each x ∈ K
∫ T
0
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
−
∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
(xij(t)− x
∗
ij(t))dt ≥ −
m∑
i=1
∫ T
0
µ∗i (t)

 n∑
j=1
xij(t)−
n∑
j=1
x∗ij(t) + pi(t)− pi(t)

 dt
= −
m∑
i=1
∫ T
0
µ∗i (t)

 n∑
j=1
xij(t)− pi(t)

 dt ≥ 0.
Then, we have (2.3.5).
Vice versa, let x∗ ∈ K be a solution to (2.3.5) and let us apply the infinite dimensional
theory given by Theorems 1.2.2 and 1.2.3.
First of all, let us show that the Assumption S is fulfilled. Let us set, for x ∈
L2([0, T ] ,Rmn),
Ψ(x) :=
∫ T
0
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
(xij(t)− x∗ij(t))dt
and
M˜ =
{(
Ψ(x) + α,−x+ y,
(
n∑
j=1
xij − pi + zi
))
: i = 1, . . . ,m,
α ≥ 0, x ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rmn+ ) \K, y ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rmn+ ), z ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rm+ )
}
.
Wemust show that, if (l, θL2([0,T ],Rmn
+
), θL2([0,T ],Rm
+
)) ∈ TM˜(0, θL2([0,T ],Rmn+ ), θL2([0,T ],Rm+ )), namely
l = lim
n→+∞
λn(Ψ(x
n) + αn),
lim
n→+∞
λn(−xn + yn) = θL2([0,T ],Rmn
+
),
lim
n→+∞
λn
(
n∑
j=1
xij − pi + zni
)
= θL2([0,T ],R+), ∀i = 1, . . . ,m
with λn ≥ 0, xn ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rmn+ ) \K, yn ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rmn+ ), zn ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rm+ ), ∀n ∈ N
and
lim
n→+∞
(Ψ(xn) + αn) = 0,
lim
n→+∞
(−xn + yn) = θL2([0,T ],Rmn
+
),
lim
n→+∞
(
n∑
j=1
xnij − pi + zni
)
= θL2([0,T ],R+), ∀i = 1, . . . ,m,
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then, l is non-negative.
Let us set, now,
∇ijDv(x∗) =
∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
, i = 1, . . . ,m, j = 1, . . . , n,
I0i =
{
t ∈ [0, T ] :
n∑
j=1
x∗ij(t)− pi(t) = 0
}
, i = 1, . . . ,m,
I−i =
{
t ∈ [0, T ] :
n∑
j=1
x∗ij(t)− pi(t) < 0
}
i = 1, . . . ,m,
γ∗i (t) = min
j=1,...,n
{−∇ijDv(x∗)} , t ∈ I0i , i = 1, . . . ,m,
X0i =
{
t ∈ I0i : −∇ijDv(x∗) > γ∗i (t)
}
, i = 1, . . . ,m,
Y 0i =
{
t ∈ I0i : −∇ijDv(x∗) = γ∗i (t)
}
, i = 1, . . . ,m.
It results
λnΨ(x
n) = λn
∫ T
0
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
−∇ijDv(x
∗)(xnij(t)− x
∗
ij(t))dt
= λn
∫
I0
i
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
−∇ijDv(x
∗)(xnij(t)− x
∗
ij(t))dt+ λn
∫
I
−
i
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
−∇ijDv(x
∗)(xnij(t)− x
∗
ij(t))dt
= λn
∫
X0
i
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
−∇ijDv(x
∗)(xnij(t)− x
∗
ij(t))dt+ λn
∫
Y 0
i
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
−∇ijDv(x
∗)(xnij(t)− x
∗
ij(t))dt
+λn
∫
I
−
i
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
−∇ijDv(x
∗)(xnij(t)− x
∗
ij(t))dt
= λn
∫
X0
i
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
−∇ijDv(x
∗)xnij(t)dt+ λn
m∑
i=1
∫
Y 0
i
γ∗i (t)

 n∑
j=1
xnij(t)− pi(t)

 dt
+λn
m∑
i=1
∫
I
−
i
n∑
j=1
−∇ijDv(x
∗)(xnij(t)− x
∗
ij(t))dt
= λn
∫
X0
i
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
−∇ijDv(x
∗)xnij(t)dt+
m∑
i=1
∫
Y 0
i
γ∗i (t)λn

 n∑
j=1
xnij(t)− pi(t) + z
n
i (t)

 dt
+λn
m∑
i=1
∫
Y 0
i
γ∗i (t) (−z
n
i (t)) dt+
m∑
i=1
∫
I
−
i
n∑
j=1
−∇ijDv(x
∗)λn(x
n
ij(t)− y
n
ij(t))dt
+λn
m∑
i=1
∫
I
−
i
n∑
j=1
−∇ijDv(x
∗)ynij(t)dt+ λn
m∑
i=1
∫
I
−
i
n∑
j=1
−∇ijDv(x
∗)(−x∗ij(t))dt.
Then, in virtue of Lemmas 2.3.1 and 2.3.2, for the conditions of belonging to the tangent
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cone and for the variational inequality (2.3.5) evalued in xij(t) = 0, we get that
l = lim
n→+∞
λn(Ψ(x
n) + αn)
is non-negative.
Taking into account Theorems 1.2.2 and 1.2.3, if we consider the Lagrange function
L(x, λ, µ) = Ψ(x)−
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
∫ T
0
λij(t)xij(t)dt+
m∑
i=1
∫ T
0
µi(t)
(
n∑
j=1
xij(t)− pi(t)
)
dt,
we have that ∃λ∗ ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rmn+ ), µ∗ ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rm+ ) such that
L(x∗, λ, µ) ≤ L(x∗, λ∗, µ∗) ≤ L(x, λ∗, µ∗), (2.3.17)
∀x ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rmn+ ), λ ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rmn+ ), µ ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rm+ ), and, moreover,
〈〈λ∗, x∗〉〉 =
∫ T
0
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
λ∗ij(t)x
∗
ij(t)dt = 0〈〈
µ∗,
n∑
j=1
x∗ij(t)− pi(t)
〉〉
=
∫ T
0
m∑
i=1
[
µ∗i (t)
(
n∑
j=1
x∗ij(t)− pi(t)
)]
dt = 0.
Hence,
λ∗ij(t)x
∗
ij(t) = 0, ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, ∀j = 1, . . . , n,
µ∗i (t)
(
n∑
j=1
x∗ij(t)− pi(t)
)
= 0, ∀i = 1, . . . ,m. (2.3.18)
Since L(x∗, λ∗, µ∗) = 0, taking into account the right side of (2.3.17) and the equalities
(2.3.18), we get
L(x, λ∗, µ∗) =
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
∫ T
0
−∇ijDv(x∗)(xij(t)− x∗ij(t)dt−
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
∫ T
0
λ∗ij(t)(xij(t)− x∗ij(t))dt
+
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
∫ T
0
µ∗i (t)(xij(t)− x∗ij(t))dt
≥ L(x∗, λ∗, µ∗) = 0, ∀x ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rmn).
Then, L(x, λ∗, µ∗) has a minimal point in x∗.
Let us assume that x1ij = x
∗
ij + εij and x
2
ij = x
∗
ij − εij, for all ε ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rmn+ ). Let
us note that
L(x1, λ∗, µ∗) =
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
∫ T
0
[−∇ijDv(x∗)− λ∗ij(t) + µ∗i (t)] εij(t)dt ≥ 0,
∀ε ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rmn+ )
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Figure 2.2: Network structure of the numerical dynamic spatial oligopoly problem.
and
L(x2, λ∗, µ∗) = −
{ m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
∫ T
0
[−∇ijDv(x∗)− λ∗ij(t) + µ∗i (t)] εij(t)dt} ≥ 0,
∀ε ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rmn+ ).
As a consequence, we have
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
∫ T
0
[−∇ijDv(x∗)− λ∗ij(t) + µ∗i (t)] εij(t)dt = 0, ∀ε ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rmn+ ),
namely, since ε is arbitrary, we get the equilibrium conditions of Definition 2.3.2,
−∂vi(x
∗(t))
∂xij
+ µ∗i (t) = λ
∗
ij(t),
(
−∂vi(x
∗(t))
∂xij
+ µ∗i (t)
)
x∗ij(t) = 0,
λ∗ij(t)x
∗
ij(t) = 0, λ
∗
ij(t) ≥ 0,
µ∗i (t)
(
n∑
j=1
x∗ij(t)− pi(t)
)
= 0, µ∗i (t) ≥ 0,
for each i = 1, . . . ,m, j = 1, . . . , n and a.e. in [0, T ] .
2.3.3 A numerical example
Let us consider an example consisting of three firms and four demand markets, as in
Figure 2.2. Let p ∈ L2([0, 1],R3) be the production function such that, a.e. in [0, 1],
p1(t) = 6t, p2(t) = 5t, p3(t) = 7t.
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Hence, the feasible set is
K =
{
x ∈ L2([0, 1],R3×4) : xij(t) ≥ 0, ∀i = 1, . . . , 3, j = 1, . . . , 4, a.e. in [0, 1],
4∑
j=1
x1j(t) ≤ 6t, ∀i = 1, . . . , 3, a.e. in [0, 1],
4∑
j=1
x2j(t) ≤ 5t, ∀i = 1, . . . , 3, a.e. in [0, 1],
4∑
j=1
x3j(t) ≤ 7t, ∀i = 1, . . . , 3, a.e. in [0, 1]
}
.
Let us consider the profit function v ∈ L2([0, 1]× L2([0, 1],R3×4),R3) defined by
v1(x(t)) = −4x211(t)− 3x212(t)− 2x213(t)− 2x214 − x11(t)x12(t)− x13(t)x14(t)
+6tx11(t) + 3tx12(t) + 2tx13(t) + 5tx14(t),
v2(x(t)) = −3x221(t)− 4x222(t)− 3x223(t)− 2x224(t)− x21(t)x23(t)− x22(t)x31(t)
−x24(t)x33(t) + 3tx21(t) + 5tx22(t) + 4tx23(t) + 3tx24(t),
v3(x(t)) = −3x231(t)− 2x232(t)− 2x233(t)− 4x234(t)− x22(t)x31(t)− x24(t)x33(t)
−x32(t)x34(t) + 3tx31(t) + 4tx32(t) + 3tx33(t) + 2tx34(t).
Then, the operator ∇Dv ∈ L2([0, 1]× L2([0, 1],R3×4),R3×4) is given by
∇Dv(x(t)) =

 −8x11(t)− x12(t) + 6t −x11(t)− 6x12(t) + 3t −4x13(t)− x14(t) + 2t −x13(t)− 4x14(t) + 5t−6x21(t)− x23(t) + 3t −8x22(t)− x31(t) + 5t −x21(t)− 6x23(t) + 4t −4x24(t)− x33(t) + 3t
−x22(t)− 6x31(t) + 3t −4x32(t)− x34(t) + 4t −x24(t)− 4x33(t) + 3t −x32(t)− 8x34(t) + 2t

 .
Now, we verify that −∇Dv is a strongly monotone operator; in fact
〈−∇Dv(x) +∇Dv(y), x− y〉
=
{
8[x11 − y11] + [x12 − y12]
}
[x11 − y11] +
{
[x11 − y11] + 6[x12 − y12]
}
[x12 − y12]
+
{
4[x13 − y13] + [x14 − y14]
}
[x13 − y13] +
{
[x13 − y13] + 4[x14 − y14]
}
[x14 − y14]
+
{
6[x21 − y21] + [x23 − y23]
}
[x21 − y21] +
{
8[x22 − y22] + [x31 − y31]
}
[x22 − y22]
+
{
[x21 − y21] + 6[x23 − y23]
}
[x23 − y23] +
{
4[x24 − y24] + [x33 − y33]
}
[x24 − y24]
+
{
[x22 − y22] + 6[x31 − y31]
}
[x31 − y31] +
{
4[x32 − y32] + [x34 − y34]
}
[x32 − y32]
+
{
[x24 − y24] + 4[x33 − y33]
}
[x33 − y33] +
{
[x32 − y32] + 8[x34 − y34]
}
[x34 − y34]
≥ 3‖x− y‖23×4.
The dynamic oligopolistic market equilibrium distribution in presence of excesses is the
solution to the evolutionary variational inequality:∫ 1
0
3∑
i=1
4∑
j=1
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
(xij(t)− x∗ij(t))dt ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ K. (2.3.19)
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Taking into account the direct method (see [29, 34, 70]), we consider the following system
8x∗11(t) + x
∗
12(t)− 6t = 0, x∗11(t) + 6x∗12(t)− 3t = 0, 4x∗13(t) + x∗14(t)− 2t = 0,
x∗13(t) + 4x
∗
14(t)− 5t = 0, 6x∗21(t) + x∗23(t)− 3t = 0, 8x∗22(t) + x∗31(t)− 5t = 0,
x∗21(t) + 6x
∗
23(t)− 4t = 0, 4x∗24(t) + x∗33(t)− 3t = 0, x∗22(t) + 6x∗31(t)− 3t = 0,
4x∗32(t) + x
∗
34(t)− 4t = 0, x∗24(t) + 4x∗33(t)− 3t = 0, x∗32(t) + 8x∗34(t)− 2t = 0,
x∗ij(t) ≥ 0, ∀i = 1, . . . , 3, j = 1, . . . , 4,
4∑
j=1
x∗1j(t) ≤ 6t,
4∑
j=1
x∗2j(t) ≤ 5t,
4∑
j=1
x∗3j(t) ≤ 7t
(2.3.20)
We obtain the following solution, a.e. in [0, 1],
x∗(t) =

33
47
t
18
47
t
1
5
t
6
5
t
2
5
t
27
47
t
3
5
t
3
5
t
19
47
t
30
31
t
3
5
t
4
31
t

,
that belongs to the constraint set K, then it is the equilibrium solution.
Moreover, the production excesses of each firm is given by
ǫ1(t) = p1(t)−
4∑
j=1
x∗1j(t) = 6t−
584
235
t =
826
235
t,
ǫ2(t) = p2(t)−
4∑
j=1
x∗2j(t) = 5t−
511
235
t =
664
235
t,
ǫ3(t) = p3(t)−
4∑
j=1
x∗3j(t) = 7t−
15306
7285
t =
35689
7285
t,
a.e. in [0, 1] .
Making use of the equilibrium definition (2.3.6)–(2.3.9), we obtain:
λ∗ij(t) = 0, ∀i = 1, . . . , 3, j = 1, . . . , 4, a.e. in [0, 1], µ∗i (t) = 0, ∀i = 1, . . . , 3, a.e. in [0, 1].
2.4 The case with both production and demand ex-
cesses
For a more complete study of the problem, we allow the presence of both production and
demand excesses, namely we allow that for a part of the producers can occur an excess
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of production whereas for a part of the demand markets the supply can not satisfy the
demand. In order to clarify the presence of both excesses we consider some concrete eco-
nomic situations. During an economic crisis period the presence of production excesses can
be due to a decrease in market demands and, on the other hand, the presence of demand
excesses may occur when the supply can not satisfy the demand especially for fundamen-
tal goods. Moreover, since the market model presented in this paper evolves in time, the
presence of both excesses can be consequence of the fact that the physical transportation
of commodity between a firm and a demand market is evidently limited, therefore there
exist some time instants in which, though some firms produce more commodity than they
can send to all the demand markets, some of the demand markets require more commodity.
In addition to what we have considered previously, let us denote by δj(t), j = 1, . . . , n,
the nonnegative demand excess for the commodity of the demand market Qj at the time
t ∈ [0, T ]. Let us group the demand excess into a vector-function δ : [0, T ] −→ Rn+ and
let us suppose that the following feasibility conditions hold, a.e. in [0, T ] :
pi(t) =
n∑
j=1
xij(t) + ǫi(t), i = 1, . . . ,m, a.e. in [0, T ] , (2.4.1)
qj(t) =
m∑
i=1
xij(t) + δj(t), j = 1, . . . , n, a.e. in [0, T ] . (2.4.2)
Hence, the quantity produced by each firm Pi, at the time t ∈ [0, T ], must be equal to
the commodity shipments from that firm to all the demand markets plus the production
excess, at the same time t ∈ [0, T ]. Moreover, the quantity demanded by each demand
market Qj, at the time t ∈ [0, T ], must be equal to the commodity shipments from all the
firms to that demand market plus the demand excess, at the same time t ∈ [0, T ] .
Furthermore, we assume that the non-negative commodity shipment between the pro-
ducer Pi and the demand market Qj has to satisfy time-dependent constraints, namely
there exist two non-negative functions x, x : [0, T ] −→ Rmn+ such that
0 ≤ xij(t) ≤ xij(t) ≤ xij(t), ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, ∀j = 1, . . . , n, a.e. in [0, T ] . (2.4.3)
For technical reasons, let us assume that
δ ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rn+).
As a consequence, we have
q ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rn+).
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Then, the set of feasible vectors (x, ǫ, δ) ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rmn+m+n+ ) is
K
∗ =
{
(x, ǫ, δ) ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rmn+m+n+ ) :
xij(t) ≤ xij(t) ≤ xij(t), ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, ∀j = 1, . . . , n, a.e. in [0, T ] ,
ǫi(t) ≥ 0, ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, a.e. in [0, T ] ,
pi(t) =
n∑
j=1
xij(t) + ǫi(t), ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, a.e. in [0, T ] ,
δj(t) ≥ 0, ∀j = 1, . . . , n, a.e. in [0, T ]
qj(t) =
m∑
i=1
xij(t) + δj(t), ∀j = 1, . . . , n, a.e. in [0, T ]
}
.
Now, we can rewrite K∗ in an equivalent way. By virtue of (2.4.1) and (2.4.2) we can
express ǫi(t) in terms of pi(t) and xij(t) and δj(t) in terms of qj(t) and xij(t), namely
ǫi(t) = pi(t)−
n∑
j=1
xij(t), i = 1, . . . ,m, a.e. in [0, T ] , (2.4.4)
δj(t) = qj(t)−
m∑
i=1
xij(t), j = 1, . . . , n, a.e. in [0, T ] . (2.4.5)
Then, the equivalent constraint set becomes
K =
{
x ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rmn+ ) :
xij(t) ≤ xij(t) ≤ xij(t), ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, ∀j = 1, . . . , n, a.e. in [0, T ] ,
n∑
j=1
xij(t) ≤ pi(t), ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, a.e. in [0, T ] ,
m∑
i=1
xij(t) ≤ qj(t), ∀j = 1, . . . , n, a.e. in [0, T ]
}
. (2.4.6)
We can observe that K includes the presence of demand excess described in K∗ and that
this set is convex, closed and bounded in the Hilbert space L2([0, T ] ,Rmn+ ).
The profit function becomes
vi(t, x(t)) = v
∗
i (t, x(t), ǫ(t), δ(t))
=
n∑
j=1
dj(t, x(t))xij(t)− fi(t, x(t))− gi(t, x(t))−
n∑
j=1
cij(t, x(t))xij(t).
42
CHAPTER 2. THE DYNAMIC OLIGOPOLISTIC MARKET
EQUILIBRIUM PROBLEM
2.4.1 The variational formulation
As regards the equilibrium definition according to Cournot-Nash principle, we can observe
that the formulation is the same.
Definition 2.4.1. x∗ ∈ K is a dynamic oligopolistic market equilibrium in presence of
excesses if and only if for each i = 1, . . . ,m and a.e. in [0, T ] we have
vi(t, x
∗(t)) ≥ vi(t, xi(t), xˆ∗i (t)), (2.4.7)
where
xˆ∗i (t) = (x
∗
1(t), . . . , x
∗
i−1(t), x
∗
i+1(t), . . . , x
∗
m(t)).
With the same technique used in section 2.2 it is possible to prove that under the
assumptions (i), (ii), (iii) on vi, Definition 2.4.1 is equivalent to an evolutionary variational
inequality, namely:
Theorem 2.4.1. Let us suppose that assumptions (i), (ii), (iii) are satisfied. Then, x∗ ∈ K
is a dynamic oligopolistic market equilibrium in presence of excesses according to Defini-
tion 2.4.1 if and only if it satisfies the evolutionary variational inequality∫ T
0
−
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
(xij(t)− x∗ij(t))dt ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ K. (2.4.8)
2.4.2 The Lagrangean formulation
In this section we will prove that, under the assumptions (i), (ii), (iii) on the profit function
v, Definition 2.4.1 is equivalent to the equilibrium conditions defined through Lagrange
variables which are very useful in order to analyze both production and demand excesses:
Definition 2.4.2. x∗ ∈ K is a dynamic oligopolistic market problem equilibrium in
presence of excesses if and only if, for each i = 1, . . . ,m, j = 1, . . . , n and a.e. in [0, T ],
there exist λ∗ij ∈ L2([0, T ]), ρ∗ij ∈ L2([0, T ]), µ∗i ∈ L2([0, T ]), ν∗j (t) ∈ L2([0, T ]) such that
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
+ ρ∗ij(t) + µ
∗
i (t) + ν
∗
j (t) = λ
∗
ij(t), (2.4.9)
λ∗ij(t)(xij(t)− x∗ij(t)) = 0, λ∗ij(t) ≥ 0, (2.4.10)
ρ∗ij(t)(x
∗
ij(t)− xij(t)) = 0, ρ∗ij(t) ≥ 0, (2.4.11)
µ∗i (t)
(
n∑
j=1
x∗ij(t)− pi(t)
)
= 0, µ∗i (t) ≥ 0, (2.4.12)
ν∗j (t)
(
m∑
i=1
x∗ij(t)− qj(t)
)
= 0, ν∗j (t) ≥ 0. (2.4.13)
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The terms λ∗ij(t), ρ
∗
ij(t), µ
∗
i (t), ν
∗
j (t) are the Lagrange multipliers associated to the
constraints x∗ij(t) ≥ xij(t), x∗ij(t) ≤ xij(t),
n∑
j=1
x∗ij(t) ≤ pi(t) and
m∑
i=1
x∗ij(t) ≤ qj(t), respec-
tively.
They, as it is well-known, have a topical importance on the understanding and the
management of the market. In fact, at a fixed time t ∈ [0, T ], we have:
(a) if λ∗ij(t) > 0 then, by using (2.4.10), we obtain x
∗
ij(t) = xij(t), namely the commodity
shipment between the firm Pi and the demand market Qj is minimum;
(b) if x∗ij(t) > xij(t) then, taking into account (2.4.10), λ
∗
ij(t) = 0 and, making use of
(2.4.9), it results ρ∗ij(t) + µ
∗
i (t) + ν
∗
j (t) =
∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
, namely ρ∗ij(t) + µ
∗
i (t) + ν
∗
j (t) is
equal to the marginal profit;
(c) if ρ∗ij(t) > 0 then, by using (2.4.11), we obtain x
∗
ij(t) = xij(t), namely the commodity
shipment between the firm Pi and the demand market Qj is maximum;
(d) if x∗ij(t) < xij(t) then, making use of (2.4.11), ρ
∗
ij(t) = 0 and, taking into account
(2.4.9), we get µ∗i (t) + ν
∗
j (t) − λ∗ij(t) =
∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
, namely µ∗i (t) + ν
∗
j (t) − λ∗ij(t) is
equal to the marginal profit;
(e) if µ∗i (t) > 0 then, for the condition (2.4.12), we have
n∑
j=1
x∗ij(t) = pi(t), namely there
is no production excess;
(f) if
n∑
j=1
x∗ij(t) < pi(t), as a consequence of (2.4.12) we get µ
∗
i (t) = 0 and, for the condition
(2.4.9), ρ∗ij(t) + ν
∗
j (t)− λ∗ij(t) =
∂vi(t, x
∗(t)
∂xij
, namely ρ∗ij(t) + ν
∗
j (t)− λ∗ij(t) is equal to
the marginal profit.
(g) if ν∗j (t) > 0 then, for the condition (2.4.13), it results
m∑
i=1
x∗ij(t) = qj(t), namely there
is no demand excess;
(h) if
m∑
i=1
x∗ij(t) < qj(t), as a consequence of (2.4.13) we obtain ν
∗
j (t) = 0 and, for the
condition (2.4.9), ρ∗ij(t) + µ
∗
i (t) − λ∗ij(t) =
∂vi(t, x
∗(t)
∂xij
, namely ρ∗ij(t) + µ
∗
i (t) − λ∗ij(t)
is equal to the marginal profit.
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It is worth to underline that in Definition 2.4.2, even if in (2.4.9) - (2.4.13) the unknown
Lagrange variables λ∗ij, ρ
∗
ij, µ
∗
i , ν
∗
j appear, they do not influence the equilibrium definition
because the following equivalent condition in terms of evolutionary variational inequality
holds:
Theorem 2.4.2. x∗ ∈ K is a dynamic oligopolistic market equilibrium in presence of
excesses according to Definition 2.4.2 if and only if it satisfies the evolutionary variational
inequality:∫ T
0
−
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
(xij(t)− x∗ij(t))dt ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ K. (2.4.14)
Taking into account Theorems 2.4.1 and 2.4.2, the equivalence between Definitions
2.4.1 and 2.4.2 is proved.
Finally, we observe that also in the case in which the production is bounded and we
are in presence of excesses, the meaning of Cournot-Nash equilibrium does not change.
In order to prove Theorem 2.4.2, let us show some preliminary results. At first we
recall Lemma 2.2.1 for the capacity constraints of the commodity shipments.
Lemma 2.4.1. Let x∗ ∈ K be a solution to the variational inequality (2.4.8) and let us
set,
E−ij =
{
t ∈ [0, T ] : x∗ij(t) = xij(t)
}
, ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, ∀j = 1, . . . , n,
E0ij =
{
t ∈ [0, T ] : xij(t) < x∗ij(t) < xij(t)
}
, ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, ∀j = 1, . . . , n,
E+ij =
{
t ∈ [0, T ] : x∗ij(t) = xij(t)
}
, ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, ∀j = 1, . . . , n.
Then, we have
∂vi(t, x(t))
∂xij
≤ 0, a.e. in E−ij ,
∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
= 0, a.e. in E0ij ,
∂vi(t, x(t))
∂xij
≥ 0, a.e. in E+ij .
Now, we recall Lemma 2.3.1 that holds when production excesses occur.
Lemma 2.4.2. Let x∗ ∈ K be a solution to the variational inequality (2.4.8). Setting
I0i =
{
t ∈ [0, T ] :
n∑
j=1
x∗ij(t) = pi(t)
}
, i = 1, . . . ,m,
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γ∗i (t) = min
{
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
, j = 1, . . . , n
}
, a.e. in I0i , i = 1, . . . ,m,
X0i =
{
t ∈ I0i : −
∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
> γ∗i (t)
}
, i = 1, . . . ,m,
and
Y 0i =
{
t ∈ I0i : −
∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
= γ∗i (t)
}
, i = 1, . . . ,m,
we have (
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
− γ∗i (t)
)
x∗ij(t) = 0, a.e. in I
0
i , ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, (2.4.15)
γ∗i (t) ≤ 0, a.e. in Y 0i , ∀i = 1, . . . ,m
and
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
≥ 0, a.e. in X0i , ∀j = 1, . . . , n.
With the same technique used for proving Lemma 2.4.2, we can obtain the following
analogous result that holds when demand excesses occur.
Lemma 2.4.3. Let x∗ ∈ K be a solution to the variational inequality (2.4.8). Setting
H0j =
{
t ∈ [0, T ] :
m∑
i=1
x∗ij(t) = qj(t)
}
, j = 1, . . . , n,
η∗j (t) = min
{
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
, i = 1, . . . ,m
}
, a.e. in H0j , j = 1, . . . , n,
V 0j =
{
t ∈ H0j : −
∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
> η∗j (t)
}
, j = 1, . . . , n,
and
W 0j =
{
t ∈ H0j : −
∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
= η∗j (t)
}
, j = 1, . . . , n,
we have (
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
− η∗j (t)
)
x∗ij(t) = 0, a.e. in H
0
j , j = 1, . . . , n, (2.4.16)
η∗j (t) ≤ 0, a.e. in W 0j , ∀j = 1, . . . , n
and
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
≥ 0, a.e. in V 0j , ∀i = 1, . . . ,m.
46
CHAPTER 2. THE DYNAMIC OLIGOPOLISTIC MARKET
EQUILIBRIUM PROBLEM
Now, we remind Lemma 2.3.2 that holds when production excesses occur.
Lemma 2.4.4. Let x∗ ∈ K be a solution to the variational inequality (2.4.8). Setting
I−i =
{
t ∈ [0, T ] :
n∑
j=1
x∗ij(t)− pi(t) < 0
}
, i = 1, . . . ,m,
we have
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
= 0, a.e. in I−i , ∀i = 1, . . . ,m. (2.4.17)
Finally, by proceeding as in Lemma 2.4.4 we can prove the following analogous result
that holds when demand excesses occur.
Lemma 2.4.5. Let x∗ ∈ K be a solution to the variational inequality (2.4.8). Setting
H−j =
{
t ∈ [0, T ] :
m∑
i=1
x∗ij(t)− qj(t) < 0
}
, j = 1, . . . , n,
we have
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
= 0, a.e. in H−j , ∀j = 1, . . . , n. (2.4.18)
Now we are able to prove Theorem 2.4.2.
Proof. Let us assume that x∗ ∈ K is an equilibrium solution according to Definition 2.4.2.
Then, taking into account that λ∗ij(t)(xij(t) − x∗ij(t)) = 0 and ρ∗ij(t)(x∗ij(t) − xij(t)) = 0,
a.e. in [0, T ], we have for every x ∈ K, a.e. in [0, T ],
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
(xij(t)− x∗ij(t)) = −ρ∗ij(t)(xij(t)− x∗ij(t))− µ∗i (t)(xij(t)− x∗ij(t))
−ν∗j (t)(xij(t)− x∗ij(t)) + λ∗ij(t)(xij(t)− x∗ij(t))
= −ρ∗ij(t)(xij(t)− xij(t))− µ∗i (t)(xij(t)− x∗ij(t))
−ν∗j (t)(xij(t)− x∗ij(t)) + λ∗ij(t)(xij(t)− xij(t))
≥ −µ∗i (t)(xij(t)− x∗ij(t))− ν∗j (t)(xij(t)− x∗ij(t)),
and, as a consequence, by summing over i = 1, . . . ,m and j = 1, . . . , n, integrating on
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[0, T ] and using the conditions (2.4.12) and (2.4.13), it results, for each x ∈ K∫ T
0
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
(xij(t)− x∗ij(t))dt
≥ −
m∑
i=1
∫ T
0
µ∗i (t)
(
n∑
j=1
xij(t)−
n∑
j=1
x∗ij(t) + pi(t)− pi(t)
)
dt
−
n∑
j=1
∫ T
0
ν∗j (t)
(
m∑
i=1
xij(t)−
m∑
i=1
x∗ij(t) + qj(t)− qj(t)
)
dt
= −
m∑
i=1
∫ T
0
µ∗i (t)
(
n∑
j=1
xij(t)− pi(t)
)
dt−
n∑
j=1
∫ T
0
ν∗j (t)
(
m∑
i=1
xij(t)− qj(t)
)
dt ≥ 0.
Hence, we obtain (2.4.8).
Vice versa, let x∗ ∈ K be a solution to (2.4.8) and let us apply the infinite dimensional
duality theory. First of all, let us prove that the Assumption S is fulfilled.
Let us set, for x ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rmn),
Ψ(x) =
∫ T
0
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
(xij(t)− x∗ij(t))dt
and
M˜ =
{(
Ψ(x) + α,−x+ x+ y, x− x+ u,
n∑
j=1
xij − pi + vi,
m∑
i=1
xij − qj + zj
)
:
i = 1, . . . ,m, j = 1, . . . , n, α ≥ 0, x ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rmn+ ) \K,
y, u ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rmn+ ), v ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rm+ ), z ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rn+)
}
,
we must show that if (l, θL2([0,T ],Rmn
+
), θL2([0,T ],Rmn
+
), θL2([0,T ],Rm
+
), θL2([0,T ],Rn
+
)) belongs to
T
M˜
(0, θL2([0,T ],Rmn
+
), θL2([0,T ],Rmn
+
), θL2([0,T ],Rm
+
), θL2([0,T ],Rn
+
)), namely
lim
n→+∞
λn(Ψ(x
n) + αn) = l,
lim
n→+∞
λn(−xn + x+ yn) = θL2([0,T ],Rmn
+
),
lim
n→+∞
λn(x
n − x+ un) = θL2([0,T ],Rmn
+
),
lim
n→+∞
λn
(
n∑
j=1
xnij − pi + vni
)
= θL2([0,T ],R+), ∀i = 1, . . . ,m,
lim
n→+∞
λn
(
m∑
i=1
xnij − qj + znj
)
= θL2([0,T ],R+), ∀j = 1, . . . , n,
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with λn ≥ 0, xn ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rmn+ ) \K, αn ≥ 0, yn, un ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rmn+ ),
vn ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rm+ ), zn ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rn+), ∀n ∈ N, and
lim
n→+∞
(Ψ(xn) + αn) = 0,
lim
n→+∞
(−xn + x+ yn) = θL2([0,T ],Rmn
+
),
lim
n→+∞
(xn + x+ un) = θL2([0,T ],Rmn
+
),
lim
n→+∞
(
n∑
j=1
xnij − pi + vni
)
= θL2([0,T ],R+), ∀i = 1, . . . ,m,
lim
n→+∞
(
m∑
i=1
xnij − qj + znj
)
= θL2([0,T ],R+), ∀j = 1, . . . , n,
then, l is non-negative.
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Let us set
E−ij =
{
t ∈ [0, T ] : x∗ij(t) = xij(t)
}
, i = 1, . . . ,m, j = 1, . . . , n,
E0ij =
{
t ∈ [0, T ] : xij(t) < x∗ij(t) < xij(t)
}
, i = 1, . . . ,m, j = 1, . . . , n,
E+ij =
{
t ∈ [0, T ] : x∗ij(t) = xij(t)
}
, i = 1, . . . ,m, j = 1, . . . , n,
I0i =
{
t ∈ [0, T ] :
n∑
j=1
x∗ij(t) = pi(t)
}
, i = 1, . . . ,m,
H0j =
{
t ∈ [0, T ] :
m∑
i=1
x∗ij(t) = qj(t)
}
, j = 1, . . . , n,
I−i =
{
t ∈ [0, T ] :
n∑
j=1
x∗ij(t)− pi(t) < 0
}
, i = 1, . . . ,m,
H−j =
{
t ∈ [0, T ] :
m∑
i=1
x∗ij(t)− qj(t) < 0
}
, j = 1, . . . , n,
γ∗i (t) = min
{
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
, j = 1, . . . , n
}
, t ∈ I0i , i = 1, . . . ,m,
η∗j (t) = min
{
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
, i = 1, . . . ,m
}
, t ∈ H0j , j = 1, . . . , n,
X0i =
{
t ∈ I0i : −
∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
> γ∗i (t)
}
, i = 1, . . . ,m,
Y 0i =
{
t ∈ I0i : −
∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
= γ∗i (t)
}
, i = 1, . . . ,m,
V 0j =
{
t ∈ H0j : −
∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
> η∗j (t)
}
, j = 1, . . . , n,
W 0j =
{
t ∈ H0j : −
∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
= η∗j (t)
}
, j = 1, . . . , n.
Before starting with the proof let us observe the following:
[0, T ] = I0i ∪
(
H0j \ I0i
) ∪ (I−i ∩H−j ) , ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, ∀j = 1, . . . , n
and also
[0, T ] = E−ij ∪ E0ij ∪ E+ij , ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, ∀j = 1, . . . , n.
Moreover
E−ij = E
−
ij ∩
[
I0i ∪
(
H0j \ I0i
) ∪ (I−i ∩H−j )]
=
(
E−ij ∩ I0i
) ∪ [E−ij ∩ (H0j \ I0i )] ∪ [E−ij ∩ (I−i ∩H−j )]
=
(
E−ij ∩X0i
) ∪ (E−ij ∩ Y 0i ) ∪ [E−ij ∩ (V 0j \ I0i )]
∪ [E−ij ∩ (W 0j \ I0i )] ∪ [E−ij ∩ (I−i ∩H−j )] , ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, ∀j = 1, . . . , n,
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and, analogously,
E0ij =
(
E0ij ∩X0i
)∪(E0ij ∩ Y 0i )∪[E0ij ∩ (V 0j \ I0i )]∪[E0ij ∩ (W 0j \ I0i )]∪[E0ij ∩ (I−i ∩H−j )] ,
∀i = 1, . . . ,m, ∀j = 1, . . . , n, and
E+ij =
(
E+ij ∩X0i
)∪(E+ij ∩ Y 0i )∪[E+ij ∩ (V 0j \ I0i )]∪[E+ij ∩ (W 0j \ I0i )]∪[E+ij ∩ (I−i ∩H−j )] ,
∀i = 1, . . . ,m,∀j = 1, . . . , n.
Now we observe that, for Lemmas 2.4.1, 2.4.2, 2.4.3, 2.4.4 and 2.4.5, we get
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
= 0, a.e. in E0ij, ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, ∀j = 1, . . . , n,
−∂vi(t, x(t))
∂xij
≥ 0, a.e. in E−ij ∩X0i , ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, ∀j = 1, . . . , n,
−∂vi(t, x(t))
∂xij
= γ∗i (t) = 0, a.e. in E
−
ij ∩ Y 0i , ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, ∀j = 1, . . . , n,
−∂vi(t, x(t))
∂xij
≥ 0, a.e. in E−ij ∩
(
V 0j \ I0i
)
, ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, ∀j = 1, . . . , n,
−∂vi(t, x(t))
∂xij
= η∗j (t) = 0, a.e. in E
−
ij ∩
(
W 0j \ I0i
)
, ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, ∀j = 1, . . . , n,
−∂vi(t, x(t))
∂xij
= 0, a.e. in E−ij ∩
(
I−i ∩H−j
)
, ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, ∀j = 1, . . . , n,
−∂vi(t, x(t))
∂xij
= 0, a.e. in E+ij ∩X0i , ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, ∀j = 1, . . . , n,
−∂vi(t, x(t))
∂xij
= γ∗i (t) ≤ 0, a.e. in E+ij ∩ Y 0i , ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, ∀j = 1, . . . , n,
−∂vi(t, x(t))
∂xij
= 0, a.e. in E+ij ∩
(
V 0j \ I0i
)
, ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, ∀j = 1, . . . , n,
−∂vi(t, x(t))
∂xij
= η∗j (t) ≤ 0, a.e. in E+ij ∩
(
W 0j \ I0i
)
, ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, ∀j = 1, . . . , n,
−∂vi(t, x(t))
∂xij
= 0, a.e. in E+ij ∩
(
I−i ∩H−j
)
, ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, ∀j = 1, . . . , n.
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As a consequence, we have
l = lim
n→+∞
λn(Ψ(x
n) + αn)
= lim
n→+∞
λn
(∫ T
0
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
(xnij(t)− x∗ij(t))dt+ αn
)
≥ lim
n→+∞
λn
(∫
E−ij
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
(xnij(t)− xij(t))dt
+
∫
E0ij
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
(xnij(t)− x∗ij(t))dt
+
∫
E+ij
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
(xnij(t)− xij(t))dt
)
.
We can observe that
lim
n→+∞
λn
∫
E0ij
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
(xnij(t)− x∗ij(t))dt = 0 (2.4.19)
being −∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
= 0, a.e. in E0ij, ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, ∀j = 1, . . . , n.
We will prove that
lim
n→+∞
λn
∫
E−ij
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
−∂vi(t, x(t)))
∂xij
(xnij(t)− xij(t))dt ≥ 0 (2.4.20)
and
lim
n→+∞
λn
∫
E+ij
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
−∂vi(t, x(t))
∂xij
(xnij(t)− xij(t))dt ≥ 0. (2.4.21)
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It results
λn
∫
E−ij
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
−∂vi(t, x(t))
∂xij
(xnij(t)− xij(t))dt
= λn
∫
E−ij∩X
0
i
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
−∂vi(t, x(t))
∂xij
(xnij(t)− xij(t))dt
+λn
∫
E−ij∩Y
0
i
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
−∂vi(t, x(t))
∂xij
(xnij(t)− xij(t))dt
+λn
∫
E−ij∩(V
0
j \I
0
i )
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
−∂vi(t, x(t))
∂xij
(xnij(t)− xij(t))dt
+λn
∫
E−ij∩(W
0
j \I
0
i )
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
−∂vi(t, x(t))
∂xij
(xnij(t)− xij(t))dt
+λn
∫
E−ij∩I
−
i ∩H
−
j
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
−∂vi(t, x(t))
∂xnij
(xnij(t)− xij(t))dt
= λn
∫
E−ij∩X
0
i
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
−∂vi(t, x(t))
∂xij
xnij(t)dt
+λn
∫
E−ij∩(V
0
j \I
0
i )
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
−∂vi(t, x(t))
∂xij
xnij(t)dt.
By virtue of the previous remarks, conditions (2.4.15) and (2.4.16), Lemmas 2.4.1, 2.4.2,
2.4.3, 2.4.4 and 2.4.5, for the conditions of belonging to the tangent cone, we get the
inequality (2.4.20) and, with analogous considerations, we get the inequality (2.4.21).
Therefore, thanks to (2.4.20), (2.4.19), (2.4.21) we have that
l = lim
n→+∞
λn(Ψ(x
n) + αn)
= lim
n→+∞
λn
(∫ T
0
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
(xnij(t)− x∗ij(t))dt+ αn
)
is non-negative.
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Taking into account Theorems 1.2.2 and 1.2.3, if we consider the Lagrange function
L(x, λ, ρ, µ, ν) = Ψ(x) +
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
∫ T
0
λij(t)(xij(t)− xij(t))dt
+
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
∫ T
0
ρij(t)(xij(t)− xij(t))dt
+
m∑
i=1
∫ T
0
µi(t)
(
n∑
j=1
xij(t)− pi(t)
)
dt
+
n∑
j=1
∫ T
0
νj(t)
(
m∑
i=1
xij(t)− qj(t)
)
dt,
∀x ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rmn+ ), λ, ρ ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rmn+ ), µ ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rm+ ), ν ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rn+),
we have that there exist λ∗, ρ∗ ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rmn+ ), µ∗ ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rm+ ), ν∗ ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rn+)
such that
L(x∗, λ, ρ, µ, ν) ≤ L(x∗, λ∗, ρ∗, µ∗, ν∗) ≤ L(x, λ∗, ρ∗, µ∗, ν∗) (2.4.22)
∀x ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rmn+ ), λ, ρ ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rmn+ ), µ ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rm+ ), ν ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rn+), and,
〈〈λ∗, x− x∗〉〉 =
∫ T
0
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
λ∗ij(t)(xij(t)− x∗ij(t))dt = 0,
〈〈ρ∗, x∗ − x〉〉 =
∫ T
0
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
ρ∗ij(t)(x
∗
ij(t)− xij(t))dt = 0,〈〈
µ∗,
n∑
j=1
x∗ij(t)− pi(t)
〉〉
=
∫ T
0
m∑
i=1
[
µ∗i (t)
(
n∑
j=1
x∗ij(t)− pi(t)
)]
dt = 0,〈〈
ν∗,
m∑
i=1
x∗ij(t)− qj(t)
〉〉
=
∫ T
0
n∑
j=1
[
ν∗i (t)
(
m∑
i=1
x∗ij(t)− qj(t)
)]
dt = 0.
Hence,
λ∗ij(t)(xij(t)− x∗ij(t)) = 0, ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, ∀j = 1, . . . , n, (2.4.23)
ρ∗ij(t)(x
∗
ij(t)− xij(t)) = 0, ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, ∀j = 1, . . . , n, (2.4.24)
µ∗i (t)
(
n∑
j=1
x∗ij(t)− pi(t)
)
= 0, ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, (2.4.25)
ν∗j (t)
(
m∑
i=1
x∗ij(t)− qj(t)
)
= 0, ∀j = 1, . . . , n. (2.4.26)
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Then, for conditions (2.4.23) – (2.4.26), L(x∗, λ∗, ρ∗, µ∗, ν∗) = 0, and by virtue of the
right-hand side of (2.4.22) and the equalities (2.4.23)-(2.4.26), we get
L(x, λ∗, ρ∗, µ∗, ν∗) =
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
∫ T
0
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
(xij(t)− x∗ij(t))dt
−
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
∫ T
0
λ∗ij(t)(xij(t)− x∗ij(t))dt
+
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
∫ T
0
ρ∗ij(t)(xij(t)− x∗ij(t))dt
+
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
∫ T
0
µ∗i (t)(xij(t)− x∗ij(t))dt
+
n∑
j=1
m∑
i=1
∫ T
0
ν∗j (t)(xij(t)− x∗ij(t))dt
≥ L(x∗, λ∗, ρ∗, µ∗, ν∗) = 0, ∀x ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rmn+ ).
Then, L(x, λ∗, ρ∗, µ∗, ν∗) has a minimal point in x∗.
Let us assume that x1ij = x
∗
ij + εij and x
2
ij = x
∗
ij − εij, for all ε ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rmn+ ). Let
us note that
L(x1, λ∗, ρ∗, µ∗, ν∗) =
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
∫ T
0
[
−
∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
− λ∗ij(t) + ρ
∗
ij(t) + µ
∗
i (t) + ν
∗
j (t)
]
εij(t)dt ≥ 0,
∀ε ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rmn+ ) and
L(x2, λ∗, ρ∗, µ∗, ν∗) = −
{ m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
∫ T
0
[
−
∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
− λ∗ij(t) + ρ
∗
ij(t) + µ
∗
i (t) + ν
∗
j (t)
]
εij(t)dt
}
≥ 0,
∀ε ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rmn+ ).
As a consequence, we have
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
∫ T
0
[
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
− λ∗ij(t) + ρ∗ij(t) + µ∗i (t) + ν∗j (t)
]
εij(t)dt = 0,
∀ǫ ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rmn+ ),
namely, we get the equilibrium conditions of Definition 2.4.2,
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
+ ρ∗ij(t) + µ
∗
i (t) + ν
∗
j (t) = λ
∗
ij(t),
λ∗ij(t)(xij(t)− x∗ij(t)) = 0, λ∗ij(t) ≥ 0,
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Figure 2.3: Network structure of the numerical dynamic spatial oligopoly problem.
ρ∗ij(t)(x
∗
ij(t)− xij(t)) = 0, ρ∗ij(t) ≥ 0,
µ∗i (t)
(
n∑
j=1
x∗ij(t)− pi(t)
)
= 0, µ∗i (t) ≥ 0,
ν∗j (t)
(
m∑
i=1
x∗ij(t)− qj(t)
)
= 0, ν∗j (t) ≥ 0.
for each i = 1, . . . ,m, j = 1, . . . , n and a.e. in [0, T ] .
2.4.3 A numerical example
Let us present a numerical example about the dynamic oligopolistic market equilibrium
problem in presence of both production and demand excesses.
Let us consider four firms and four demand markets, as in Figure 2.3. Let x, x ∈
L2([0, 1],R16+ ) be the capacity constraints such that, a.e. in [0, 1],
x(t) =

1
2
t 0
1
100
t
1
2
t
t
1
4
t 0
1
10
t
3
100
t
1
4
t
1
10
t
1
4
t
4
7
t
2
7
t
1
10
t 0

,
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x(t) =

t 2t t 4t
2t
3
2
t
10
11
t
5
6
t
t
3
4
t 3t
3
4
t
6
7
t
6
7
t
3
7
t
1
2
t

.
Let p ∈ L2([0, 1],R4+) be the production function such that, a.e. in [0, 1],
p(t) =

5t
7t
9t
11t
 ,
and let q ∈ L2([0, 1],R4+) be the demand function such that, a.e. in [0, 1],
q(t) =

6t
8t
10t
12t
 .
As a consequence, the feasible set is
K =
{
x ∈ L2([0, 1] ,R16+ ) :
xij(t) ≤ xij(t) ≤ xij(t), ∀i = 1, . . . , 4, ∀j = 1, . . . , 4, a.e. in [0, 1] ,
4∑
j=1
xij(t) ≤ pi(t), ∀i = 1, . . . , 4, a.e. in [0, 1] ,
4∑
i=1
xij(t) ≤ qj(t), ∀j = 1, . . . , 4, a.e. in [0, 1]
}
.
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Let us consider the profit function v ∈ L2([0, 1]× L2([0, 1],R4×4+ ),R4) defined by
v1(t, x(t)) = −4x211(t)− 6x212(t)− 2x213(t)− 4x214(t)− 2x11(t)x13(t)− 2x12(t)x14(t)
+3tx11(t) + 6tx12(t) + tx13(t) + 5tx14(t),
v2(t, x(t)) = −2x221(t)− 5x222(t)− 6x223(t)− 2x224(t)− 2x21(t)x23(t)− 2x22(t)x31(t)
−2x24(t)x33(t) + 6tx21(t) + 5tx22(t) + 4tx23(t) + tx24(t),
v3(t, x(t)) = −3x231(t)− 4x232(t)− 2x233(t)− 2x234(t)− 2x22(t)x31(t)− 2x24(t)x33(t)
−2x32(t)x34(t) + 2tx31(t) + 5tx32(t) + tx33(t) + 3tx34(t),
v4(t, x(t)) = −4x241(t)− 4x242(t)− 2x243(t)− 2x244(t)− 2x41(t)x43(t)− 2x42(t)x44(t)
+6tx41(t) + 5tx42(t) + 2tx43(t) + 2tx44(t).
Then, the operator ∇Dv ∈ L2([0, 1]× L2([0, 1],R4×4+ ),R4×4) is given by
∇Dv(t, x(t)) =


−8x11(t)− 2x13(t) + 3t −12x12(t)− 2x14(t) + 6t −4x13(t)− 2x11(t) + t −8x14(t)− 2x12(t) + 5t
−4x21(t)− 2x23(t) + 6t −10x22(t)− 2x31(t) + 5t −12x23(t)− 2x21(t) + 4t −4x24(t)− 2x33(t) + t
−6x31(t)− 2x22(t) + 2t −8x32(t)− 2x34(t) + 5t −4x33(t)− 2x24(t) + t −4x34(t)− 2x32(t) + 3t
−8x41(t)− 2x43(t) + 6t −8x42(t)− 2x44(t) + 5t −4x43(t)− 2x41(t) + 2t −4x44(t)− 2x42(t) + 2t


.
Now, we verify that −∇Dv is a strongly monotone operator, in fact
〈−∇Dv(x) +∇Dv(y), x− y〉
=
{
8[x11 − y11] + 2[x13 − y13]
}
[x11 − y11] +
{
12[x12 − y12] + 2[x14 − y14]
}
[x12 − y12]
+
{
4[x13 − y13] + 2[x11 − y11]
}
[x13 − y13] +
{
8[x14 − y14] + 2[x12 − y12]
}
[x14 − y14]
+
{
4[x21 − y21] + 2[x23 − y23]
}
[x21 − y21] +
{
10[x22 − y22] + 2[x31 − y31]
}
[x22 − y22]
+
{
12[x23 − y23] + 2(x21 − y21][x23 − y23] +
{
4[x24 − y24] + 2[x33 − y33]
}
[x24 − y24]
+
{
6[x31 − y31] + 2[x22 − y22]
}
[x31 − y31] +
{
8[x32 − y32] + 2[x34 − y34]
}
[x32 − y32]
+
{
4[x33 − y33] + 2[x24 − y24]
}
[x33 − y33] +
{
4[x34 − y34] + 2[x32 − y32]
}
[x34 − y34]
+
{
8[x41 − y41] + 2[x43 − y43]
}
[x41 − y41] +
{
8[x42 − y42] + 2[x44 − y44]
}
[x42 − y42]
+
{
4[x43 − y43] + 2[x41 − y41]
}
[x43 − y43] +
{
4[x44 − y44] + 2[x42 − y42]
}
[x44 − y44]
≥ 3‖x− y‖24×4.
The dynamic oligopolistic market equilibrium distribution in presence of excesses is the
solution to the evolutionary variational inequality:∫ 1
0
4∑
i=1
4∑
j=1
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
(xij(t)− x∗ij(t))dt ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ K. (2.4.27)
In order to compute the solution to (2.4.27) we make use of the direct method (see
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[29, 34, 70]). We consider the following system

8x∗11(t) + 2x
∗
13(t)− 3t = 0, 12x∗12(t) + 2x∗14(t)− 6t = 0, 4x∗13(t) + 2x∗11(t)− t = 0,
8x∗14(t) + 2x
∗
12(t)− 5t = 0, 4x∗21(t) + 2x∗23(t)− 6t = 0, 10x∗22(t) + 2x∗31(t)− 5t = 0,
12x∗23(t) + 2x
∗
21(t)− 4t = 0, 4x∗24(t) + 2x∗33(t)− t = 0, 6x∗31(t) + 2x∗22(t)− 2t = 0,
8x∗32(t) + 2x
∗
34(t)− 5t = 0, 4x∗33(t) + 2x∗24(t)− t = 0, 4x∗34(t) + 2x∗32(t)− 3t = 0,
8x∗41(t) + 2x
∗
43(t)− 6t = 0, 8x∗42(t) + 2x∗44(t)− 5t = 0, 4x∗43(t) + 2x∗41(t)− 2t = 0,
4x∗44(t) + 2x
∗
42(t)− 2t = 0,
xij(t) ≤ xij(t) ≤ xij(t), ∀i = 1, . . . , 4, ∀j = 1, . . . , 4,
n∑
j=1
xij(t) ≤ pi(t), ∀i = 1, . . . , 4,
m∑
i=1
xij(t) ≤ qj(t), ∀j = 1, . . . , 4,
.
and we get the following solution, a.e. in [0, 1],
x∗(t) =

5
14
t
19
46
t
1
14
t
12
23
t
16
11
t
13
28
t
1
11
t
1
6
t
5
28
t
1
2
t
1
6
t
1
2
t
5
7
t
4
7
t
1
7
t
3
14
t

.
It is easy to prove that x∗ belongs to the constraint set K, then it is the equilibrium
solution.
Now, we are able to compute the production excess of each firm and the demand excess
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of each demand market
ǫ1(t) = p1(t)−
4∑
j=1
x∗1j(t) = 5t−
439
322
t =
1610
322
t, a.e. in [0, 1] ,
ǫ2(t) = p2(t)−
4∑
j=1
x∗2j(t) = 7t−
2014
924
t =
4454
924
t, a.e. in [0, 1] ,
ǫ3(t) = p3(t)−
4∑
j=1
x∗3j(t) = 9t−
113
84
t =
643
84
t, a.e. in [0, 1] ,
ǫ4(t) = p4(t)−
4∑
j=1
x∗3j(t) = 11t−
23
14
t =
131
14
t, a.e. in [0, 1] ,
δ1(t) = q1(t)−
4∑
i=1
x∗i1(t) = 6t−
833
308
t =
1015
308
t, a.e. in [0, 1] ,
δ2(t) = q2(t)−
4∑
i=1
x∗i2(t) = 8t−
1255
644
t =
3897
644
t, a.e. in [0, 1] ,
δ3(t) = q3(t)−
4∑
i=1
x∗i3(t) = 10t−
218
462
t =
4402
462
t, a.e. in [0, 1] ,
δ4(t) = q4(t)−
4∑
i=1
x∗i4(t) = 12t−
1355
966
t =
10237
966
t, a.e. in [0, 1] .
Making use of the equilibrium conditions (2.4.9) – (2.4.13), we derive:
λ∗ij(t) = 0, ∀i = 1, . . . , 4, ∀j = 1, . . . , 4, a.e. in [0, 1],
ρ∗ij(t) = 0, ∀i = 1, . . . , 4, ∀j = 1, . . . , 4, a.e. in [0, 1],
µ∗i (t) = 0, ∀i = 1, . . . , 4, a.e. in [0, 1],
ν∗j (t) = 0, ∀j = 1, . . . , 4, a.e. in [0, 1].
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Existence and regularity
3.1 Introduction
In optimization theory it is important to answer to the question if there exists a solution
to the problem by giving a look, in first analysis, to the structure of the constraint set
and to the nature of the functions that define the problem. There exists a vast literature
about this question (see, for example, [71, 87, 101]).
Another important question in optimization is the structure of the equilibrium solu-
tion. To know if it shows elements of regularity proves to be very important to build some
computational procedures to compute the solution. The regularity results that we show
in this chapter are all based on set convergence in Kuratowski’s sense (see [61, 74, 93, 94]),
namely we present regularity results for evolutionary variational inequalities which depend
explicity on the time and the constraint set K satisfies the next assumption:
(K) K ⊆ L2([0, T ] ,Rm) is a nonempty convex, closed set, such that the sequence
{K(tn)}n∈N converges to K(t) in Kuratowski’s sense, for each t ∈ [0, T ] , and the
sequence {tn}n∈N ⊆ [0, T ] , such that tn → t, as n→ +∞.
For more details, see [2–6, 8].
Moreover, in [10], a Lipschitz continuity result, which depends on the variation rate of
projections onto time-dependent constraints set, is shown (see also [23, 46, 73, 105]).
Finally, in [12] some sensitivity results have been obtained each of them showing that
small changes of the solution happen in correspondence with small changes of the profit
function (see also [64, 65]).
3.2 Existence results
This section is devoted to show some results for the existence of solutions to the dynamic
oligopolistic market equilibrium problem.
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Theorem 3.2.1. Let us set
A =
[
−∂vi(x
∗)
∂xij
]
i = 1, . . . ,m
j = 1, . . . , n
,
A : L2([0, T ] ,Rmn) −→ L2([0, T ] ,Rmn),
u = (xij) i = 1, . . . ,m
j = 1, . . . , n
,
let K be the constraint sets considered in chapter 2.
If A is B-pseudomonotone or F-hemicontinuous, or assuming that A is K-pseudomonotone
and lower hemicontinuous along line segments, then the variational inequality
≪ Ax∗, x− x∗ ≫≥ 0, ∀x ∈ K, (3.2.1)
admits a solution.
Proof. Let us note that K is clearly a nonempty, closed, convex and bounded subset of
L2([0, T ] ,Rmn) and, consequently, it is a weakly compact subset of L2([0, T ] ,Rmn).Then,
the claim is achieved by applying Theorems 2.6 and 2.7 and Corollary 3.7 in [71].
3.3 Regularity results
In the following, we want to establish conditions under which the solutions to dynamic
oligopolistic market problems with both production and demand excesses are continuous
with respect to time.
3.3.1 Set convergence
Let us remind the classical notion of convergence for subsets of a given metric space (X, d),
which was introduced in the 50’s by Kuratowski (see [61], see also [93, 94]).
Let {Kn}n∈N be a sequence of subsets of X. Let us remind that
d− limnKn = {x ∈ X : ∃{xn}n∈N eventually in Kn such that xn d→ x},
and
d− limnKn = {x ∈ X : ∃{xn}n∈N frequently in Kn such that xn d→ x},
where eventually means that there exists δ ∈ N such that xn ∈ Kn for any n ≥ δ, and
frequently means that there exists an infinite subset N ⊆ N such that xn ∈ Kn for any
n ∈ N (in this last case, according to the notation given above, we also write that there
exists a subsequence {xkn}n∈N ⊆ {xn}n∈N such that xkn ∈ Kkn).
Now, we are able to recall the Kuratowski’s convergence of sets.
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Definition 3.3.1. We say that the sequence {Kn}n∈N converges to some subset K ⊆ X
in Kuratowski’s sense, and we briefly write Kn → K, iff d− limnKn = d− limnKn = K.
Thus, in order to verify that Kn → K, it suffices to check that
• K ⊂ d − limnKn, i.e. for any x ∈ K there exists a sequence {xn}n∈N eventually in
Kn such that xn
d→ x;
• d− limnKn ⊆ K, i.e. for any sequence {xn}n∈N frequently in Kn such that xn d→ x
for some x ∈ S, then x ∈ K.
We observe that the set convergence in Kuratowski’s sense can also be expressed as
follows:
Remark 3.3.1. Let (X, d) be a metric space and K a nonempty, closed and convex
subset of X. A sequence of nonempty, closed and convex sets Kn of X converges to K in
Kuratowski’s sense, as n→ +∞, i.e. Kn → K, if and only if
(K1) for any x ∈ K, there exists a sequence {xn}n∈N converging to x ∈ X such that xn
lies in Kn for all n ∈ N,
(K2) for any subsequence {xn}n∈N converging to x ∈ X such that xn lies in Kn, for all
n ∈ N, then the limit x belongs to K.
The following lemmas, that now we prove, assure that the feasible sets K of the
dynamic oligopolistic market problem satisfy the property of the set convergence in Ku-
ratowski’s sense.
Lemma 3.3.1. [9] Let x, x ∈ C0 ([0, T ] ,Rmn+ ) and let {tk}k∈N be a sequence such that
tk ∈ [0, T ], ∀k ∈ N, and tk → t, with t ∈ [0, T ] , as k → +∞. Then the sequence of sets
K(tk) =
{
x(tk) ∈ Rmn : xij(tk) ≤ xij(tk) ≤ xij(tk), ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, ∀j = 1, . . . , n
}
∀k ∈ N, converges to
K(t) =
{
x(t) ∈ Rmn : xij(t) ≤ xij(t) ≤ xij(t), ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, ∀j = 1, . . . , n
}
,
as k → +∞, in Kuratowski’s sense.
Proof. In the first part, we prove the condition (K1). Let {tk}k∈N be a sequence such that
tk ∈ [0, T ], ∀k ∈ N, and tk → t, with t ∈ [0, T ] , as k → +∞.Let x(t) ∈ K(t) be fixed and
let us consider the following sequence:
x(tn) = x(tn) + min {x(t)− x(t), x(tn)− x(tn)} , ∀n ∈ N.
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Let us verify that x(tn) ∈ K(tn), ∀n ∈ N. Since min {x(t)− x(t), x(tn)− x(tn)} ≥ 0, ∀n ∈
N, it results x(tn) ≥ x(tn), ∀n ∈ N. Moreover, from min {x(t)− x(t), x(tn)− x(tn)} ≤
x(tn)− x(tn), ∀n ∈ N, it follows x(tn) ≤ x(tn), ∀n ∈ N.
Taking into account that, for continuity assumptions and for x(t) ∈ K(t),
lim
n→+∞
x(tn) = lim
n→+∞
{x(tn) + min {x(t)− x(t), x(tn)− x(tn)}}
x(t) + min {x(t)− x(t), x(t)− x(t)} = x(t),
the condition (K1) is achieved.
Now let us prove the condition (K2). Let {tk}k∈N be a sequence such that tk ∈ [0, T ] ,
∀k ∈ N, and tk → t, with t ∈ [0, T ] , as k → +∞. Let {x(tk)}k∈N be a sequence, such
that x(tk) ∈ K(tk), ∀k ∈ N, and converging to x(t), as k → +∞. We need to prove that
x(t) ∈ K(t).
Since x(tk) ∈ K(tk), ∀k ∈ N, it results
xij(tk) ≤ xij(tk) ≤ xij(tk), ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, ∀j = 1, . . . , n, ∀k ∈ N.
Passing to the limit as n → +∞ and taking into account the continuity assumption on
the functions x, x, we obtain
xij(t) ≤ xij(t) ≤ xij(t), ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, ∀j = 1, . . . , n.
As a consequence x(t) ∈ K(t), and, hence, the condition (K2) is achieved.
Lemma 3.3.2. Let p ∈ C ([0, T ] ,Rm+) and let {tk}k∈N be a sequence such that tk → t,
with t ∈ [0, T ] , as k → +∞. Then, the sequence of sets
K(tk) =
{
x(tk) ∈ Rmn : xij(tk) ≥ 0, ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, ∀j = 1, . . . , n,
n∑
j=1
xij(tk) ≤ pi(tk), ∀i = 1, . . . ,m
}
converges to
K(t) =
{
x(t) ∈ Rmn : xij(t) ≥ 0, ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, ∀j = 1, . . . , n,
n∑
j=1
xij(t) ≤ pi(t), ∀i = 1, . . . ,m
}
as k → +∞, in Kuratowski’s sense.
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Proof. First of all, let us prove the condition (K1). Let {tk}k∈N be a sequence such that
tk → t, with t ∈ [0, T ] , as k → +∞. Owing to the continuity of p, p(tk) → p(t), as
k → +∞, follows. Let x(t) ∈ K(t) be fixed and let us observe that, for i = 1, . . . ,m and
j = 1, . . . , n, it results
lim
k→+∞
[
xij(t) +
1
n
pi(tk)− 1
n
pi(t)
]
= xij(t) ≥ 0.
Then there exists an index ν such that for k > ν, i = 1, . . . ,m and j = 1, . . . , n we have
xij(t) +
1
n
pi(tk)− 1
n
pi(t) ≥ 0.
Hence we can consider a sequence {x(tk)}k∈N such that:
• for k > ν, i = 1, . . . ,m and j = 1, . . . , n
xij(tk) := xij(t) +
1
n
pi(tk)− 1
n
pi(t), (3.3.1)
• and for k ≤ ν, i = 1, . . . ,m and j = 1, . . . , n
xij(tk) := PK(tk)xij(t),
where PK(tk) denotes the Hilbertian projection on K(tk).
Obviously if k ≤ ν we get x(tk) ∈ K(tk), whereas for k > ν we have
xij(tk) ≥ 0, ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, ∀j = 1, . . . , n
and
n∑
j=1
xij(tk) =
n∑
j=1
xij(t) + pi(tk)− pi(t)
≤
n∑
j=1
xij(t) + pi(tk)−
n∑
j=1
xij(t)
= pi(tk), ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, ∀j = 1, . . . , n.
Hence x(tk) ∈ K(tk), ∀k ∈ N, and it results lim
k→+∞
x(tk) = x(t). Then, the proof of the
condition (K1) is completed.
Let us prove, now, the condition (K2). Let {tk}k∈N be a sequence such that tk → t,
with t ∈ [0, T ] , as k → +∞. Let {x(tk)}k∈N be a fixed sequence, such that x(tk) ∈ K(tk),
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∀k ∈ N, and converging to x(t), as k → +∞. We need to prove that x(t) ∈ K(t). Since
x(tk) ∈ K(tk), ∀k ∈ N, it results
xij(tk) ≥ 0, ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, ∀j = 1, . . . , n, ∀k ∈ N,
n∑
j=1
xij(tk) ≤ pi(tk), ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, ∀k ∈ N.
Passing to the limit as n→ +∞ and using the continuity assumption on the function p,
we obtain
xij(t) ≥ 0, ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, ∀j = 1, . . . , n,
n∑
j=1
xij(t) ≤ pi(t), ∀i = 1, . . . ,m.
Then x(t) ∈ K(t), and, hence, the proof of the condition (K2) has been completed.
Lemma 3.3.3. Let x, x ∈ C0 ([0, T ] ,Rmn+ ) , p ∈ C0 ([0, T ] ,Rm+), q ∈ C0 ([0, T ] ,Rn+) and
let {tk}k∈N be a sequence such that tk ∈ [0, T ], ∀k ∈ N, and tk → t, with t ∈ [0, T ] , as
k → +∞. Then the sequence of sets
K(tk) =
{
x(tk) ∈ Rmn : xij(tk) ≤ xij(tk) ≤ xij(tk), ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, ∀j = 1, . . . , n,
n∑
j=1
xij(tk) ≤ pi(tk), ∀i = 1, . . . ,m,
m∑
i=1
xij(tk) ≤ qj(tk), ∀j = 1, . . . , n
}
∀k ∈ N, converges to
K(t) =
{
x(t) ∈ Rmn : xij(t) ≤ xij(t) ≤ xij(t), ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, ∀j = 1, . . . , n,
n∑
j=1
xij(t) ≤ pi(t), ∀i = 1, . . . ,m,
m∑
i=1
xij(t) ≤ qj(t), ∀j = 1, . . . , n
}
,
as k → +∞, in Kuratowski’s sense.
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Proof. In the first part, we prove the condition (K1). Let {tk}k∈N be a sequence such that
tk ∈ [0, T ], ∀k ∈ N, and tk → t, with t ∈ [0, T ] , as k → +∞. By virtue of the continuity
of x, x, p, q, it follows that x(tk) → x(t), x(tk) → x(t), p(tk) → p(t), q(tk) → q(t), as
k → +∞, respectively. Let x(t) ∈ K(t) be fixed and let us note that, for i = 1, . . . ,m and
j = 1, . . . , n, and if
aij(tk) = xij(t)− xij(tk) +
mpi(tk) + nqj(tk)
mn
− mpi(t) + nqj(t)
mn
,
it results
lim
k→+∞
aij(tk) = xij(t)− xij(t) ≥ 0.
As a consequence, there exists an index ν1 such that for k > ν1 we get
aij(tk) ≥ 0, ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, ∀j = 1, . . . , n. (3.3.2)
We remark
lim
k→+∞
[
1
m
n∑
j=1
qj(tk)− 1
m
n∑
j=1
qj(t)− ǫi(t)
]
= −ǫi(t) ≤ 0, ∀i = 1, . . . ,m,
where ǫ is the production excess function. Then, there exists an index ν2 such that for
k > ν2 we have
1
m
n∑
j=1
qj(tk)− 1
m
n∑
j=1
qj(t)− ǫi(t) ≤ 0, ∀i = 1, . . . ,m. (3.3.3)
Moreover, we get
lim
k→+∞
[
1
n
m∑
i=1
pi(tk)− 1
n
m∑
i=1
pi(t)− δj(t)
]
= −δj(t) ≤ 0, ∀j = 1, . . . , n,
where δ is the demand excess function. Hence, there exists an index ν3 such that for
k > ν3 we have
1
n
m∑
i=1
pi(tk)− 1
n
m∑
i=1
pi(t)− δj(t) ≤ 0, ∀j = 1, . . . , n. (3.3.4)
As a consequence, we can consider a sequence {x(tk)}k∈N such that:
• for k > ν = max{ν1, ν2, ν3}, ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, ∀j = 1, . . . , n,
xij(tk) = xij(tk) + min{xij(t)− xij(t), xij(tk)− xij(tk), aij(tk)}, (3.3.5)
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• for k ≤ ν, ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, ∀j = 1, . . . , n,
xij(tk) = PK(tk)xij(t), (3.3.6)
where PK(tk)(·) denotes the Hilbertian projection on K(tk).
Obviously if k ≤ ν, for (3.3.6) we get x(tk) ∈ K(tk). Instead, for k > ν, since for
(3.3.2), min{xij(t)− xij(t), xij(tk)− xij(tk), aij(tk)} ≥ 0, ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, ∀j = 1, . . . , n, we
obtain
xij(tk) ≤ xij(tk), ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, ∀j = 1, . . . , n.
Moreover, since min{xij(t)− xij(t), xij(tk)− xij(tk), aij(tk)} ≤ xij(tk)− xij(tk),
∀i = 1, . . . ,m, ∀j = 1, . . . , n, we have
xij(tk) ≤ xij(tk), ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, ∀j = 1, . . . , n.
Now, being
min{xij(t)− xij(t), xij(tk)− xij(tk), aij(tk)}
≤ aij(tk)
= xij(t)− xij(tk) +
mpi(tk) + nqj(tk)
mn
− mpi(t) + nqj(t)
mn
∀i = 1, . . . ,m, ∀j = 1, . . . , n,
it results
xij(tk) ≤ xij(t) + mpi(tk) + nqj(tk)
mn
− mpi(t) + nqj(t)
mn
, ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, ∀j = 1, . . . , n.
(3.3.7)
Then, taking into account (3.3.3), we get
n∑
j=1
xij(tk) ≤
n∑
j=1
xij(t) + pi(tk) +
1
m
n∑
j=1
qj(tk)− pi(t)− 1
m
n∑
j=1
qj(t)
≤
n∑
j=1
xij(t) + pi(tk)− pi(t) + ǫi(t)
=
n∑
j=1
xij(t) + pi(tk)−
n∑
j=1
xij(t)− ǫi(t) + ǫi(t)
= pi(tk), ∀i = 1, . . . ,m,
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and, making use of (3.3.4), we obtain
m∑
i=1
xij(tk) ≤
m∑
i=1
xij(t) +
1
n
m∑
i=1
pi(tk) + qj(tk)− 1
n
m∑
i=1
pi(t) + qj(t)
≤
m∑
i=1
xij(t) + qj(tk)− qj(t) + δj(t)
=
m∑
i=1
xij(t) + qj(tk)−
m∑
i=1
xij(t)− δj(t) + δj(t)
= qj(tk), ∀j = 1, . . . , n.
Hence x(tk) ∈ K(tk), ∀k ∈ N, and it results
lim
k→+∞
xij(tk) = xij(t) + min{xij(t)− xij(t), xij(t)− xij(t), xij(t)− xij(t)}
= xij(t) + xij(t)− xij(t)
= xij(t).
Then, the proof of the condition (K1) is completed.
Now let us prove the condition (K2). Let {tk}k∈N be a sequence such that tk ∈ [0, T ] ,
∀k ∈ N, and tk → t, with t ∈ [0, T ] , as k → +∞. Let {x(tk)}k∈N be a sequence, such
that x(tk) ∈ K(tk), ∀k ∈ N, and converging to x(t), as k → +∞. We need to prove that
x(t) ∈ K(t).
Since x(tk) ∈ K(tk), ∀k ∈ N, it results
xij(tk) ≤ xij(tk) ≤ xij(tk), ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, ∀j = 1, . . . , n, ∀k ∈ N,
n∑
j=1
xij(tk) ≤ pi(tk), ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, ∀k ∈ N,
m∑
i=1
xij(tk) ≤ qj(tk), ∀j = 1, . . . , n, ∀k ∈ N.
Passing to the limit as n → +∞ and taking into account the continuity assumption on
the functions x, x, p, q, we obtain
xij(t) ≤ xij(t) ≤ xij(t), ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, ∀j = 1, . . . , n,
n∑
j=1
xij(t) ≤ pi(t), ∀i = 1, . . . ,m,
n∑
i=1
xij(t) ≤ qj(t), ∀j = 1, . . . , n.
As a consequence x(t) ∈ K(t), and, hence, the condition (K2) is achieved.
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3.3.2 Continuity Theorems for Equilibrium Solutions
Now, in this section, we give a result of continuity for the solution of the evolution-
ary variational inequalities (2.2.8), (2.3.5), (2.4.8) which express the oligopolistic market
equilibrium conditions.
In [3], for the first time, the author proved, under the only continuity assumption on
the data, that the solution of the dynamic traffic equilibrium problem is continuous when
the cost function is linear and strongly monotone. Then, this result has been generalized
for an evolutionary variational inequality associated to a nonlinear operator belonging
in L2 (see [4–6]). In [8], the authors show the continuity of solution to a parametric
variational inequality in a Banach space.
Applying Theorem 4.2 in [8] to the dynamic oligopolistic market equilibrium model
in presence of production excesses and taking into account Lemmas 3.3.1, 3.3.2, 3.3.3, we
obtain the following result:
Theorem 3.3.1. Let us assume that the production function p, the demand function q
and the capacity constraints x and x are continuous on [0, T ]. Moreover, let us assume
that the function −∇Dv is a strictly pseudomonotone and continuous on [0, T ]. Then,
the unique dynamic market equilibrium distribution in presence of both production and
demand excesses x∗ ∈ K is continuous on [0, T ].
Moreover, in [7, 10], another important regularity property for the solutions to the
dynamic oligopolistic market equilibrium problem has been proved. Infact it was possible
to prove that the solution is Lipschitz continuous, namely ∀ t1 6= t2, there exists a constant
L > 0 such that :
‖x∗(t2)− x∗(t1)‖ ≤ L |t2 − t1| .
Finally, in [12] some sensitivity results have been obtained. In this way it is possible
to see how the solution changes when the profit function is perturbed.
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The inverse problem
4.1 Historical development of the inverse variational
inequalities
In this chapter we leave the analysis of the problem from a producer’s point of view.
Analogously to the case of the time-dependent spatial price equilibrium control problem
studied in [96], here we want to draw our attention to the policy-maker’s point of view
who influences the model by regulating the exportation through the regulation of taxes
and incentives. The resulting optimization problem, where we want to investigate the
optimal tax regulation, is investigated through inverse variational inequalities.
Inverse variational inequalities can be considered as a special case of general variational
inequalities introduced in [86] and can be used to model various control problems. In
finite-dimensional problems an inverse variational inequality problem formally consists in
finding x∗ ∈ Rn such that
f(x∗) ∈ Ω : 〈x− f(x∗), x∗〉 ≤ 0, ∀x ∈ Ω, (4.1.1)
where Ω is a nonempty subset of Rn and f : Rn → Rn. Unlike the classical variational
inequalities, in such a problem the equilibrium state f(x∗) must belong to the feasible set,
whereas the feasibility is not required for the variable x∗. It is simple to find the analogous
formulation for infinite dimensional problems.
Only recently the strict connection between the classical variational inequalities and
inverse variational inequalities has been unveiled and this enables to exploit all the pow-
erful tools of evolutionary variational inequalities that allow us to treat completely this
problem and analyze the questions about the existence, the regularity and the computa-
tion of solution.
The authors of [54], for the first time, used the inverse variational inequality theory
to study a general network economic equilibrium problem in the static case. Later, in
[104], the power price problem is discussed in both the static and the evolutionary case
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and in both cases the optimal price is characterized as a solution of an inverse static
or evolutionary variational inequality. Recently, in [96] the author studied an optimal
control perspective on the evolutionary time-dependent spatial price equilibrium problem
and the equivalence with an appropriate inverse variational inequality is proved.
4.2 The case with no excesses
In this section we want to consider the case in which all of the amounts of the commodity
available are sold out, namely the quantity of commodity produced by the firms is sold
out and the demand of commodity demanded by the demand markets is fully satisfied
under the condition that the commodity distribution is limited as a consequence of the
evident limited physical transportation of commodity (see [9]). Moreover, we prove the
equivalence of the inverse variational inequality, which allows the system to control the
commodity exportations by means of the imposition of taxes or incentives with an appro-
priate evolutionary variational inequality.
Let us consider the model presented in section 2.2. Moreover, let ηij(t) be supply or
resource tax imposed on supply market Pi for the transaction with the demand market
Qj, at the time t ∈ [0, T ] . Let λij(t) be the incentive pay imposed on supply market Pi
for the transaction with the demand market Qj, at the same time t ∈ [0, T ] . Finally, let
hij(t) be the difference between the supply tax and the incentive pay for the transaction
with the demand market Qj at the time t ∈ [0, T ], namely, hij(t) = ηij(t)− λij(t).
For technical reasons we suppose that
η ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rmn+ ), λ ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rmn+ ).
As a consequence, we have
h ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rmn+ ).
The profit vi(t, x(t)), i = 1, . . . ,m, of the firm Pi at the time t ∈ [0, T ] is, then,
vi(t, x(t)) =
n∑
j=1
dj(t, x(t))xij(t)− fi(t, x(t))−
n∑
j=1
cij(t, x(t))xij(t)−
n∑
j=1
hij(t)xij(t).
Like in section 2.2, let us consider the dynamic oligopolistic market, in which the m
firms supply the commodity in a noncooperative fashion, each one trying to maximize
its own profit and to minimize the taxes at the time t ∈ [0, T ]. We seek to determine a
nonnegative commodity distribution matrix-function x∗ for which the m firms and the n
demand markets will be in a state of equilibrium according to the dynamic Cournot-Nash
principle that, also in this case, is not influenced by the presence of taxes.
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Let K be the feasible set:
K =
{
x ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rmn+ ) : xij(t) ≤ xij(t) ≤ xij(t),
∀i = 1, . . . ,m, ∀j = 1, . . . , n, a.e. in [0, T ]
}
.
Definition 4.2.1. x∗ ∈ K is a dynamic oligopolistic market equilibrium if and only if for
each i = 1, . . . ,m and a.e. in [0, T ] we have
vi(t, x
∗(t)) ≥ vi(t, xi(t), xˆ∗i (t)), a.e. in [0, T ] , where (4.2.1)
xi(t) = (xi1(t), . . . , xin(t)), a.e. in [0, T ] and xˆ
∗
i (t) = (x
∗
1(t), . . . , x
∗
i−1(t), x
∗
i+1(t), . . . , x
∗
m(t)).
Like we already know from section 2.2, the previous definition is equivalent to an
evolutionary variational inequality as the following result shows.
Theorem 4.2.1. x∗ ∈ K is a dynamic oligopolistic market equilibrium according to Def-
inition 4.2.1 if and only if it satisfies the evolutionary variational inequality∫ T
0
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
(
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
)
(xij(t)− x∗ij(t))dt ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ K. (4.2.2)
Now we change the point of view in the analysis of the problem by introducing an
optimal control problem in which the variable h represents the difference between the
supply tax η and the incentive pay λ for the transactions. As a consequence, the term h,
previously considered as a fixed parameter, is now considered a variable. This represents
the typical policy-maker’s point of view.
In this perspective, it is possible to control the resource exploitations x(h(t)) at sup-
ply markets by adjusting taxes h(t). Namely, the tax adjustment becomes an efficient
mean of regulating exportation. More precisely, if the policy-maker is concerned with the
restriction of exportation and, consequently, of production of a certain commodity, then
the government will impose higher taxes, whereas if the policy-maker aims to encourage
exportation of a certain commodity, the government will impose subsidies.
We introduce the function of regulatory taxes x(h) = x(t, h), so x : [0, T ]×Rmn → Rmn,
since h(t) ∈ Rmn, ∀t ∈ [0, T ] .
We also suppose that x(t, h) is a Carathe´odory function and we require also that there
exists γ(t) ∈ L2([0, T ]) such that, a.e. in [0, T ]
‖x(t, h(t))‖mn ≤ γ(t) + ‖h(t)‖mn . (4.2.3)
Therefore,
x : [0, T ]× L2([0, T ] ,Rmn)→ L2([0, T ] ,Rmn),
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which assigns to each regulatory tax h(t) the exportation vector x(h(t)).
We now introduce the set of feasible states
Ω =
{
ω ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rmn) : xij(t) ≤ ωij(t) ≤ xij(t),
∀i = 1, . . . ,m, ∀j = 1, . . . , n, a.e. in [0, T ]
}
,
and define the optimal regulatory tax as follows.
Definition 4.2.2. A vector h∗ ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rmn) is an optimal regulatory tax if x(t, h∗) ∈
Ω and for i = 1, . . . ,m, j = 1, . . . , n and a.e. in [0, T ] the following conditions hold:
xij(t, h
∗(t)) = xij(t), ⇒ h∗ij(t) ≤ 0, (4.2.4)
xij(t) < xij(t, h
∗(t)) < xij(t), ⇒ h∗ij(t) = 0, (4.2.5)
xij(t, h
∗(t)) = xij(t), ⇒ h∗ij(t) ≥ 0. (4.2.6)
Definition 4.2.2 must be interpreted as follows: first of all, the optimal regulatory
tax h∗ is such that the correspondig state x(t, h∗) has to satisfy capacity constraints,
namely x(t, h∗) ∈ Ω. Moreover, if one requires that xij(t, h∗(t)) = xij(t), then it means to
encourage the exportations, namely the optimal choice is that taxes must be less than or
equal to the incentive pays. If one requires that xij(t, h
∗(t)) = xij(t), then the exportations
must be reduced, hence taxes must be greater than or equal to the incentive pays. Finally,
if xij(t) < xij(t, h
∗(t)) < xij(t) is satisfied, taxes equal incentive pays.
The following theorem shows the inverse variational inequality formulation of the
optimal equilibrium control problem.
Theorem 4.2.2. A regulatory tax h∗ ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rmn) is an optimal regulatory tax ac-
cording to Definition 4.2.2 if and only if it solves the inverse variational inequality:
x(t, h∗) ∈ Ω :
∫ T
0
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
(ωij(t)− xij(t, h∗(t)))h∗ij(t)dt ≤ 0, ∀ω ∈ Ω. (4.2.7)
Proof. Let h∗ be an optimal regulatory tax according to Definition 4.2.2, let i ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
j ∈ {1, . . . , n} and ω ∈ Ω, namely xij(t) ≤ ωij(t) ≤ xij(t) a.e. in [0, T ] .
1. if xij(t, h
∗(t)) = xij(t), a.e. in [0, T ] , by (4.2.4) we get that h
∗
ij(t) ≤ 0, a.e. in [0, T ] ,
and, hence, (ωij(t)− xij(t, h∗(t)))h∗ij(t) ≤ 0, a.e. in [0, T ] ;
2. if xij(t) < xij(t, h
∗(t)) < xij(t), a.e. in [0, T ] , by (4.2.4) we get that h
∗
ij(t) =
0 ; a.e. in [0, T ] , and, hence, (ωij(t)− xij(t, h∗(t)))h∗ij(t) = 0, a.e. in [0, T ] ;
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3. if xij(t, h
∗(t)) = xij(t), a.e. in [0, T ] , by (4.2.4) we get that h
∗
ij(t) ≥ 0, a.e. in [0, T ] ,
and, hence, (ωij(t)− xij(t, h∗(t)))h∗ij(t) ≤ 0, a.e. in [0, T ] .
So, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , n} and ∀ω ∈ Ω, we get
(ωij(t)− xij(t, h∗(t)))h∗ij(t) ≤ 0, a.e. in [0, T ] .
By summing over i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, j ∈ {1, . . . , n} and integrating on [0, T ] , we get the
inverse variational inequality (4.2.7).
Converserly, we assume, now, that h∗ satisfies the inverse variational inequality (4.2.7).
If we fix i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, j ∈ {1, . . . , n} and set ωhk(t) = xij(t, h∗(t)), a.e. in [0, T ] , and
for all h 6= i, k 6= j from (4.2.7), we get∫ T
0
(ωij(t)− xij(t, h∗(t)))h∗ij(t)dt ≤ 0, ∀ωij(t) ∈ L2([0, T ] ,R) : (4.2.8)
xij(t) ≤ ωij(t) ≤ xij(t).
Let us prove that if xij(t, h
∗(t)) = xij(t) a.e. in [0, T ] , then, h
∗
ij(t) ≤ 0 a.e. in [0, T ] .
By contradiction, we suppose that there exists a set E ⊆ [0, T ] with positive measure
such that h∗ij(t) > 0, a.e. inE. If we choose
ωij(t) =
{
xij(t) t ∈ E
xij(t, h
∗(t)) t ∈ [0, T ] \ E
we have ∫ T
0
(ωij(t)− xij(t, h∗(t)))h∗ij(t)dt =
∫
E
(xij(t)− xij(t))h∗ij(t)dt > 0,
which contradicts (4.2.8).
Let us prove, now, that if xij(t, h
∗(t)) = xij(t), a.e. in [0, T ] , then, h
∗
ij(t) ≥ 0, a.e. in [0, T ] .
By contradiction, we suppose that there exists a set F ⊆ [0, T ] with positive measure
such that h∗ij(t) < 0, a.e. inF. If we choose
ωij(t) =
{
xij(t) t ∈ F
xij(t, h
∗(t)) t ∈ [0, T ] \ F
we have ∫ T
0
(ωij(t)− xij(t, h∗(t)))h∗ij(t)dt =
∫
F
(xij(t)− xij(t))h∗ij(t)dt > 0,
which contradicts (4.2.8).
If xij(t) < xij(t, h
∗(t)) < xij(t), a.e. in [0, T ] , by using the same technique as in the
previous cases, it can be easily proved that h∗(t) cannot be either negative or positive on
any set with positive measure.
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It is also possible to provide a classical variational inequality formulation of the optimal
equilibrium control problem. The advantage of such a standard formulation lies in the
fact we can have disposal of all the theoretical and numerical advances in the theory of
variational inequalities to treat fully the problem. If we set
W = L2([0, T ] ,Rmn)× Ω, F : [0, T ]×W → L2([0, T ] ,R2mn),
z(t) =
(
h(t)
ω(t)
)
,
and
F (t, z(t)) =
(
ω(t)− x(t, h(t))
−h(t)
)
.
it is possible to prove that evolutionary inverse variational inequality problem (4.2.7) is
equivalent to an evolutionary variational inequality, as you can see with the following
result (see [104, Th. 4.8]):
Theorem 4.2.3. The evolutionary inverse variational inequality problem (4.2.7) is equiv-
alent to the evolutionary variational inequality
z∗ ∈W :
∫ T
0
2m∑
l=1
n∑
j=1
Flj(t, z
∗(t))
(
zlj(t)− z∗lj(t)
)
dt ≥ 0, ∀z ∈W. (4.2.9)
Proof. If (4.2.9) holds true, then we can get easily that
z∗ = (h∗, ω∗)T ∈W,
∫ T
0
(
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
(ω∗ij(t)− xij(t, h∗(t)))(hij(t)− h∗ij(t))
)
dt (4.2.10)
−
∫ T
0
(
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
h∗ij(t)(ωij(t)− ω∗ij(t))
)
dt ≥ 0
holds for all
z = (h, ω)T ∈ W.
By setting h(t) = h∗(t)− ω∗(t) + x(t, h∗(t)) and ω(t) = ω∗(t) in (4.2.10), we get
−
∫ T
0
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
(ω∗ij(t)− xij(t, h∗(t)))2dt ≥ 0,
hence x(t, h∗(t)) = ω∗(t), a.e. in [0, T ] . Thus x(t, h∗(t)) ∈ Ω and (4.2.10) indicates that
(4.2.7) holds.
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Figure 4.1: Network structure of the numerical dynamic spatial oligopoly problem.
Converserly, if h∗ ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rmn) is a solution of (4.2.7), then z∗ = (h∗, x(t, h∗))T ∈
W is a solution of (4.2.9) in fact,∫ T
0
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
(xij(t, h
∗(t))− xij(t, h∗(t)))(hij(t)− h∗ij(t))dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
−
∫ T
0
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
h∗ij(t)(ωij(t)− xij(t, h∗(t)))dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
≥ 0.
It is worth noting that W is a closed, convex and not bounded subset of L2([0, T ] ,R2mn).
4.2.1 A numerical example
This section is devoted to provide a numerical example of the theoretical achievements
presented.
Let us consider two firms and two demand markets, as in Figure 4.1. Let x, x ∈
L2([0, 1],R4) be the capacity constraints such that, a.e. in [0, 1],
x(t) =
 0 1100t
0 1
100
t
 ,
x(t) =
 100t 200t
100t 200t
 .
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As a consequence, the feasible set is
K =
{
x ∈ L2([0, 1] ,R4) : xij(t) ≤ xij(t) ≤ xij(t), ∀i = 1, 2, ∀j = 1, 2, a.e. in [0, 1]
}
.
The set of feasible states is
Ω =
{
ω ∈ L2([0, T ] ,R2) : xij(t) ≤ ωij(t) ≤ xij(t), ∀i = 1, 2, ∀j = 1, 2, a.e. in [0, T ]
}
.
Let us consider the profit function v ∈ L2([0, 1]× L2([0, 1],R4),R2) defined by
v1(t, x(t)) = 4x
2
11(t) + 3x12(t)
2 + α(t)x11(t)− 2x11(t)x22(t)
−2x21(t)x12(t)− 4h11(t)x11(t)− 4h12(t)x12(t),
v2(t, x(t)) = 2x
2
21(t) + 3x22(t)
2 + β(t)x21(t)− 2x21(t)x12(t)
−4x11(t)x22(t)− 4h21(t)x21(t)− 2h22(t)x22(t).
Then, the operator ∇Dv ∈ L2([0, 1]× L2([0, 1],R4),R4) is given by
∇Dv(t, x(t)) =
(
8x11(t)− 2x22(t) + α(t)− 4h11(t) 6x12(t)− 2x21(t)− 4h12(t)
4x21(t)− 2x12(t) + β(t)− 4h21(t) 6x22(t)− 4x11(t)− 2h22(t)
)
.
The dynamic oligopolistic market equilibrium distribution is the solution to the evo-
lutionary variational inequality:∫ 1
0
2∑
i=1
2∑
j=1
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
(xij(t)− x∗ij(t))dt ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ K. (4.2.11)
In order to compute the solution to (4.2.11) we make use of the direct method (see
[29, 34, 70]). We consider the following system
−8x∗11(t) + 2x∗22(t)− α(t) + 4h11(t) = 0,
−6x∗12(t) + 2x∗21(t) + 4h12(t) = 0,
−4x∗21(t) + 2x∗12(t)− β(t) + 4h21(t) = 0,
−6x∗22(t) + 4x∗11(t) + 2h22(t) = 0,
xij(t) ≤ xij(t) ≤ xij(t), ∀i = 1, 2, ∀j = 1, 2,
and we get the following solution, a.e. in [0, 1],
x∗(t) =
 2h22(t)+12h11(t)−3α(t)20 8h12(t)+4h21(t)−β(t)10
4h12(t)+12h21(t)−3β(t)
10
4h22(t)+4h11(t)−α(t)
10
 .
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For the inverse problem, now we have to solve the following variational inequality∫ T
0
(
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
(ω∗ij(t)− xij(t, h∗(t)))(hij(t)− h∗ij(t))−
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
h∗ij(t)(ωij(t)− ω∗ij(t))
)
dt ≥ 0
∀(h, ω) ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rmn)× Ω. (4.2.12)
For ωij(t) = ω
∗
ij(t), ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, ∀j = 1, . . . , n, a.e. in [0, 1], we can consider the
following system 
20ω∗11(t)− 2h∗22(t)− 12h∗11(t) + 3α(t) = 0,
10ω∗12(t)− 8h∗12(t)− 4h∗21(t) + β(t) = 0,
10ω∗21(t)− 4h12(t)− 12h21(t) + 3β(t) = 0,
10ω∗22(t)− 4h22(t)− 4h11(t) + α(t) = 0,
and we get the following solution, a.e. in [0, 1],
h∗(t) =
 8ω∗11(t)−2ω∗22(t)+α(t)4 3ω∗12(t)−ω∗21(t)2
4ω∗
21
(t)−2ω∗
12
(t)+β(t)
4
−2ω∗11(t) + 3ω∗22(t)
 .
1) In order to obtain the solution to (4.2.12), we consider, in first analysis, the case
ω∗(t) =
 100t 200t
100t 200t
 .
As a consequence of the direct method, it must be
h∗11(t) > 0, h
∗
12(t) > 0, h
∗
21(t) > 0, h
∗
22(t) > 0.
This is true if and only if α(t) > −400t and β(t) > 0. In this case the optimal regulatory
tax is
h∗(t) =
 α(t)+100t4 250t
β(t)
4
400t
 ,
from which we get that the optimal commodity distribution is
x∗(t) =
 100t 200t
100t 200t
 .
2) Let us study, now, the case
ω∗(t) =
 0 200t
100t 200t
 .
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As a consequence of the direct method, it must be
h∗11(t) < 0, h
∗
12(t) > 0, h
∗
21(t) > 0, h
∗
22(t) > 0.
This is true if and only if α(t) < 400t and β(t) > 0. In this case the optimal regulatory
tax is
h∗(t) =
 −400t+α(t)4 250t
β(t)
4
600t
 ,
from which we get that the optimal commodity distribution is
x∗(t) =
 0 200t
100t 200t
 .
3) Let us study, now, the case
ω∗(t) =
 0 1100t
100t 200t
 .
As a consequence of the direct method, it must be
h∗11(t) < 0, h
∗
12(t) < 0, h
∗
21(t) > 0, h
∗
22(t) > 0.
This is true if and only if α(t) < 400t and β(t) < − 39998
100
t. In this case the optimal
regulatory tax is
h∗(t) =
 −400t+α(t)4 −9997t200
39998t+100β(t)
400
600t
 ,
from which we get that the optimal commodity distribution is
x∗(t) =
 0 1100t
100t 200t
 .
4) Let us study, now, the case
ω∗(t) =
 100t 1100t
100t 200t
 .
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As a consequence of the direct method, it must be
h∗11(t) > 0, h
∗
12(t) < 0, h
∗
21(t) > 0, h
∗
22(t) > 0.
This is true if and only if α(t) > −400t and β(t) < − 39998
100
t. In this case the optimal
regulatory tax is
h∗(t) =
 α(t)+100t4 −9997t200
39998t+100β(t)
400
400t
 ,
from which we get that the optimal commodity distribution is
x∗(t) =
 100t 1100t
100t 200t
 .
5) Let us study, now, the case
ω∗(t) =
 100t 200t
0 200t
 .
As a consequence of the direct method, it must be
h∗11(t) > 0, h
∗
12(t) > 0, h
∗
21(t) < 0, h
∗
22(t) > 0.
This is true if and only if α(t) > −400t and β(t) < 400t. In this case the optimal regulatory
tax is
h∗(t) =
 α(t)+100t4 300t
−400t+β(t)
4
400t
 ,
from which we get that the optimal commodity distribution is
x∗(t) =
 100t 200t
0 200t
 .
6) Let us study, now, the case
ω∗(t) =
 0 200t
0 200t
 .
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As a consequence of the direct method, it must be
h∗11(t) < 0, h
∗
12(t) > 0, h
∗
21(t) < 0, h
∗
22(t) > 0.
This is true if and only if α(t) < 400t and β(t) < 400t. In this case the optimal regulatory
tax is
h∗(t) =
 α(t)−400t4 300t
−400t+β(t)
4
600t
 ,
from which we get that the optimal commodity distribution is
x∗(t) =
 0 200t
0 200t
 .
7) Let us study, now, the case
ω∗(t) =
 100t 200t
100t 1
100
t
 .
As a consequence of the direct method, it must be
h∗11(t) > 0, h
∗
12(t) > 0, h
∗
21(t) > 0, h
∗
22(t) < 0.
This is true if and only if α(t) > − 79998
100
t and β(t) > 0. In this case the optimal regulatory
tax is
h∗(t) =
 79998t+α(t)400 250t
β(t)
4
−19997
100
t
 ,
from which we get that the optimal commodity distribution is
x∗(t) =
 100t 200t
100t 1
100
t
 .
8) Let us study, now, the case
ω∗(t) =
 100t 1100t
100t 1
100
t
 .
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As a consequence of the direct method, it must be
h∗11(t) > 0, h
∗
12(t) < 0, h
∗
21(t) > 0, h
∗
22(t) < 0.
This is true if and only if α(t) > − 79998
100
t and β(t) < − 39998
100
t. In this case the optimal
regulatory tax is
h∗(t) =
 79998t+α(t)400 −9997200 t
100β(t)+39998t
400
−19997
100
t
 ,
from which we get that the optimal commodity distribution is
x∗(t) =
 100t 1100t
100t 1
100
t
 .
9) Let us study, now, the case
ω∗(t) =
 100t 200t
0 1
100
t
 .
As a consequence of the direct method, it must be
h∗11(t) > 0, h
∗
12(t) > 0, h
∗
21(t) < 0, h
∗
22(t) < 0.
This is true if and only if α(t) > −79998t and β(t) < 400t. In this case the optimal
regulatory tax is
h∗(t) =
 79998t+α(t)400 300t
−400tβ(t)
4
−19997
100
t
 ,
from which we get that the optimal commodity distribution is
x∗(t) =
 100t 200t
0 1
100
t
 .
Other options are not allowed for the condition of the direct method. Namely the
cases in which ω∗12 and ω
∗
21 are both minimal and the cases in which ω
∗
11 and ω
∗
22 are both
minimal, are not allowed.
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4.3 The case with both production and demand ex-
cesses
In this section we want to consider the case in which not all of the amounts of the
commodity available are sold out and the demand of commodity demanded by the demand
markets is not fully satisfied under the condition that the commodity distribution is
limited, namely we allow production and demand excesses. In this section we prove
the equivalence of the inverse variational inequality, which allows the system to control
the commodity exportations by means of the imposition of taxes or incentives with an
appropriate evolutionary variational inequality.
Let us consider the model presented in section 2.4 and the taxes and incentives con-
sidered in section 4.2.
The profit vi(t, x(t)), i = 1, . . . ,m, of the firm Pi at the time t ∈ [0, T ] is, then,
vi(t, x(t)) =
n∑
j=1
dj(t, x(t))xij(t)− fi(t, x(t))−
n∑
j=1
cij(t, x(t))xij(t)−
n∑
j=1
hij(t)xij(t).
Like in section 2.4, let us consider the dynamic oligopolistic market, in which the m
firms supply the commodity in a noncooperative fashion, each one trying to maximize
its own profit and to minimize the taxes at the time t ∈ [0, T ]. We seek to determine a
nonnegative commodity distribution matrix-function x∗ for which the m firms and the n
demand markets will be in a state of equilibrium according to the dynamic Cournot-Nash
principle that, also in this case, is not influenced by the presence of taxes and excesses.
Let K the feasible set:
K =
{
x ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rmn+ ) :
xij(t) ≤ xij(t) ≤ xij(t), ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, ∀j = 1, . . . , n, a.e. in [0, T ] ,
n∑
j=1
xij(t) ≤ pi(t), ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, a.e. in [0, T ] ,
m∑
i=1
xij(t) ≤ qj(t), ∀j = 1, . . . , n, a.e. in [0, T ]
}
.
Definition 4.3.1. x∗ ∈ K is a dynamic oligopolistic market equilibrium if and only if for
each i = 1, . . . ,m and a.e. in [0, T ] we have
vi(t, x
∗(t)) ≥ vi(t, xi(t), xˆ∗i (t)), a.e. in [0, T ] , where (4.3.1)
xi(t) = (xi1(t), . . . , xin(t)), a.e. in [0, T ] and xˆ
∗
i (t) = (x
∗
1(t), . . . , x
∗
i−1(t), x
∗
i+1(t), . . . , x
∗
m(t)).
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Like we already know from section 2.4, the previous definition is equivalent to an
evolutionary variational inequality as the following result shows.
Theorem 4.3.1. x∗ ∈ K is a dynamic oligopolistic market equilibrium according to Def-
inition 4.3.1 if and only if it satisfies the evolutionary variational inequality∫ T
0
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
(
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
)
(xij(t)− x∗ij(t))dt ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ K. (4.3.2)
Like in section 4.2, now we change the point of view in the analysis of the problem by
introducing an optimal control problem in which the variable h represents the difference
between the supply tax η and the incentive pay λ for the transactions.
We introduce the function of regulatory taxes x(h) = x(t, h), so x : [0, T ]×Rmn → Rmn,
since h(t) ∈ Rmn, ∀t ∈ [0, T ] .
We also suppose that x(t, h) is a Carathe´odory function and we require also that there
exists γ(t) ∈ L2([0, T ]) such that, a.e. in [0, T ]
‖x(t, h(t))‖mn ≤ γ(t) + ‖h(t)‖mn . (4.3.3)
Therefore,
x : [0, T ]× L2([0, T ] ,Rmn)→ L2([0, T ] ,Rmn),
which assigns to each regulatory tax h(t) the exportation vector x(h(t)).
We now introduce the set of feasible states
Ω =
{
ω ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rmn) : xij(t) ≤ ωij(t) ≤ xij(t),
∀i = 1, . . . ,m, ∀j = 1, . . . , n, a.e. in [0, T ]
}
,
and define the optimal regulatory tax as follows.
Definition 4.3.2. A vector h∗ ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rmn) is an optimal regulatory tax if x(t, h∗) ∈
Ω and for i = 1, . . . ,m, j = 1, . . . , n and a.e. in [0, T ] the following conditions hold:
xij(t, h
∗(t)) = xij(t), ⇒ h∗ij(t) ≤ 0, (4.3.4)
xij(t) < xij(t, h
∗(t)) < xij(t), ⇒ h∗ij(t) = 0, (4.3.5)
xij(t, h
∗(t)) = xij(t), ⇒ h∗ij(t) ≥ 0. (4.3.6)
Definition 4.3.2 is the same as the one presented in section 4.2 and its meaning does
not change also if we consider production and demand excesses.
The following theorem shows the inverse variational inequality formulation of the
optimal equilibrium control problem.
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Theorem 4.3.2. A regulatory tax h∗ ∈ L2([0, T ] ,Rmn) is an optimal regulatory tax ac-
cording to Definition 4.2.2 if and only if it solves the inverse variational inequality:
x(t, h∗) ∈ Ω :
∫ T
0
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
(ωij(t)− xij(t, h∗(t)))h∗ij(t)dt ≤ 0, ∀ω ∈ Ω. (4.3.7)
It is also possible to provide a classical variational inequality formulation of the optimal
equilibrium control problem. If we set
W = L2([0, T ] ,Rmn)× Ω, F : [0, T ]×W → L2([0, T ] ,R2mn),
z(t) =
(
h(t)
ω(t)
)
,
and
F (t, z(t)) =
(
ω(t)− x(t, h(t))
−h(t)
)
.
it is possible to prove that evolutionary inverse variational inequality problem (4.3.7) is
equivalent to an evolutionary variational inequality, as you can see with the following
result:
Theorem 4.3.3. The evolutionary inverse variational inequality problem (4.3.7) is equiv-
alent to the evolutionary variational inequality
z∗ ∈W :
∫ T
0
2m∑
l=1
n∑
j=1
Flj(t, z
∗(t))
(
zlj(t)− z∗lj(t)
)
dt ≥ 0, ∀z ∈W. (4.3.8)
It is worth noting that W is a closed, convex and not bounded subset of L2([0, T ] ,R2mn).
4.3.1 A numerical example
This section is devoted to provide a numerical example of the theoretical achievements
presented.
Let us consider two firms and two demand markets, as in Figure 4.2.
Let x, x ∈ L2([0, 1],R4) be the capacity constraints such that, a.e. in [0, 1],
x(t) =
 0 2t
0 2t
 ,
x(t) =
 100t 200t
100t 200t
 ,
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Figure 4.2: Network structure of the numerical dynamic spatial oligopoly problem.
and p, q ∈ L2([0, 1],R2) be the production and demand function, such that, a.e. in [0, 1],
p(t) =
(
250t
500t
)
,
q(t) =
(
400t
500t
)
.
As a consequence, the feasible set is
K =
{
x ∈ L2([0, 1] ,R4) : xij(t) ≤ xij(t) ≤ xij(t), ∀i = 1, 2, ∀j = 1, 2, a.e. in [0, 1] ,
2∑
j=1
xij(t) ≤ pi(t), ∀i = 1, 2, a.e. in [0, 1] ,
2∑
i=1
xij(t) ≤ qj(t), ∀j = 1, 2, a.e. in [0, 1]
}
.
The set of feasible states is
Ω =
{
ω ∈ L2([0, T ] ,R2) : xij(t) ≤ ωij(t) ≤ xij(t), ∀i = 1, 2, ∀j = 1, 2, a.e. in [0, T ]
}
.
Let us consider the profit function v ∈ L2([0, 1]× L2([0, 1],R4),R2) defined by
v1(t, x(t)) = 6x
2
11(t) + 2x12(t)
2 + 2α(t)x12(t)− 2x11(t)x12(t)
−4x21(t)x22(t)− 2h11(t)x11(t)− 2h12(t)x12(t),
v2(t, x(t)) = 6x
2
21(t) + 2x22(t)
2 + 2β(t)x22(t)− 4x21(t)x22(t)
−2x11(t)x12(t)− 4h21(t)x21(t)− 4h22(t)x22(t),
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where α, β are suitable functions L2([0, 1]).
Then, the operator ∇Dv ∈ L2([0, 1]× L2([0, 1],R4),R4) is given by
∇Dv(t, x(t)) =
(
12x11(t)− 2x12(t)− 2h11(t) 4x12(t)− 2x11(t)− 2h12(t) + 2α(t)
12x21(t)− 4x22(t)− 4h21(t) 4x22(t)− 4x21(t)− 4h22(t) + 2β(t)
)
.
The dynamic oligopolistic market equilibrium distribution in presence of excesses is
the solution to the evolutionary variational inequality:
∫ 1
0
2∑
i=1
2∑
j=1
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
(xij(t)− x∗ij(t))dt ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ K. (4.3.9)
In order to compute the solution to (4.3.9) we make use of the direct method (see [29, 34,
70]). We consider the following system
−12x∗11(t) + 2x∗12(t) + 2h11(t) = 0,
2x∗11(t)− 4x∗12(t) + 2h12(t)− 2α(t) = 0,
−12x∗21(t) + 4x∗22(t) + 4h21(t) = 0,
4x∗21(t)− 4x∗22(t) + 4h22(t)− 2β(t) = 0,
xij(t) ≤ x∗ij(t) ≤ xij(t), ∀i = 1, 2, ∀j = 1, 2,
2∑
j=1
x∗ij(t) ≤ pi(t), ∀i = 1, 2, a.e. in [0, 1] ,
2∑
i=1
x∗ij(t) ≤ qj(t), ∀j = 1, 2, a.e. in [0, 1]
and we get the following solution, a.e. in [0, 1],
x∗(t, h(t)) =

2h11(t) + h12(t)− α(t)
11
h11(t) + 6h12(t)− 6α(t)
11
2h21(t) + 2h22(t)− β(t)
4
2h21(t) + 6h22(t)− 3β(t)
4
 .
For the inverse problem, now we have to solve the following variational inequality
∫ T
0
(
2∑
i=1
2∑
j=1
(ω∗ij(t)− xij(t, h∗(t)))(hij(t)− h∗ij(t))−
2∑
i=1
2∑
j=1
h∗ij(t)(ωij(t)− ω∗ij(t))
)
dt ≥ 0
∀(h, ω) ∈ L2([0, T ] ,R4)× Ω. (4.3.10)
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For ωij(t) = ω
∗
ij(t), ∀i = 1, 2, ∀j = 1, 2, a.e. in [0, 1], we can consider the following
system 
2h∗11(t) + h
∗
11(t)− α(t)− 11ω∗11(t) = 0,
h∗11(t) + 6h
∗
12(t)− 6α(t)− 11ω∗12(t) = 0,
2h∗21(t) + 2h
∗
22(t)− β(t)− 4ω∗21(t) = 0,
2h∗21(t) + 6h
∗
22(t)− 3β(t)− 4ω∗22(t) = 0,
and we get the following solution, a.e. in [0, 1],
h∗(t) =
 6ω
∗
11(t)− ω∗12(t) −ω∗11(t) + 2ω∗12(t) + α(t)
3ω∗21(t)− ω∗22(t) −ω∗21(t) + ω∗22(t) +
1
2
β(t)
 .
1) Let us study, now, the case
ω∗(t) =
 100t 2t
100t 200t
 .
As a consequence of the direct method, it must be
h∗11(t) > 0, h
∗
12(t) < 0, h
∗
21(t) > 0, h
∗
22(t) > 0.
This is true if and only if α(t) < 96t and β(t) > −200t. In this case the optimal regulatory
tax is
h∗(t) =
 598t α(t)− 96t
100t
1
2
β(t) + 100t
 ,
from which we get that the optimal commodity distribution is
x∗(t) =
 100t 2t
100t 200t
 ,
which belongs to K.
Here, the production and demand excesses are, respectively:
ǫ(t) =
(
148t
200t
)
, δ(t) =
(
200t
298t
)
.
2) Let us study, now, the case
ω∗(t) =
 0 200t
100t 200t
 .
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As a consequence of the direct method, it must be
h∗11(t) < 0, h
∗
12(t) > 0, h
∗
21(t) > 0, h
∗
22(t) > 0.
This is true if and only if α(t) > −400t and β(t) > −200t. In this case the optimal
regulatory tax is
h∗(t) =
 −200t α(t) + 400t
100t
1
2
β(t) + 100t
 ,
from which we get that the optimal commodity distribution is
x∗(t) =
 0 200t
100t 200t
 ,
which belongs to K.
Here, the production and demand excesses are, respectively:
ǫ(t) =
(
50t
200t
)
, δ(t) =
(
300t
100t
)
.
3) Let us study, now, the case
ω∗(t) =
 100t 2t
100t 2t
 .
As a consequence of the direct method, it must be
h∗11(t) > 0, h
∗
12(t) < 0, h
∗
21(t) > 0, h
∗
22(t) < 0.
This is true if and only if α(t) < 96t and β(t) < 196t. In this case the optimal regulatory
tax is
h∗(t) =
 598t α(t)− 96t
298t
1
2
β(t)− 98t
 ,
from which we get that the optimal commodity distribution is
x∗(t) =
 100t 2t
100t 2t
 ,
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which belongs to K.
Here, the production and demand excesses are, respectively:
ǫ(t) =
(
148t
398t
)
, δ(t) =
(
200t
496t
)
.
4) Let us study, now, the case
ω∗(t) =
 0 200t
100t 2t
 .
As a consequence of the direct method, it must be
h∗11(t) < 0, h
∗
12(t) > 0, h
∗
21(t) > 0, h
∗
22(t) < 0.
This is true if and only if α(t) > −400t and β(t) < 196t. In this case the optimal regulatory
tax is
h∗(t) =
 −200t α(t) + 400t
298t
1
2
β(t)− 98t
 ,
from which we get that the optimal commodity distribution is
x∗(t) =
 0 200t
100t 2t
 ,
which belongs to K.
Here, the production and demand excesses are, respectively:
ǫ(t) =
(
50t
398t
)
, δ(t) =
(
300t
298t
)
.
5) Let us study, now, the case
ω∗(t) =
 100t 2t
0 200t
 .
As a consequence of the direct method, it must be
h∗11(t) > 0, h
∗
12(t) < 0, h
∗
21(t) < 0, h
∗
22(t) > 0.
This is true if and only if α(t) < 96t and β(t) > −400t. In this case the optimal regulatory
tax is
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h∗(t) =
 598t α(t)− 96t−200t 1
2
β(t) + 200t
 ,
from which we get that the optimal commodity distribution is
x∗(t) =
 100t 2t
0 200t
 ,
which belongs to K.
Here, the production and demand excesses are, respectively:
ǫ(t) =
(
148t
300t
)
, δ(t) =
(
300t
298t
)
.
6) Let us study, now, the case
ω∗(t) =
 0 200t
0 200t
 .
As a consequence of the direct method, it must be
h∗11(t) < 0, h
∗
12(t) > 0, h
∗
21(t) < 0, h
∗
22(t) > 0.
This is true if and only if α(t) > −400t and β(t) > −400t. In this case the optimal
regulatory tax is
h∗(t) =
 −200t α(t) + 400t−200t 1
2
β(t) + 200t
 ,
from which we get that the optimal commodity distribution is
x∗(t) =
 0 200t
0 200t
 ,
which belongs to K.
Here, the production and demand excesses are, respectively:
ǫ(t) =
(
50t
300t
)
, δ(t) =
(
400t
100t
)
.
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7) Let us study, now, the case
ω∗(t) =
 0 2t
100t 200t
 .
As a consequence of the direct method, it must be
h∗11(t) < 0, h
∗
12(t) < 0, h
∗
21(t) > 0, h
∗
22(t) > 0.
This is true if and only if α(t) < −4t and β(t) > −200t. In this case the optimal regulatory
tax is
h∗(t) =
 −2t α(t) + 4t
100t
1
2
β(t) + 100t
 ,
from which we get that the optimal commodity distribution is
x∗(t) =
 0 2t
100t 200t
 ,
which belongs to K.
Here, the production and demand excesses are, respectively:
ǫ(t) =
(
248t
200t
)
, δ(t) =
(
300t
298t
)
.
8) Let us study, now, the case
ω∗(t) =
 0 2t
0 200t
 .
As a consequence of the direct method, it must be
h∗11(t) < 0, h
∗
12(t) < 0, h
∗
21(t) < 0, h
∗
22(t) > 0.
This is true if and only if α(t) < −4t and β(t) > −400t. In this case the optimal regulatory
tax is
h∗(t) =
 −2t α(t) + 4t−200t 1
2
β(t) + 200t
 ,
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from which we get that the optimal commodity distribution is
x∗(t) =
 0 2t
0 200t
 ,
which belongs to K.
Here, the production and demand excesses are, respectively:
ǫ(t) =
(
248t
300t
)
, δ(t) =
(
400t
298t
)
.
9) Let us study, now, the case
ω∗(t) =
 0 2t
100t 2t
 .
As a consequence of the direct method, it must be
h∗11(t) < 0, h
∗
12(t) < 0, h
∗
21(t) > 0, h
∗
22(t) < 0.
This is true if and only if α(t) < −4t and β(t) < 196t. In this case the optimal regulatory
tax is
h∗(t) =
 −2t α(t) + 4t
298t
1
2
β(t)− 98t
 ,
from which we get that the optimal commodity distribution is
x∗(t) =
 0 2t
100t 2t
 ,
which belongs to K.
Here, the production and demand excesses are, respectively:
ǫ(t) =
(
248t
398t
)
, δ(t) =
(
300t
496t
)
.
10) Let us study, now, the case
ω∗(t) =
 0 200t
0 2t
 .
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As a consequence of the direct method, it must be
h∗11(t) < 0, h
∗
12(t) > 0, h
∗
21(t) < 0, h
∗
22(t) < 0.
This is true if and only if α(t) > −400t and β(t) < −4t. In this case the optimal regulatory
tax is
h∗(t) =
 −200t α(t) + 400t−2t 1
2
β(t) + 2t
 ,
from which we get that the optimal commodity distribution is
x∗(t) =
 0 200t
0 2t
 ,
which belongs to K.
Here, the production and demand excesses are, respectively:
ǫ(t) =
(
50t
498t
)
, δ(t) =
(
400t
298t
)
.
11) Let us study, now, the case
ω∗(t) =
 100t 2t
0 2t
 .
As a consequence of the direct method, it must be
h∗11(t) > 0, h
∗
12(t) < 0, h
∗
21(t) < 0, h
∗
22(t) < 0.
This is true if and only if α(t) < 96t and β(t) < −4t. In this case the optimal regulatory
tax is
h∗(t) =
 598t α(t)− 96t−2t 1
2
β(t) + 2t
 ,
from which we get that the optimal commodity distribution is
x∗(t) =
 100t 2t
0 2t
 ,
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which belongs to K.
Here, the production and demand excesses are, respectively:
ǫ(t) =
(
148t
498t
)
, δ(t) =
(
300t
496t
)
.
12) Let us study, now, the case
ω∗(t) =
 0 2t
0 2t
 .
As a consequence of the direct method, it must be
h∗11(t) < 0, h
∗
12(t) < 0, h
∗
21(t) < 0, h
∗
22(t) < 0.
This is true if and only if α(t) < −4t and β(t) < −4t. In this case the optimal regulatory
tax is
h∗(t) =
 −2t α(t) + 4t−2t 1
2
β(t) + 2t
 ,
from which we get that the optimal commodity distribution is
x∗(t) =
 0 2t
0 2t
 ,
which belongs to K.
Here, the production and demand excesses are, respectively:
ǫ(t) =
(
248t
498t
)
, δ(t) =
(
400t
496t
)
.
We remark that the cases ω∗11(t) and ω
∗
12(t) both maximal are not allowed since the
correspondent commodity shipment x∗(t) does not belong to the constraint set K because
x∗11(t) + x
∗
12(t) > 250t.
Let us consider now the set
K˜ =
{
x ∈ L2([0, 1] ,R4) : xij(t) ≤ xij(t) ≤ xij(t), ∀i = 1, 2, ∀j = 1, 2, a.e. in [0, 1] ,
x11(t) + x12(t) = p1(t), a.e. in [0, 1] ,
x21(t) + x22(t) ≤ p2(t), a.e. in [0, 1] ,
2∑
i=1
xij(t) ≤ qj(t), ∀j = 1, 2, a.e. in [0, 1]
}
.
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In order to compute the solution to (4.3.9) we make use again of the direct method.
We consider the following system
x∗11(t) + x
∗
12(t)− 250t = 0,
14x∗11(t)− 6x∗12(t)− 2h11(t) + 2h12(t)− 2α(t) = 0,
−12x∗21(t) + 4x∗22(t) + 4h21(t) = 0,
4x∗21(t)− 4x∗22(t) + 4h22(t)− 2β(t) = 0,
x1j(t) < x
∗
1j(t) < x1j(t), ∀j = 1, 2,
x2j(t) ≤ x∗2j(t) ≤ x2j(t), ∀j = 1, 2,
x∗21(t) + x
∗
22(t) ≤ p2(t), ∀i = 1, 2, a.e. in [0, 1] ,
2∑
i=1
x∗ij(t) ≤ qj(t), ∀j = 1, 2, a.e. in [0, 1]
and we get the following solution, a.e. in [0, 1],
x∗(t, h(t)) =

h11(t)− h12(t) + α(t) + 750t
10
−h11(t) + h12(t)− α(t) + 1750t
10
2h21(t) + 2h22(t)− β(t)
4
2h21(t) + 6h22(t)− 3β(t)
4
 .
For the inverse problem, now we have to solve the following variational inequality
(4.3.10).∫ T
0
(
2∑
i=1
2∑
j=1
(ω∗ij(t)− xij(t, h∗(t)))(hij(t)− h∗ij(t))−
2∑
i=1
2∑
j=1
h∗ij(t)(ωij(t)− ω∗ij(t))
)
dt ≥ 0
∀(h, ω) ∈ L2([0, T ] ,R4)× Ω. (4.3.11)
We remark that the condition x1j(t) < x
∗
1j(t) < x1j(t), ∀j = 1, 2, implies h∗1j(t) = 0, ∀j =
1, 2, as you can see from Definition (4.3.2). As a consequence, we can consider the following
system 
h∗1j(t) = 0, ∀j = 1, 2,
h∗11(t)− h∗12(t) + α(t)− 10ω∗11(t) = 0,
−h∗11(t) + h∗12(t)− α(t)− 10ω∗12(t) = 0,
2h∗21(t) + 2h
∗
22(t)− β(t)− 4ω∗21(t) = 0,
2h∗21(t) + 6h
∗
22(t)− 3β(t)− 4ω∗22(t) = 0,
and we get the following solution, a.e. in [0, 1],
h∗(t) =
 0 0
3ω∗21(t)− ω∗22(t) −ω∗21(t) + ω∗22(t) +
1
2
β(t)

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and, moreover, ω∗11(t) =
α(t) + 750t
10
and ω∗12(t) =
−α(t) + 1750t
10
.
13) In order to obtain the solution to (4.3.11), we consider, in first analysis, the case
ω∗(t) =
 α(t) + 750t10 −α(t) + 1750t10
100t 200t
 .
As a consequence of the direct method, it must be
h∗21(t) > 0, h
∗
22(t) > 0.
This is true if and only if β(t) > −200t. In this case the optimal regulatory tax is
h∗(t) =
 0 0
100t
1
2
β(t) + 100t
 ,
from which we get that the optimal commodity distribution is
x∗(t) =
 α(t) + 750t10 −α(t) + 1750t10
100t 200t
 ,
which belongs to K˜ for −250t ≤ α(t) ≤ 250t.
Here, the production and demand excesses are, respectively:
ǫ(t) =
(
0
200t
)
, δ(t) =

2250t− α(t)
10
1250t+ α(t)
10
 .
14) Let us study, now, the case
ω∗(t) =
 α(t) + 750t10 −α(t) + 1750t10
100t 2t
 .
As a consequence of the direct method, it must be
h∗21(t) > 0, h
∗
22(t) < 0.
This is true if and only if β(t) < 196t. In this case the optimal regulatory tax is
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h∗(t) =
 0 0
298t
1
2
β(t)− 98t
 ,
from which we get that the optimal commodity distribution is
x∗(t) =
 α(t) + 750t10 −α(t) + 1750t10
100t 2t
 ,
which belongs to K˜ for −250t ≤ α(t) ≤ 250t.
Here, the production and demand excesses are, respectively:
ǫ(t) =
(
0
398t
)
, δ(t) =

2250t− α(t)
10
3230t+ α(t)
10
 .
15) Let us study, now, the case
ω∗(t) =
 α(t) + 750t10 −α(t) + 1750t10
0 200t
 .
As a consequence of the direct method, it must be
h∗21(t) < 0, h
∗
22(t) > 0.
This is true if and only if β(t) > −400t. In this case the optimal regulatory tax is
h∗(t) =
 0 0−200t 1
2
β(t) + 200t
 ,
from which we get that the optimal commodity distribution is
x∗(t) =
 α(t) + 750t10 −α(t) + 1750t10
0 200t
 ,
which belongs to K˜ for −250t ≤ α(t) ≤ 250t.
Here, the production and demand excesses are, respectively:
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ǫ(t) =
(
0
300t
)
, δ(t) =

3250t− α(t)
10
1250t+ α(t)
10
 .
16) Let us study, now, the case
ω∗(t) =
 α(t) + 750t10 −α(t) + 1750t10
0 2t
 .
As a consequence of the direct method, it must be
h∗21(t) < 0, h
∗
22(t) < 0.
This is true if and only if β(t) < −4t. In this case the optimal regulatory tax is
h∗(t) =
 0 0−2t 1
2
β(t) + 2t
 ,
from which we get that the optimal commodity distribution is
x∗(t) =
 α(t) + 750t10 −α(t) + 1750t10
0 2t
 ,
which belongs to K˜ for −250t ≤ α(t) ≤ 250t.
Here, the production and demand excesses are, respectively:
ǫ(t) =
(
0
498t
)
, δ(t) =

3250t− α(t)
10
3230t+ α(t)
10
 .
4.4 An existence result
We, now, state the following existence result.
Theorem 4.4.1. Let us set
F : W −→ L2([0, T ] ,R2mn),
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W = L2([0, T ] ,Rm)× Ω,
and suppose that F is K-pseudomonotone and lower hemicontinuous along line seg-
ments. Let us further suppose that there exists z0 ∈ K and R > ‖z0‖ such that
≪ Fz, z − z0 ≫> 0, ∀z ∈W ∩
{
z ∈ L2([0, T ] ,R2mn) : ‖z‖ = R} . (4.4.1)
Then the variational inequality
≪ Fz∗, z − z∗ ≫≥ 0, ∀z ∈W (4.4.2)
admits a solution.
Proof. Let us note thatK is clearly a nonempty closed and convex subset of L2([0, T ] ,R2mn).
Then, the claim is achieved applying Theorem 3.6 in [71].
In particular, the monotonicity assumption on the operator F is equivalent to the
monotonicity of function −x, infact
≪ Fz1 − Fz2, z1 − z2 ≫
=
∫ T
0
2m∑
l=1
n∑
j=1
(Flj(t, z1(t))− Flj(t, z2(t)))
(
z1lj(t)− z2lj(t)
)
dt
=
∫ T
0
(
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
(
ω1ij(t)− xij(t, h1(t))− ω2ij(t) + xij(t, h2(t))
)
(h1ij(t)− h2ij(t))
)
dt
+
∫ T
0
(
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
(−h1ij(t) + h2ij(t)) (ω1ij(t)− ω2ij(t))
)
dt
=
∫ T
0
(
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
(−xij(t, h1(t)) + xij(t, h2(t))) (h1ij(t)− h2ij(t))
)
dt
= ≪ −x(h1) + x(h2), h1 − h2 ≫ .
Remark 4.4.1. As proved in [22], relationship (4.4.1) is ensured under condition that
lim
‖z‖ → +∞
z ∈W
≪ Fz, z ≫
‖z‖ = +∞,
or, equivalently, as you can see from the previous equality,
lim
‖z‖ → +∞
z ∈W
≪ −x(h), h≫
‖z‖ = +∞.
The advantage of using Theorem 4.4.1 lies in the fact that the lower hemicontinuity
is ensured by assumptions (4.2.3). Moreover, operator F is monotone.
The regularity of solutions may be ensured under regularity assumptions on data (see
[4, 8]).
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102
Chapter 5
Computational procedures
5.1 A brief introduction
The development of efficient computational procedures for the numerical computation of
dynamic equilibria is a very important question in optimization theory. The algorithms
proposed in this chapter are based on time-discretization methods. It is the continuity
of solutions to dynamic equilibrium problem that allows us to consider a partition of the
time interval and hence reduce the infinite-dimensional problem to some finite-dimensional
problems that can be solved by means of known methods. In particular we make use to
the generalized projection method, the generalized projection-contraction method and
the generalized extragradient method to solve finite-dimensional variational inequalities
associated to the points of the discretization of the time interval. For a more extended and
detailed collection of numerical procedures to solve variational inequalities, you can refer
to [103]. Finally, the equilibrium curve of models is determined through the interpolation
of numerical solutions with linear splines. Moreover, we give some numerical examples
that have been implemented under MatLab. In the end, we make a convergence study in
L1-sense.
5.2 The generalized projection method
Let us introduce the generalized projection method to solve dynamic oligopolistic mar-
ket equilibrium problems in presence of excesses expressed by evolutionary variational
inequalities.
We suppose that the assumptions which ensure the continuity of dynamic oligopolistic
market equilibrium solution hold. As a consequence, (2.2.8), (2.3.5), and (2.3.5) hold for
each t ∈ [0, T ], namely the following point-to-point evolutionary variational inequality
holds:
〈−∇Dv(t, x∗(t)), x(t)− x∗(t)〉 ≥ 0, ∀x(t) ∈ K(t), ∀t ∈ [0, T ] (5.2.1)
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where
K(t) =
{
x(t) ∈ Rmn : xij(t) ≤ xij(t) ≤ xij(t), ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, ∀j = 1, . . . , n
}
,(5.2.2)
K(t) =
{
x(t) ∈ Rmn : xij(t) ≥ 0, ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, ∀j = 1, . . . , n, (5.2.3)
n∑
j=1
xij(t) ≤ pi(t), ∀i = 1, . . . ,m
}
(5.2.4)
K(t) =
{
x(t) ∈ Rmn : xij(t) ≤ xij(t) ≤ xij(t), ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, ∀j = 1, . . . , n,(5.2.5)
n∑
j=1
xij(t) ≤ pi(t), ∀i = 1, . . . ,m, (5.2.6)
m∑
i=1
xij(t) ≤ qj(t), ∀j = 1, . . . , n
}
, (5.2.7)
respectively, which expresses dynamic equilibrium problems in the common formulation.
Now, we present a computational method to compute the dynamic equilibrium solution
to (5.2.1).
In the following, applying a discretization procedure, we use the projection method intro-
duced by Marcotte and Wu in [69] in order to compute the solution to (5.2.1).
We consider now a partition of [0, T ], such that:
0 = t0 < t1 < . . . < tr < . . . < tN = T,
and, for each value tr, for r = 0, 1, . . . , N , we apply the projection method to solve the
finite-dimensional variational inequality
〈−∇Dv(tr, x∗(tr)), x(tr)− x∗(tr)〉 ≥ 0, ∀x(tr) ∈ K(tr). (5.2.8)
We can compute now the solution to the finite-dimensional variational inequality
(5.2.8) using the following procedure. The algorithm, as it is well known, starting from
any x∗0(tr) ∈ K(tr) fixed, iteratively updates x∗(tr) according to the formula
x∗k+1(tr) = PK(tr)(x
∗k(tr)− α(−∇Dv(x∗k(tr)))),
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for k ∈ N, where PK(tr)(·) denotes the orthogonal projection map onto K(tr) and α is
a judiciously chosen positive steplength. Here, PK(tr)(x
∗k(tr) − α(−∇Dv(x∗k(tr)))), for
k ∈ N, is the solution of the following quadratic programming problem
min
x∗(tr)∈K(tr)
1
2
(x∗(tr))
Tx∗(tr)− (x∗k(tr)− α(−∇Dv(x∗k(tr))))Tx∗(tr),
for k ∈ N. The projection method is based on the observation that x∗(tr) ∈ K(tr) is a
solution of (5.2.8) if and only if
x∗(tr) = PK(tr)(x
∗(tr)− α(−∇Dv(x∗(tr)))).
This method requires restrictive assumptions on −∇Dv for the convergence. The
convergence analysis for the projection methods is based on the contractive properties
of the operator x∗(tr) → x∗(tr) − α(−∇Dv(u(tr))): if (−∇Dv(tr)) is strongly monotone
(with constant ν) and Lipschitz continuous on K(tr) (with Lipschitz constant L), and if
α ∈ (0, 2ν/L2), the projection method determines a sequence {x∗k(tr)}k∈N convergent to
a solution of (5.2.8), for every r = 0, 1, . . . , N (see [88] and [97]).
Marcotte and Wu in [69] have shown that the projection algorithm converges for
cocoercive variational inequalities. We recall that a mapping F is cocoercive on K(tr) if
there exists a positive constant ν˜ such that, ∀x(tr), y(tr) ∈ K(tr) one has
〈F (x(tr))− F (y(tr)), x(tr)− y(tr)〉 ≥ ν˜‖F (x(tr))− F (y(tr))‖2q.
Any strongly monotone (with constant ν) and Lipschitz continuous mapping (with Lips-
chitz constant L) is cocoercive with the constant ν˜ = ν
L2
. If K(tr) 6= ∅ and α ∈ (0, 2ν˜).
The cocoercivity of the operator F is sufficient to assure the convergence of the projection
algorithm.
A drawback is the choice of α when L is unknown. Indeed, if α is too small, the
convergence is slow; when α is too large, there might be no convergence at all.
After iterative procedure, we can construct a function by performing a linear interpo-
lation.
5.2.1 A numerical example
Let us consider four firms and four demand markets, as in Figure 5.1. Let x, x ∈
L2([0, 1],R16+ ) be the capacity constraints such that, a.e. in [0, 1],
x(t) =

1
10
t
1
2
t
1
4
t t
1
2
t 0
1
6
t 0
1
2
t 0 0
1
6
t
0 2t 2t
1
10
t

,
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Figure 5.1: Network structure of the numerical dynamic spatial oligopoly problem.
x(t) =

2t 8t 7t 20t
11t 10t 15t 15t
10t 12t 10t 9t
15t 20t 20t 2t
 .
Let p ∈ L2([0, 1],R4+) be the production function such that, a.e. in [0, 1],
p(t) =

40t
35t
35t
60t
 ,
and let q ∈ L2([0, 1],R4+) be the demand function such that, a.e. in [0, 1],
q(t) =

35t
50t
50t
45t
 .
As a consequence, the feasible set is
K =
{
x ∈ L2([0, 1] ,R16+ ) :
xij(t) ≤ xij(t) ≤ xij(t), ∀i = 1, . . . , 4, ∀j = 1, . . . , 4, a.e. in [0, 1] ,
4∑
j=1
xij(t) ≤ pi(t), ∀i = 1, . . . , 4, a.e. in [0, 1] ,
4∑
i=1
xij(t) ≤ qj(t), ∀j = 1, . . . , 4, a.e. in [0, 1]
}
.
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Let us consider the profit function v ∈ L2([0, 1]× L2([0, 1],R16+ ),R4) defined by
v1(t, x(t)) = −(t+ 3)x211(t)−
5
2
x212(t)−
3t+ 2
2
x213(t)−
5
2
x214(t)− 4(t+ 2)x11(t)x44(t)
+tx11(t) + 2tx12(t) + (2t+ 3)x13(t) + 4tx14(t),
v2(t, x(t)) = −1
2
x221(t)− (3t+ 1)x222(t)−
5t+ 5
2
x223(t)− x224(t)− 2(t+ 1)x22(t)x33(t)
6tx21(t) + 9tx22(t) + (t+ 4)x23(t) + tx24(t),
v3(t, x(t)) = −x231(t)− x232(t)−
t+ 4
2
x233(t)−
t+ 1
2
x234(t)− 2tx33(t)x12(t)
+(t+ 1)x31(t) + tx32(t) + 4tx33(t) + tx34(t),
v4(t, x(t)) = −x241(t)−
1
2
x242(t)− 3x243(t)− (t+ 6)x244(t)− 4(t+ 2)x44(t)x23(t)
+2tx41(t) + (t+ 3)x42(t) + tx43(t) + 3tx44(t).
Let the operator ∇Dv ∈ L2([0, 1] × L2([0, 1],R16+ ),R4) be the operator of the partial
derivatives, namely
∇Dv(t, x(t)) =
(
∂vi(t, x(t))
∂xij(t)
)
i = 1, . . . ,m
j = 1, . . . , n
It is possible to prove that the operator −∇Dv is strongly monotone and Lipschitz con-
tinuous, infact,
〈−∇Dv(x) +∇Dv(y), x− y〉 ≥ ‖x− y‖216
and
‖ − ∇Dv(x) +∇Dv(y)‖216 ≤ 680‖x− y‖216.
The dynamic oligopolistic market equilibrium distribution in presence of excesses is
the solution to the evolutionary variational inequality:
∫ 1
0
4∑
i=1
4∑
j=1
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
(xij(t)− x∗ij(t))dt ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ K.
Now, we solve the numerical problem using the generalized projection method. This
method is convergent for the properties of −∇Dv. Then, we can compute an approximate
curve of equilibria, by selecting tr ∈
{
k
20
: k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 20}} .With the help of a MatLab
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Figure 5.2: Curves of equilibria
computation and choosing the initial point
x∗0(tr) =

2
3
tr tr
1
2
tr 2tr
3
4
tr
1
10
tr
3
4
tr
1
8
tr
tr
1
3
tr
2
5
tr
1
2
tr
tr 3tr 3tr
1
2
tr

in order to start the iterative method, we obtain the equilibrium solutions for every time
instant. Setting R(x∗k(tr)) = x
∗k(tr) − x∗k−1(tr) the difference between two approxima-
tions of the equilibrium solution in the time instant tr and making use of the stopping
criterion
∥∥R(x∗k(tr))∥∥4×4 ≤ 10−6, for r = 0, 1, . . . , 20, we obtain the approximate curve of
equilibria shown in Figure 5.2.
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5.3 The generalized projection-contraction method
Let us introduce the generalized projection-contraction method to solve dynamic oligopolis-
tic market equilibrium problems in presence of excesses expressed by evolutionary varia-
tional inequalities.
We suppose that the assumptions which ensure the continuity of dynamic oligopolistic
market equilibrium solution hold. As a consequence, (5.2.1) holds and the time-dependent
constraint sets K(t) are (5.2.2), (5.2.3) and (5.2.5), respectively, which express dynamic
equilibrium problems in the common formulation.
Let us consider a partition of [0, T ], such that:
0 = t0 < t1 < . . . < tr < . . . < tN = T. For each point tr, r = 0, 1, . . . , N , of the
partition, we consider the finite-dimensional variational inequality
〈−∇Dv(tr, x∗(tr)), x(tr)− x∗(tr)〉 ≥ 0, ∀x(tr) ∈ K(tr).
Now, we can compute the solution to (5.2.1) by using a class of projection-contraction
methods proposed by Solodov and Tseng in [99] and improved by Tinti in [103].
The idea of these algorithms is to choose a symmetric positive definite matrix M ∈
R
q×q and a starting point x∗0(tr) ∈ K(tr), and to iteratively update x∗k(tr), as follows:
x∗k(tr) = PK(tr)(x
∗k(tr) + α∇Dv(tr, x∗k(tr))),
x∗k+1(tr) = x
∗k(tr)− γM−1(Tα(tr, x∗k(tr))− Tα(tr, x∗k(tr)),
where γ ∈ R+ and Tα = (I + α∇Dv), in which I is the identity matrix, α ∈ (0,+∞) is
chosen dynamically (according to an Armijo type rule), so that Tα is strongly monotone.
These methods converge under condition that a solution exists and the operator is mono-
tone. They have an additional parameter, the scaling matrix M , that must be chosen as
a symmetric positive matrix to accelerate the convergence.
After the iterative procedure, we construct the dynamic equilibrium solution by means
of a linear interpolation.
5.3.1 A numerical example
Let us consider four firms and four demand markets, as in Figure 5.3. Let x, x ∈
L2([0, 1],R16+ ) be the capacity constraints such that, a.e. in [0, 1],
x(t) =

0 t
1
2
t
1
100
t
1
2
t t 0 0
1
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4
t 0
1
4
t
0 t 2t 0

,
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Figure 5.3: Network structure of the numerical dynamic spatial oligopoly problem.
x(t) =

10t 9t 12t 12t
9t 20t 5t 5t
10t 15t 10t 11t
10t 15t 11t 10t
 .
Let p ∈ L2([0, 1],R4+) be the production function such that, a.e. in [0, 1],
p(t) =

40t
40t
50t
50t
 ,
and let q ∈ L2([0, 1],R4+) be the demand function such that, a.e. in [0, 1],
q(t) =

45t
45t
55t
55t
 .
As a consequence, the feasible set is
K =
{
x ∈ L2([0, 1] ,R16+ ) :
xij(t) ≤ xij(t) ≤ xij(t), ∀i = 1, . . . , 4, ∀j = 1, . . . , 4, a.e. in [0, 1] ,
4∑
j=1
xij(t) ≤ pi(t), ∀i = 1, . . . , 4, a.e. in [0, 1] ,
4∑
i=1
xij(t) ≤ qj(t), ∀j = 1, . . . , 4, a.e. in [0, 1]
}
.
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Let us consider the profit function v ∈ L2([0, 1]× L2([0, 1],R16+ ),R4) defined by
v1(t, x(t)) = −(t+ 10)x211(t)−
1
2
x212(t)−
2t+ 9
2
x213(t)−
3
2
x214(t)− 2tx11(t)x44(t)
+tx11(t) + 2tx12(t) + (2t+ 9)x13(t) + 5tx14(t),
v2(t, x(t)) = −5
2
x221(t)− (t+ 4)x222(t)−
t+ 7
2
x223(t)− 2x224(t)− 2(t+ 1)x22(t)x33(t)
6tx21(t) + 11tx22(t) + (t+ 1)x23(t) + 9tx24(t),
v3(t, x(t)) = −2x231(t)− 3x232(t)−
2t+ 9
2
x233(t)−
t+ 3
2
x234(t)− 4tx33(t)x22(t)
+(t+ 2)x31(t) + tx32(t) + 10tx33(t) + 2tx34(t),
v4(t, x(t)) = −3x241(t)− 2x242(t)−
7
2
x243(t)−
2t+ 9
2
x244(t)− 6(t+ 1)x44(t)x11(t)
+tx41(t) + (2t+ 3)x42(t) + 2tx43(t) + 9tx44(t).
Let the operator ∇Dv ∈ L2([0, 1] × L2([0, 1],R16+ ),R4) be the operator of the partial
derivatives, namely
∇Dv(t, x(t)) =
(
∂vi(t, x(t))
∂xij(t)
)
i = 1, . . . ,m
j = 1, . . . , n
It is possible to prove that the operator −∇Dv is strongly monotone and Lipschitz con-
tinuous, infact,
〈−∇Dv(x) +∇Dv(y), x− y〉 ≥ ‖x− y‖216
and
‖ − ∇Dv(x) +∇Dv(y)‖216 ≤ 1256‖x− y‖216.
The dynamic oligopolistic market equilibrium distribution in presence of excesses is
the solution to the evolutionary variational inequality:
∫ 1
0
4∑
i=1
4∑
j=1
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
(xij(t)− x∗ij(t))dt ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ K.
Now, we solve the numerical problem using the generalized projection-contraction
method. This method is convergent for the properties of −∇Dv. Then, we can compute
an approximate curve of equilibria, by selecting tr ∈
{
k
20
: k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 20}} . With the
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Figure 5.4: Curves of equilibria
help of a MatLab computation and choosing the initial point
x∗0(tr) =

2
3
tr 2tr
3
4
tr 2tr
3
4
tr
11
10
tr
3
4
tr
1
6
tr
tr
2
3
tr
2
3
tr
1
2
tr
2tr 2tr 3tr
1
3
tr

in order to start the iterative method, we obtain the equilibrium solutions for every time
instant. Setting R(x∗k(tr)) = x
∗k(tr) − x∗k−1(tr) the difference between two approxima-
tions of the equilibrium solution in the time instant tr and making use of the stopping
criterion
∥∥R(x∗k(tr))∥∥4×4 ≤ 10−6, for r = 0, 1, . . . , 20, we obtain the approximate curve of
equilibria shown in Figure 5.4.
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5.4 The generalized extragradient method
Let us introduce the generalized extragradient method to solve dynamic oligopolistic
market equilibrium problems in presence of excess expressed by evolutionary variational
inequalities.
We suppose that the assumptions which ensure the continuity of dynamic oligopolistic
market equilibrium solution hold. As a consequence, (5.2.1) holds and the time-dependent
constraint sets K(t) are (5.2.2), (5.2.3) and (5.2.5), respectively, which express dynamic
equilibrium problems in the common formulation.
In the following, applying a discretization procedure and making use of the extragradient
method in Marcotte’s version, we compute the solutions of the evolutionary variational
inequality which expresses the dynamic oligopolistic market equilibrium conditions.
Let us consider a partition of [0, T ], such that:
0 = t0 < t1 < . . . < tr < . . . < tN = T. For each point tr, r = 0, 1, . . . , N , of the
partition, we consider the finite-dimensional variational inequality
〈−∇Dv(tr, x∗(tr)), x(tr)− x∗(tr)〉 ≥ 0, ∀x(tr) ∈ K(tr). (5.4.1)
We compute now the solution to the finite-dimensional variational inequality (5.4.1)
making use of a modified version of the extragradient method introduced by Marcotte in
[68].
The algorithm starting from any x∗0(tr) ∈ K(tr) and a fixed number α0 > 0, iteratively
updates x∗k+1(tr) from x
∗k(tr) according to the following projection formulas
x∗k+1(tr) = PK(tr)(x
∗k(tr)− αk(−∇D(x˜∗k(tr)))), (5.4.2)
x˜∗k(tr) = PK(tr)(x
∗k(tr)− αk(−∇D(x∗k(tr)))) (5.4.3)
for k ∈ N, where αk is chosen as following
αk = min
{
αk−1
2
,
‖x∗k(tr)− x˜∗k(tr)‖mn√
2‖(−∇D(x∗k(tr)))− (−∇D(x˜∗k(tr)))‖mn
}
. (5.4.4)
If −∇Dv is a monotone and Lipschitz continuous mapping, then, the convergence of the
scheme is proved. This method was improved by Tinti in [103].
After the iterative procedure, we get the dynamic equilibrium solution through a linear
interpolation of the computed static equilibrium solutions.
5.4.1 A numerical example
Let us consider a numerical example of the dynamical oligopolistic market equilibrium
problem in presence solved using the direct method and the generalized extragradient
method consisting of three firms and four demand markets, as in Figure 5.5.
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Figure 5.5: Network structure of the numerical dynamic spatial oligopoly problem.
Let p ∈ C([0, 1],R3) be the production function such that, in [0, 1],
p(t) =
(
4t 3t 4t
)T
,
As a consequence, the feasible set is
K =
{
x ∈ L2([0, 1],R3×4) : xij(t) ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, 3, j = 1, 2, 3, 4, a.e. in [0, 1],
4∑
j=1
xij(t) ≤ pi(t), i = 1, 2, 3, a.e. in [0, 1]
}
.
Let v ∈ C1(L2([0, 1],R3×4),R3) be the profit function defined by
v1(t, x(t)) = −4x
2
11
(t)− 4x2
12
(t)− 6x2
13
(t)− 6x2
14
(t)− 4x11(t)x12(t)− 6x13(t)x14(t)
+3tx11(t) + 4tx12(t) + tx13(t) + tx14(t),
v2(t, x(t)) = −5x
2
21
(t)− 2x2
22
(t)− 2x2
23
(t)− 2x2
24
(t)− 2x21(t)x22(t)− 2x23(t)x24(t)
+2tx21(t) + 2tx22(t) + 3tx23(t) + 2tx24(t),
v3(t, x(t)) = −10x
2
31
(t)− 4x2
32
(t)− 4x2
33
(t)− 5x2
34
(t)− 2x11(t)x32(t)− 2x33(t)x34(t)
−2x12(t)x31(t) + tx31(t) + 2tx32(t) + 10tx33(t) + 3tx34(t).
Then, the operator ∇Dv ∈ C(L2([0, 1],R3×4),R3×4) is given by
∇Dv =

 −8x11 − 4x12 + 3t −8x12 − 4x11 + 4t −12x13 − 6x14 + t −12x14 − 6x13 + t−10x21 − 2x22 + 2t −4x22 − 2x21 + 2t −4x23 − 2x24 + 3t −4x24 − 2x23 + 2t
−20x31 − 2x12 + t −8x32 − 2x11 + 2t −8x33 − 2x34 + 10t −10x34 − 2x33 + 3t

 .
Moreover, it is possible to verify that −∇Dv is a strongly monotone operator (for the
proof, you can see similar calculations in Chapter 2).
The dynamic oligopolistic market equilibrium distribution in presence of excesses is
the solution to the evolutionary variational inequality:∫ 1
0
3∑
i=1
4∑
j=1
−∂vi(t, x
∗(t))
∂xij
(xij(t)− x∗ij(t))dt ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ K. (5.4.5)
Taking into account the direct method, we consider the following system
8x∗11(t) + 4x
∗
12(t)− 3t = 0, 4x∗11(t) + 8x∗12(t)− 4t = 0,
12x∗13(t) + 6x
∗
14(t)− t = 0, 6x∗13(t) + 12x∗14(t)− t = 0,
10x∗21(t) + 2x
∗
22(t)− 2t = 0, 2x∗21(t) + 4x∗22(t)− 2t = 0,
4x∗23(t) + 2x
∗
24(t)− 3t = 0, 2x∗23(t) + 4x∗24(t)− 2t = 0,
20x∗31(t) + 2x
∗
12(t)− t = 0, 8x∗32(t) + 2x∗11(t)− 2t = 0,
8x∗33(t) + 2x
∗
34(t)− 10t = 0, 2x∗33(t) + 10x∗34(t)− 3t = 0
(5.4.6)
114
CHAPTER 5. COMPUTATIONAL PROCEDURES
We get the following solution, in [0, 1],
x∗(t) =

1
6
t
5
12
t
1
18
t
1
18
t
1
9
t
4
9
t
2
3
t
1
6
t
1
120
t
5
24
t
47
38
t
1
19
t
 ,
that belongs to the constraint set K, then it is the equilibrium solution. Moreover, the
production excesses, in [0, 1], are given by
ǫ(t) =
(
119
36
t
29
18
t
2843
1140
t
)T
.
Now, we solve the numerical problem using the generalized Marcotte’s version of the
extragradient method. This method is convergent for the properties of −∇Dv. Then, we
can compute an approximate curve of equilibria, by selecting tr ∈
{
k
20
: k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 20}} .
With the help of a MatLab computation and choosing the initial point
x∗0(tr) =

2
3
tr
1
3
tr
1
2
tr tr
1
2
tr
1
10
tr
1
2
tr
1
8
tr
tr
1
3
tr
2
5
tr
1
8
tr

in order to start the iterative method, we obtain the equilibrium solutions for every time
instant. Setting R(x∗k(tr)) = x
∗k(tr) − x∗k−1(tr) the difference between two approxima-
tions of the equilibrium solution in the time instant tr and making use of the stopping
criterion
∥∥R(x∗k(tr))∥∥3×4 ≤ 10−6, for r = 0, 1, . . . , 20, we obtain the approximate curve of
equilibria shown in Figure 5.6.
5.5 The convergence study
In this section, we investigate the convergence of algorithms presented in the previous
section. We prove that under suitable assumptions, the sequence, generated by the algo-
rithm, converges in L1-sense to the dynamic oligopolistic market equilibrium solution in
presence of excesses.
Let us assume that all hypotheses which ensure the continuity of solution to the point-
to-point evolutionary variational inequality (5.2.1) and the convergence of the method to
compute solutions to finite-dimensional variational inequalities hold.
Let us introduce a sequence {πs}s∈N of (not necessarily equidivided) partitions of the
time interval [0, T ] such that πs = (t
0
s, t
1
s, . . . , t
Ns
s ), where 0 = t
0
s < t
1
s < . . . < t
Ns
s = T .
We consider a sequence of equidivided partitions, in the sense that ks = max{|trs − tr−1s | :
r = 1, 2, . . . , Ns}, approaches zero for s→ +∞.
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Figure 5.6: Curves of equilibria
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By the interpolation theory, we know that if we construct the approximate solution to
(5.2.1) by means of Hermite’s polynomial, using known values of the solution x∗(t), the
sequence converges uniformly to the exact solution. We do not use Hermite’s polynomial,
but we consider an approximation by means of piecewise constant functions and we can
prove that the convergence is in L1-sense.
Let us consider the approximate solutions to (5.2.1) given by the following formula:
x∗s(t) =
Ns∑
r=1
x∗(trs)χ[tr−1s ,trs[(t), (5.5.1)
where x∗(trs) is the solution to the finite-dimensional variational inequality which is ob-
tained from (5.2.1) for t = trs, which can be computed by means of a numerical method.
Let us estimate the following integral∫ T
0
∥∥∥∥x∗(t)− Ns∑
r=1
x∗(trs)χ[tr−1s ,trs[(t)
∥∥∥∥
mn
dt
=
∫ T
0
∥∥∥∥ Ns∑
r=1
x∗(t)χ[tr−1s ,trs[(t)−
Ns∑
r=1
x∗(trs)χ[tr−1s ,trs[(t)
∥∥∥∥
mn
dt
≤
Ns∑
r=1
∫ tsr
tsr−1
‖x∗(t)− x∗(trs)‖mndt .
Being x∗ uniformly continuous, it results that for every ε > 0 there exists δ > 0 such that
if t ∈ [tr−1s , trs] satisfies the condition |t− trs| < δ it results
‖x∗(t)− x∗(trs)‖mn <
ε
T
, for r = 1, 2, . . . , Ns, ∀s ∈ N.
Choosing s large enough in such way that ks < δ, we reach∫ T
0
∥∥∥∥x∗(t)− Ns∑
r=1
x∗(trs)χ[t2r−1,tsr[(t)
∥∥∥∥
mn
dt <
Ns∑
r=1
ε
T
(tsr − tsr−1) = ε. (5.5.2)
Taking into account (5.5.2), we conclude that the sequence (5.5.1) converges in L1-
sense to the dynamic oligopolistic market equilibrium solution.
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Conclusions
The aim of this thesis is to analyze the multiple aspects of the dynamic oligopolistic mar-
ket equilibrium problem, by improving, the primordial models introduced by Cournot and
Nash in [26, 83, 84], the static model studied by Nagurney in [28, 75, 78, 80] and the first
dynamic formulation in [9] where only capacity constraints were considered. In particular,
in this thesis we investigate initially the presence of only production excesses. Later we
improved this problem, by considering a more complete model in which we consider not
only capacity constraints, bu also production and demand excesses and we underline the
presence of the constraints through the Lagrangean duality theory.
The most important result of this theory is the equivalence of the equilibrium definition
according to Cournot-Nash principle with a suitable evolutionary variational inequality.
Moreover, a definition of equilibrium in which the Lagrange variables of the Duality theory
is present. The equivalence between the two definitions is then proved and it is justified
by the surprising fact that they both are equivalent to the same evolutionary variational
inequality. The variational approach of the problem is fundamental in order to establish,
under suitable assumptions, some existence and regularity results for equilibrium solu-
tions. The regularity results are very important for the computation of solution because
they allow us to reduce, by means of a discretization procedure, the infinite-dimensional
problem to some finite-dimensional problems so that it is possible to make use of some
methods to solve static equilibrium problems. Then, by means of an interpolation proce-
dure, we are able to find the dynamic equilibrium solutions. Moreover, the convergence
of the scheme in L1 ([0, T ] ,Rmn) has been proved.
Another aspect we have deeply faced in this thesis, is to consider the inverse problem.
Here we forsake the firms’ point of view whose main purpose is to maximize their own
profit, and we focus our attention to the policy-maker’s point of view. The control poli-
cies’ aim is to regulate the exportation through the adjustment of taxes and subsides on
the firms. This is a policy-maker optimization problem and here we define an optimal
regulatory tax. It is worth to emphasize that this problem can be studied with the help
of the inverse variational inequalities (see also [86]). Another surprising fact is the strict
connection between the classical variational inequalities and inverse variational inequali-
ties that enables to exploit all the powerful tools of evolutionary variational inequalities.
In particular, for this connection, we can treat completely the problem and analyze the
questions about the existence, the regularity and the computation of solution.
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It still remains to investigate the case in which the constraint set is not fixed, but it
depends on the equilibrium solution, namely the production and the demand functions
depend on the equilibrium solution. Such an approach can be studied making use of evo-
lutionary quasi-variational inequalities that exploit the cover part of the vast literature of
multifunctional analysis (see [1, 3, 4, 24, 40–42, 91, 95, 102]).
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